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"Environmental Dispute Resolution: Mediation, an effective 
alternative to litigation?" 
The 1980's have seen an increase in the diversity and complexity of 
environmental disputes resultant of the competing demands of economic 
development and environmental protection. Nowhere is this more 
evident than in Tasmania. 
Environmental disputes in Tasmania are handled by a number of judicial 
and administrative systems, each with its own "package" of legislation, 
infrastructure, processes and procedures. Dissatiqaction with the 
inadequacies and adversarial nature of these systems has been expressed 
by members of the judiciary, government, industry and public interest 
groups. 
This thesis examines the potential of environmental mediation as a 
proven, non-adversarial process for the resolution of site specific and 
public policy disputes both within current systems and as a strategy in its 
own right. 
It is concluded that environmental mediation is of value in environmental 
decision making and that it can be effectively incorporated in existing 
Tasmanian dispute resolution systems. A case is also put for the use of 
mediation as a viable alternative to present methods of environmental 
dispute resolution. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION: THE NEED FOR A REVIEW OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
DISPUTE RESOLUTION (EDR) IN TASMANIA 
1.1 Background of study 
In the past 10 years or so, environmental disputes have become a feature 
of life in Tasmania. In a resource rich state with a depressed economy, 
the highest rate of unemployment in Australia, and a unique environment 
including spectacular wilderness areas of world heritage status, competing 
pressures for economic development and conservation have inevitably 
resulted in conflict. Effective natural resource management is essential 
for Tasmania's future, as all involved parties appreciate. The conflict 
arises over the nature and direction of management - resource exploitation 
or resource preservation. 
There is no easy way out of this dilemma. Environmental disputes are 
primarily about politics, and it is a potentially explosive mix of power, 
values and emotions that is manifest in an environmental dispute. 
Tasmania is a veritable pressure-cooker of environmental conflict, fuelled 
by competing interests, a vigilant media, parochialism, and the isolation 
of an island state. 
To date, Tasmania has survived the destructive fallout of some of the 
most divisive environmental disputes in Australian history, all the more 
devastating in social effect because of the dosely-knit nature of Tasmanian 
society. There is no escape from either the inevitability of environmental 
issues or from contact with disputants. Not only are these disputes socially 
divisive but they are costly, time consuming and divert resources that 
could be more productively used for the development of alternative 
economic, environmental, and social activities. 
There is therefore a critical need to develop more constructive, long 
term methods of environmental dispute resolution than exist at present. 
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Tasmania's environmental dispute resolution (EDR) systems are 
modelled on, and so are comparable with, those in existence in other 
states and overseas. One of the difficulties is that the judicial and 
administrative systems which constitute the primary, formal methods of 
EDR, were developed at a time when there was less competition for 
abundant resources, there was less awareness of the value of the 
environment (in both the social and economic sense), and there were 
fewer articulate, well-organized public interest groups . In addition, the 
magnitude and rate of technological change is escalating in an 
unprecedented manner. 
Environmental decision making systems have proven unable to keep 
pace with the rate and nature of these changes. To remain relevant, 
effective and credible, new approaches must now be considered . This 
has already happened overseas. 
Paradoxically, by being 10 years behind, Tasmania could in fact be 10 years 
ahead of the other Australian states if it so chose - a pacesetter in 
environmental dispute resolution. That is, Tasmania is in a position to 
learn from the mistakes of other decision-making regimes both interstate 
and overseas and so not adopt approaches that have little prospect of 
success. Its small size and the strength of its formal and informal networks 
should mean that its decision making structures and functions can be 
changed relatively quickly (though a major problem is inherent 
conservatism and the difficulty of attitudinal change). Thus, by noting 
successes and failures elsewhere, Tasmania is in a position to select the 
approach or combination of approaches that is the most appropriate and 
effective for its unique environment and its political, social, and economic 
culture; an approach that will minimize the potential for environmental 
conflict. Environmental mediation is one such possibility. 
Mediation is a form of non-adversarial or Alternative Dispute Resolution 
(ADR), ADR being the collective term for a number of dispute resolution 
processes which constitute alternatives to the traditional adversarial 
judicial approach. The core processes are accepted as arbitration, mediation, 
and independent-expert appraisal (Adler 1987a) . Other processes include 
regulation-negotiation, "Med-Arb" (Mediation-Arbitration) and 
conciliation. ADR techniques have been successful in the resolution of 
commercial, labour, neighbourhood, and environmental disputes in 
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Canada, USA, China, and Japan. They are as effective in the resolution of 
two party, single issue disputes as they are in the multi issue, multi party 
disputes that characterize environmental issues. 
Mediation has proven effective in both site specific and public policy 
disputes in the USA and Canada. Environmental mediation is a voluntary 
process in which disputing parties in a public or environmental dispute 
jointly explore and attempt to resolve their differences with the assistance 
of a neutral third party professional, a mediator. 
In mediation the focus is on the relationship between the parties and the 
achievement of a mutually satisfactory outcome . Although the process 
is voluntary, a binding outcome can be convened via a written agreement 
and/or legal contract if necessary. 
Proponents of environmental mediation argue that it is flexible; is able 
to address the substantive rather than merely the procedural issues in 
the dispute; and is less costly and less, time consuming than traditional, 
adversarial judicial and administrative 'processes. They also consider that 
a negotiated and agreed outcome is more likely to be adhered to by the 
parties to the dispute. 
Detractors of mediation counter that it is compromise in another guise 
and so is unlikely to be acceptable to disputants who are strongly committed 
to a particular position or set of values; that it does not address the 
critical issue of power imbalance between developers and public interest 
groups; and that mediated agreements may not be legally enforceable. 
Nevertheless, both proponents and detractors agree that environmental 
mediation has emerged strongly in the 1980s, that it has been significant 
in environmental dispute resolution, and that, as such, its use should be 
seriously considered and evaluated. 
1. 2 Aim of study 
The aim of this study is to demonstrate that non-adversarial dispute 
resolution strategies such as environmental mediation are an effective 
and efficient approach to the resolution of environmental disputes in 
Tasmania. 
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Environmental mediation is particularly appropriate in the resolution of 
site-specific and public policy disputes, which constitute the majority of 
environmental disputes in Tasmania. It can be incorporated into existing 
structures and systems or it can "stand alone" in its own right. 
Options will be examined and an integrated package of strategies will be 
recommended . 
1.3 	Objectives 
The specific objectives of this study are: 
(i) to examine the existing EDR systems in operation in several 
Tasmanian jurisdictions - sea fisheries, mining, environmental 
protection, town and country planning and forestry - using case 
studies to illustrate the systems in action; 
(ii) to review the effectiveness of environmental mediation, in EDR 
overseas and in Australia; 
(iii) to consider the potential of environmental mediation as a means 
of environmental dispute resolution within existing systems in 
Tasmania; and 
(iv) to consider options for the future of environmental mediation in 
Tasmania . 
1.4 Structure and methodology 
Within Australia, environmental dispute resolution has been primarily 
addressed from either a legal or from a planning/land-use perspective. 
There has been no integrated approach to environmental dispute 
resolution nor has there been a study of environmental mediation (to 
the best of the author's knowledge). To say that the field is embryonic is 
an understatement . 
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A multifaceted methodology has been selected as the most appropriate 
way to address the complex matter of environmental dispute resolution. 
It has included: 
(i) literature review; 
(ii) review of relevant legislation, regulations, policies, reports, and 
associated procedures; 
(iii) discussions with disputants; 
(iv) discussions with Heads of Departments and senior resource 
managers; 
(v) observations of public meetings. 
(vi) observations of cases being heard by the Environment Protection 
Appeals Board, Planning Appeal Board, Court of Petty Sessions, 
and the Mining Warden's Court; and 
In order to demonstrate the current management of environmental 
disputes in Tasmania, case studies were identified for analysis in each of 
five resource management jurisdictions. These were fisheries (marine 
farms), mining, environment protection, land-use planning and forestry. 
Although most of the agencies were generally supportive of the author's 
research, direct access to information (other than that indicated above) 
was limited, there being no Freedom of Information legislation in 
Tasmania. 
Another limitation was the length of time taken to process an objection 
and appeal in both judicial and administrative systems so that many 
cases were not decided within the 12 month period of the study, 
adjournments being common. 
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Case studies were analysed and jurisdictional and administrative issues 
and inadequacies identified (see Chapter 4) in all jurisdictions with the 
exception of forestry. The author was not permitted to observe a Forestry 
Tribunal hearing, the explanation being that they were private, as distinct 
from public, hearings and were usually held in the field. 
The number of cases listed in each jurisdiction was limited during the 
study period and the author was usually dependent on the relevant agency 
to notify her of their occurrence. 
In the case of the marine farm dispute, the author was contacted directly 
by the potential objectors who requested her assistance as a mediator. 
The applicant and the agency agreed to this, however the procedural 
inflexibility of the appeals system excluded a negotiated and/or mediated 
resolution. 
The author was notified of the two mining disputes by the agency. 
Subsequent disputes were unable to be included within the time frame 
of the study. 
The environment protection case study was the only one available for 
analysis within the time constraints of the study. Other cases were listed 
but were adjourned for lengthy periods for various reasons and so not 
available for analysis. 
The land-use planning dispute was the only one available to the author. 
The Forestry Commission would not permit author access to Tribunal 
hearings for the reasons mentioned previously. 
Chapter 1 considers the need for a review of EDR in Tasmania, given 
acknowledged inadequacies in traditional adversarial systems by members 
of the judiciary, government, developers and interest groups . The 
objectives and methodology of the study are also outlined. 
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Chapter 2 reviews the literature on judicial and administrative approaches 
to environmental decision-making and in so doing establishes the context 
for the operation of existing systems. 
Chapter 3 reviews the literature on the practice of environmental 
mediation overseas, noting that most of the source material is from the 
USA and Canada. It appears that there is at present very little Australian 
literature available on environmental mediation per. se. with the 
exception of papers by the author. 
Chapter 4 examines the ways in which environmental disputes are 
presently handled in Tasmania with reference to 5 jurisdictions and their 
associated courts and administrative tribunals. Case studies are used to 
illustrate the operation of the systems. 
Chapter 5 identifies opportunities for the incorporation of environmental 
mediation into existing Tasmanian judicial and administrative dispute 
resolution systems. A case is also put for the use of mediation as a strategy 
in its own right. 
Chapter 6 concludes that there is considerable potential for the effective 
use of mediation to benefit all parties and recommendations are made 
for future directions for Tasmania. 
1.5 	Limitations of the study 
Limitations in the dimensions and methodology of this study are 
acknowledged. There are a number of matters that impinge on a study 
of environmental dispute resolution, in particular the influence of 
political factors on the potential for success of negotiation and mediation 
in the resolution of environmental disputes. The impact of political 
factors on the use of mediation warrants a study in its own right and as 
this thesis is a minor thesis in a coursework Masters, manageable 
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boundaries have had to be drawn and the thesis has thus focused on an 
ideal type. 
Limitations are as follows: 
(i) inability to examine all the Tasmanian environmental dispute 
resolution systems in operation. To do so was beyond the scale of 
and resources available to this project; 
(ii) restrictions upon access to documentation in case study illustrations, 
particularly legal evidence and government documentation. There 
is no Freedom of Information legislation in Tasmania. This has 
placed undue reliance on the observation of dynamics, processes 
and procedures, and on discussions with disputants and others (as 
indicated in Section 2. 4); 
no survey of the attitudes, needs and desired outcomes of parties 
in disputes could be undertaken; 
(iv) no comprehensive or statistical analysis of all the disputes in each 
jurisdiction exists, nor was there the means to carry out this task 
in the context of this project; and 
(v) no follow-up evaluation of the effectiveness of the outcomes of 
environmental dispute resolution processes was possible, although 
a longitudinal study would certainly be valuable. 
These limitations notwithstanding, it is considered that this study breaks 
new ground in the analysis of environmental dispute resolution in 
Tasmania and in the evaluation of the potential for environmental 
mediation. 
CHAPTER 2 
AN OVERVIEW OF ENVIRONMENTAL DECISION MAKING 
2. 1 Introduction 
Environmental disputes are essentially conflicts between competing 
interests over the allocation and use of resources. 
To allocate or not to allocate, and if so, what? To whom? How? For what 
purpose(s) and at what cost? These are the key questions underlying 
environmental decision making and the way in which they are handled 
may provoke or resolve an environmental dispute. 
The aim of this chapter is to give an overview of the legal and 
administrative context in which environmental management decisions 
are made and disputes are addressed. It is not intended as an in-depth 
treatise on environmental law concepts and practices nor as an expert 
appraisal of environmental management practices . Rather, the intention 
is as stated, to provide a contextual backdrop against which to undertake 
a more detailed examination of existing and potential environmental 
dispute resolution practices and options in subsequent chapters. 
The definition of "environment" is in itself no easy matter. It depends 
on whether it is defined by a physical or social scientist, a lawyer or 
economist, a developer or politician. The definition will reflect the interests 
of the person by whom it is defined. 
The common thread is that all refer, to a greater or lesser degree, to 
natural and man-made resources and the interaction and inter-
relationship of humans with these, be they living or non-living. The 
focus of the definition can be anthropocentric or ecocentric . 
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Environmental law and administrative decision-making are traditionally 
anthropocentric in orientation . There are, however, critics of this approach 
. Boer (1984) argues for the incorporation of a new ecological ethic into 
the current legal and administrative framework to more adequately 
encompass and develop the notion of "social ecology", the interaction 
between humans and other life-forms and non living elements of the 
earth . Birkeland-Corro (1988 ) also advocates a new ecological ethic to 
underpin environmental law and planning systems and so more 
adequately reflect the true nature of environmental problems. 
In fact the definition of "environment" as embodied in various pieces of 
legislation varies from the narrow definition in the Commonwealth 
Environment Protection (Impact of Proposals) Act 1974, S.3: 
"[environment] includes all aspects of the surroundings of man, whether 
affecting him as an individual or in his social groupings"; to the broad 
definition in the Western Australian Environmental Protection Act (1986): 
'[environment] means living things, their physical, biological, and social 
surroundings, and interactions between all of these", to the somewhat 
prosaic definition in the Tasmanian Environment Protection Act (1973) 
S2, which merely refers to "the land, water, and atmosphere of the earth". 
For the purpose of this study, "environment" will be used in the broad 
context to refer to the interaction and interrelationship of humans with 
both living and non-living resources. It will retain an anthropocentric 
focus whilst not disputing the validity of an ecocentric perspective. 
Environmental decision-making systems are an amalgam of a judicial 
framework and administrative and policy decision making machinery, 
usually containing an inbuilt facility for judicial or quasi-judicial review 
of decisions, such as an objection and appeal process . Both systems must 
be taken into account in any overview of environmental decision-making. 
(On systems see Appendix 
Environmental disputes are a manifestation of systems failure or 
dysfunction. Review and appeals systems can be considered to be fail-safe 
mechanisms to minimize the possibility of negative outcomes in the 
event of a systems malfunction such as a dispute. 
However, environmental disputes - the issues, dynamics, processes, and 
outcomes - cannot be considered in isolation from the institutional 
framework in which environmental dispute resolution is effected. 
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The institutional framework determines the manner and extent to which 
issues in dispute are identified; for example, only those issues that come 
within the bounds of the prevailing legislation can be addressed by the 
designated statutory authority responsible for the implementation of that 
legislation. The institutional framework also determines the processes, 
be they judicial or administrative, by which disputes are resolved, and 
their ability to deal with substantive as well as procedural issues. Inability 
to resolve substantive issues often results in outcomes that are not 
satisfactory to the parties. This being so, the unresolved issues often re-
emerge in another form or in another jurisdiction; for example, a dispute 
over licensing conditions may re-emerge as a zoning issue (Sandford 
1988) . 
2.2 	The judicial system 
The major body of legal literature on environmental disputes has two 
streams, natural resource law and environmental law . This division 
reflects past controversy as to whether "natural resource law" with its 
primary concern for the development and exploitation of natural resources 
can properly be considered as environmental law, given that proponents 
of environmental law view conservation and protection as the primary 
focii of environmental law. 
Bates (1987: 4) proposes an all encompassing definition of environmental 
law: 
any regulation of statute law or common law which affects the 
natural environment per se; which declares the rights and duties 
of any person to take action to develop or protect the environment; 
or which might affect the scenic, historical, artistic or cultural beauty 
or appreciation of human efforts to harmonise the built and natural 
environments. 
Fisher (1980: 8) adopted the following view of environmental law: 
to include the protection of the environment, the integration of 
• the environmental dimension into the decision-making process 
and the use and exploitation of resources as the background against 
which other aspects of environmental law operate. 
Both definitions are indicative of the difficulty of encapsulating a 
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comprehensive (rather than a linear) concept of "environment" which 
reflects the holistic and interdisciplinary origins of environmental issues 
and environmental law. 
In a later publication Fisher (1987) appears to merge natural resources 
and environmental concepts. His use of "natural resources" includes 
decisions relating to the use, development, and conservation of the 
physical resources of Australia . So, his structural model of natural 
resources law can be readily applied to an analysis of environmental law. 
Natural resource law is inevitably environmentally-relevant as it has an 
environmental impact. On these grounds, this author has no difficulty 
in encompassing natural resources law as part of environmental law. 
According to Bates (1987: 5), environmental law is almost entirely a product 
of legislation . That is, its sources of authority and responsibility are 
derived from statute law or legislation supported by common law. In 
• essence, the scope and context of environmental law and its legislative 
products are concerned with public law, issues of public concern and 
protection of the public interest . On the other hand, common law, the 
traditional body of the law, is concerned with the protection of private, 
individual rights and relies on the doctrine of precedent. Some resources 
such as water, minerals, and energy do not fit neatly into either public or 
private sector and tend to have elements of both. In these situations, 
both environmental law and common law are often used . 
Common law, as well as defining the nature and extent of an individual's 
property rights, makes provision for the protection of these rights by an 
action in nuisance or trespass. Nuisance or trespass are the "grounds" on 
which individuals may take action to seek protection of their property 
rights and they allow for remedies of an injunction or damages. Both 
remedies have been awarded in environmental disputes. 
Injunctions to stop actions about which there is a complaint are the 
more common. They can also be used as a delaying tactic. Environmental 
damage is more difficult to measure and to quantify in monetary terms, 
as in the case of damage caused by toxic emissions and the estimation of 
the cost of future loss. For example, it is difficult to estimate economic 
loss to the agricultural industry of the impact of a toxic or pesticide buildup 
in the food chain. Another example is the difficulty in estimating pain 
and suffering and future loss of earning capacity as the result of exposure 
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to occupational carcinogens which are typified by a gradual onset of 
symptoms often over a period of years, Heller (1981). 
The "revolution" of common law around individual property rights, 
rights of ownership, or an interest over, or in land, is historically based. 
Common law evolved from eleventh century British law, a time of 
primitive technology by present day standards, abundant natural resources 
and minimal competition for those resources . In the twentieth century, 
common law is too narrow and lacks the flexibility to deal with 
technological advances which are expanding rapidly, which pose 
unprecedented threats to the environment and which transcend the 
boundaries of property rights (Ozawa and Susskind 1985). 
The inability of the common law to meet the challenges of advanced 
technology and its effects over large areas of land, particularly public 
land, has meant that the major momentum in environmental matters 
and environmental law has come from governments and legislation 
rather than from the common law (Bates 1987: 36). 
Statute law or legislation is an instrument of government. It is therefore 
unavoidable that legislation will reflect the political imperatives and the 
perceived electoral issues and pressures of the time. Hence the multitude 
of amendments as issues and governments change. Nevertheless, 
legislation tends to be able to respond more readily and rapidly to changing 
economic, political and social demands and realities than does the common 
law. 
Statute has frequently intervened to distort the common law approach 
(Fisher 1987), for example, to bypass common law as a source of legal 
authority, as with so-called "Fast Track" legislation. Furthermore, 
Australia is a federation, and as such, there are two sources of legislative 
powers in each state - the State and the Commonwealth. While 
responsibility for environmental matters is vested in the states, the 
Commonwealth also possesses powers which it may validly exercise for 
environmental reasons. It has enacted national environmental legislation, 
the Commonwealth Environment Protection (Impact of Proposals ) Act 
1974.   
In addition to its direct powers, the Commonwealth also exercised indirect 
powers, for example, those relating to taxation, corporate affairs, funding, 
14 
and Local government powers which are derived from state government 
powers. 
The oft cited Tasmanian Dams Case Commonwealth v Tasmania (1983) 
4ALR 625 is perhaps the most publicised demonstration of the extent of 
Commonwealth power in several areas, those of external affairs, 
corporations, and the people of any race power having been used to 
sanction Commonwealth intervention in an environmental dispute. 
The "Dams' issue" was also the source of one of the most bitterly contested, 
divisive and costly environmental disputes Australia has ever seen. The 
scars are still evident in Tasmanian society today, witness to the inability 
of the legal system to address and resolve the substantive issues of the 
dispute (Herr & Davis 1982). 
It is in the exercise of Commonwealth-State environmental 
responsibilities and the administration and implementation of 
environmental management policies that the macro-legal system is seen 
in operation. The interrelationship and interaction of a multitude of 
government departments and statutory authorities at federal, state, and 
local levels - ministerial councils, advisory bodies, federal and state 
Cabinets, and Parliament - comprise the macro-legal system. 
As Fisher (1987: 1) states, the natural resources legal system Australia is 
largely institutional in character and structural in form. 
He argues that the current structure of natural resources/environmental 
law in Australia has 2 parts - the traditional micro-legal system and the 
emerging macro-legal system. The two systems are interdependent and 
with the administrative decision-making apparatus make up the structure 
of a natural resources legal system. 
The micro-legal system is predominantly jurisdictional, administrative, 
and procedural. It prescribes the existence of rights of sovereignty, rules 
of titular ownership, the requirements for the exercise of statutory and 
common law powers and the standards required for the exercise of these 
powers (Fisher 1987). The micro-legal system thus portrays the popular 
perception of environmental law as being preoccupied with due process 
and procedure rather than with substantive issues. 
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The macro-legal system is the "broad-brush" perspective, being concerned 
with policies, aims, objectives, or purposes of the decision-making process 
whether legislative, executive, proprietary, or contractual. 
Both systems presuppose the capacity to make legally binding decisions 
within their relevant areas of jurisdiction . In the microlegal system, the 
ultimate decision is liable to judicial review in court. Decisions of the 
macrolegal system, on the other hand, may not necessarily always be 
enforceable. 
This plethora of legal and administrative bodies at federal level has its 
mirror-image in each state. There is, however, a notable lack of national 
consistency in the way in which each state has sought to develop its own 
environmental management regime. 
In the macro-legal arena of environmental policy implementation, the 
potentially problematic, even conflictual, relationship of law to 
administration becomes apparent . The objectives and purposes of the 
decision-making process may be explicit, or, more often, implicit in the 
legislation (Fisher 1987). In the judicial context it is usually limited to 
indicating the preferred interpretation of the legislation. Statements or 
implications of purpose in legislation are increasingly a more formal 
part of the decision-making process. They are intended as a guide to the 
administration of the legislation and may not be enforceable, nor is legal 
remedy likely should an administrator choose to ignore these statutory 
indicators (Fisher 1987). 
It is concerns such as this that prompt the legal profession to advocate 
the need for retention of judicial review of administrative decision-
making . The profession contends that the judicial system, and in particular 
the courts, is removed from the political influence which may affect the 
objectivity of administrative decision makers in the public sector . For 
this reason, it has sought an extension of the judicial role in the macro-legal 
system. 
As Lake (1980: 4) points out, although environmental policy 
implementation has frequently resulted in administrative breakdown, 
and judicial intervention, the transfer of the decision making process 
from the operating agency to the legal profession has meant that lawyers, 
intent on the development of precedents and procedural regularity, have 
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failed to consider the institutional impact of expanded judicial roles on 
the quality of decisions and on the authority of administrators. 
Environmental management, including policy implementation, is the 
central concept of the macro-legal system. Management is dynamic rather 
than static . It must be able to change as issues, demands, and priorities 
change. It has a flexibility and a capacity for movement not available to 
the law . In fact, "management ... has become the principle means of 
settling disputes arising from the consequences of the fragmentation of 
rights of property into a series of potentially conflicting interests" (Fisher 
1987: 45). 
2.3 The administrative system 
In contrast to the judicial system with its clearly defined concepts and 
principles of power, authority, rights, obligations, and process, the 
administrative system appears relatively ill defined, an amorphous body 
of policy, objectives, priorities, management plans, and discretionary 
decision-making. Unlike the judicial system, the administrative system, 
located in public sector bureaucracy, is interwoven with the political 
decision making process, structurally and functionally. 
Structurally, the public service is a product of the Westminster system of 
government. It carries out the directions of the government of the day. 
Ministers determine policy which is implemented by public servants 
who are held to be politically impartial. Ministers are responsible to 
Parliament for the policies and actions of their departments and the 
ultimate decision-making power rests with the Prime Minister or the 
Premier and Cabinet depending on whether the legislature is federal or 
state (Davis et. al. 1988). 
Within departments and public agencies there are structural and 
functional divisions, decision making power being assigned according to 
the authority and functions of the position. 
Environmental management and its administrative systems demonstrate 
a number of characteristics common to most public administration, 
namely: 
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(i) policy formulation and implementation; 
(ii) identification and protection of the public interest; and 
(iii) discretionary decision making. 
It may also display characteristics that differentiate it from the more 
usual forms of public administration: 
(iv) resource based structural and functional differentiation of 
administration; and 
(v) interdisciplinary decision making. 
(i) 	Policy formulation and implementation 
Policy, in this case environmental policy, is the core of the administrative 
decision-making process. It is a statement of purpose or of the intent of 
the government. It may be explicit or implicit. It may be contained in the 
legislation or in guidelines, policy statements or position papers. In any 
event it is intended as a guide for legislation. 
The theory is straightforward, the practice less so (Frazer 1986) .Iii practice — 
there is no such phenomenon as a national (or even a state) public policy 
process, nor can it be generalised across departments or government bodies, 
let alone between levels of government, local, state, or federal, although 
there have been some efforts to do so: 
Although some attempts have been made within states to 
coordinate environmental policy through ministries of 
conservation or land-use advisory councils of civil services, the 
standard of performance does not seem significantly different from 
those jurisdictions where functional fragmentation occurs (Davis 
1985: 3). 
Federal and State bureaucracies develop environmental policies using a 
variety of strategies. There is no single procedure for making policy. 
They get experts to write policy papers; modify existing programs; and/or 
request input from academics, interest groups, industry and other 
government agencies (Davis et al. 1986: 122). They also react to political 
stimuli: 
18 
Major public policies are the outcome of a complex game of 
negotiations, of expert opinion weighted against the electoral 
imperative of competing interests seeking to advance self-interest 
through a favourable choice (Davis et.al. 1988: 123) . 
A Cabinet government promotes not just argument or debate but often 
barely disguised conflict as competing bureaucratic and ministerial 
interests and priorities jostle for the Treasury dollar at the expense of 
integrated environmental management in the public interest. 
(ii) 	Protection of the public interest 
Identification and protection of the public interest is a central function of 
the administrative system, protection of the private interest being a 
function of the legal system (Fisher 1987). 
Environmental law is primarily public law, but the development or 
management of a resource usually involves the exercise of property rights. 
This is where the functions of the legal and administrative systems merge. 
For example, the development or management of a resource may impinge 
on the property rights of another person and the exercise of property 
rights may be inconsistent with the public interest manifested through 
statements of public policy or governmental objective. - 
This is most readily demonstrated at a state level where the majority of 
environmental policies are formulated and decisions made. The 
evolution of the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) process for all 
its faults is generally accepted as an example of the establishment of an 
administrative decision-making process to identify and protect the public 
interest vis-a-vis resource development (Fowler 1982). 
One of the difficulties confronting the protection of the public interest by 
an administrative decision-making process, is that, although disincentives 
for breach of policy may be stated (for example, in policies, guidelines, 
and management plans), this does not mean that they are legally 
enforceable and they may thus be challenged or even ignored. 
This where Fisher's (1987) identification of regulatory, interventionist 
and directory functions of resource authorities comes into its own. Fisher 
contends that these functions are common to all jurisdictions to a greater 
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or lesser degree, depending on the purpose of the department or statutory 
authority . 
The regulatory approach is seen in environmental and pollution control 
where protection of the public interest lies with the authority in which is 
also vested discretionary power of control as identified in legislation or 
policies and which are exercised by reference to criteria designed to protect 
the public interest. This regulatory function effectively operates to limit 
the range of decisions open to the owner of the resource. 
The second function is that of intervention. It applies to resources vested 
in the private sector and is the mandate whereby a public authority may 
require a private person or institution to undertake designated activities. 
It becomes complicated where functions of ownership and management 
are divided between private and public sector as, for example, in the case 
of mining on Crown Land. 
The third function of environmental administration is the directory 
approach which relates to resources vested in public authorities. It indicates 
the direction in which public authorities are expected to exercise their 
powers in the public interest. 
It is likely that some public authorities have a combination of these 
functions. Some are explicitly stated in legislation, regulations, and 
policies, while others are the subject of discretionary decision-making. 
(iii) Discretionary decision-making 
Administrative decision making involves choices; choices which can be 
made at a number of levels in different agencies. As Davis et. al. (1988) 
note, there is inevitably discretion in the decision-process. 
Departments and statutory authorities negotiate policy with the Minister 
and Cabinet, with broad guidelines being laid down by Cabinet . However, 
departments decide for themselves the details and process of policy 
implementation. There is usually considerable latitude here for 
discretionary decision-making, including the determination of priorities 
and the allocation of resources. 
Where several jurisdictions and agencies are involved, as in many 
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environmental issues, the decisions of a department may be challenged 
by other departments and by Cabinet. In these situations Cabinet may 
decide. 
In practice, government agencies have substantial discretion to make 
decisions about the allocation and management of resources. It is the 
extent and implications of those discretionary powers that cause concern 
among those outside the bureaucracy including the legal profession, public 
interest groups, and industry, many of whom support the need for a 
mechanism to review administrative decisions (procedures for appeals 
against administrative discretion are considered later in this thesis). 
In actuality it is not just the use of discretion in decision making that is 
in question, but the possibility of political influence and possibly direct 
intervention in the process, so that the outcome is tailored to political 
needs and priorities rather than to the public interest per se. As critics of 
"unbridled discretion" are anxious to note, public servants also have a 
vested interest in outcomes that will enhance their positions and 
opportunities in the bureaucracy and not alienate their political masters. 
So it seems that discretion may be the better part of valour, but only in so 
far as it does not jeopardise the status quo of the public service. 
(iv) Functional differentiation 
Functional differentiation typifies environmental management and is 
evident in the literature where most environmental law is developed 
around the nature of the relevant resource - minerals, energy, forestry, 
fisheries, and land-use planning. It is further evident in the functional 
approach at state level, the state being the level of jurisdiction at which 
most land use and environmental management policies are made. For 
example, resource legislation reflects the divisions in the administrative 
structure, which in turn depend upon the separation of resources into 
various elements: land, minerals, forests, fisheries, and the like (Bates 
1987). 
There is, however, a significant overlap of jurisdictions in the management 
of some resources and/or issues. This raises questions of which legislation 
and government authority has priority. Sometimes exclusive or priority 
control is identified. More often than not, it is not, resulting in 
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interdepartmental competition for resource management or control. 
(v) 	Interdisciplinary decision-making 
It is the multidisciplinary nature of environmental management that is 
both its greatest strength and its greatest challenge; as Bates (1987: 53) 
notes, "the world of environmental management and protection is a 
multidisciplinary one". 
Bates might also have added that the law is but One of the disciplines 
involved. In fact the roles of other professional disciplines, industry, and 
public interest groups, have increased in significance in recent years as 
environmental issues gain in stature on political, economic and social 
agendas across the country and particularly in Tasmania (Hay 1987). 
This multidisciplinary nature is most apparent in the EIA process where 
interdisciplinary analysis of issues is required. As Bhu -nm (1988 ) notes, 
generalising from the record of operation of the National Environment 
Policy Act (NEPA) in the USA, the roles of certain professional disciplines 
in the government, for example, planners and biologists, have risen in 
prominence through the requirement for interdisciplinary analysis. The 
incorporation of social and economic impact analysis as discrete 
components of an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) will also serve 
to raise the profile of social scientists and economists. 
Social Impact Assessment (SIA ) is a fairly new but rapidly growing field 
in Australia as developers and governments come to appreciate that, 
although there may be economic benefits from resource development, 
social impacts can "make or break" a project. Negative social impacts of a 
development can have adverse electoral ramifications. 
An interdisciplinary approach to administrative decision-making is not 
easy, one of the reasons being that different values, objectives, and concepts 
of environmental management must be taken into account. This is 
apparent in the literature, the bulk of literature on environmental 
decision-making having its origins in planning and land-use 
administration and more recently environmental law. 
Physical scientists are represented mainly in discussions of the merits of 
scientific methodologies, the validity of scientific and technical data and 
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the use of expert witnesses in development disputes. 
Social scientists are poorly represented, especially in Australia. This is 
perhaps surprising given their prominence in areas of social reform, and 
civil and welfare rights in the late 1960s to mid 1970s. It appears that 
social scientists have failed to grasp the importance and magnitude of 
the social implications of environmental issues. 
2.4 Conclusion 
Environmental decision making is a composite of a legal system with 
clearly defined, even inflexible powers, processes, and procedures, and an 
administrative system of discretionary decision making in the public 
interest by functionally different authorities, its policies, processes, and 
procedures being as variable as the functions of the public authorities. 
This combination of legal definition and administrative discretion in 
environmental decision-making can be summed up in the author's 
formula 
Definition + Discretion = Decision 
No decision-making process is infallible. While flexibility of processes 
and procedures enables the administrative system to more readily and 
more rapidly adapt to technological advances and to anticipate 
environmental impacts, it remains susceptible to political, economic, and 
social pressures. 
On the other hand, the law is restrained, if not inhibited, by its lack of 
flexibility in a rapidly changing world. It has to battle to establish precedents 
or wait for precedents to be established, either way a lengthy process. The 
law lacks the capacity to accommodate rapid change and can only deal in 
the present, not in prospect . Hence decisions made may be contextually 
inadequate or inappropriate as is often the case in wide ranging, 
environmental issues which require a more integrated approach to 
decision-making. 
Neither decision making system is adequate in itself and the probability 
of error and omission is present in each. Provisions for review of decisions, 
both legal and administrative, are essential as a quality control of 
environmental decision-making. The review process may be judicial or 
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administrative, a court in the case of the former, an administrative tribunal 
in the case of the latter, or a two-tiered process . - a combination of both. 
These are the means by which environmental decision-making is 
safeguarded, and resource allocation and disputes addressed. There are 
comparable systems in most democratic countries, including Canada and 
the USA, and this is evident from a review of the literature and history 
of public disputes and environmental mediation in the following chapter. 
CHAPTER 3 
PUBLIC DISPUTES AND ENVIRONMENTAL MEDIATION IN 
HISTORY, IN THEORY AND IN PRACTICE 
3.1 	Introduction 
The presence of conflict in a situation is not necessarily a negative 
phenomenon. If viewed positively, it can be an opportunity for growth 
and for the exploration of innovative solutions to problems of competing 
goals, whether they be actual or perceived (Moore 1987: 18). It is the 
negative impacts of unmanaged conflict that are dysfunctional rather 
than the conflict itself. Productive conflict resolution depends on the 
abilities of the participants to devise efficient and co-operative problem 
solving procedures and to be prepared to work together to develop 
mutually acceptable solutions; that is the key to successful conflict and 
dispute resolution (Moore 1987). 
Gulliver (quoted in Moore 1987: 4) notes that a disagreement or conflict 
becomes a dispute: 
only when the two parties are unable and/or unwilling to resolve 
their disagreement, that is when one or both are not prepared to 
accept the status quo (should that any longer be a possibility) or to 
accede to the demand or denial of demand by the other. A dispute 
is precipitated by a crisis in a relationship. 
Folberg and Taylor (1984) also distinguish between a manifest dispute to 
be resolved and the underlying conflict that may remain, perhaps in a 
more manageable form. Both dispute resolution and conflict management 
are complementary and realistic goals of mediation. 
A level of managed conflict underpins and maintains the profile and 
momentum of most environmental disputes, fuelled by differences in 
the values, attitudes, philosophies and objectives of the parties in conflict. 
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This managed conflict becomes a dispute when it is triggered by a particular 
event or decision such as a notice of intent to develop or a development 
proposal. It is at this point of conflict escalation that parties become 
disputants and must then seek ways to resolve the dispute and contain 
the conflict at a manageable level. 
Environmental disputes are public disputes; that is, they focus on public 
issues and the public interest rather than on private issues. The disputes 
profiled in Chapter 4 are examples of public disputes. Forestry, mining, 
fisheries, land-use planning and environmental protection are all public 
issues, being resources that are managed by government in the public 
rather than in the private interest. 
What distinguishes public disputes from private disputes is that they are 
controversies that affect members of the public beyond the primary 
negotiators - they involve one or more levels of government often as a 
party and usually as a decision maker (Carpenter and Kennedy 1988: 4). 
Environmental disputes are therefore public disputes and the terms are 
often used interchangeably in environmental dispute resolution 
literature. 
3.2 	Public disputes defined 
Public disputes are important for several reasons: 
(i) they represent important public choices about major economic, 
social and environmental issues; 
(ii) they are time consuming and expensive to litigate; 
(iii) if they are not fully resolved they often re-emerge in other forms 
as new litigation, or new legislative, regulatory or administrative 
battles (Adler 1987: 1). 
Public disputes also attract considerable attention - witness the forestry 
disputes of the Tasmanian Southern and Lemonthyme forests, the 
proposed construction of a pulpmill at Wesley Vale, and the lower profile, 
but equally divisive disputes described in the next chapter. As Susskind 
and Cruikshank (1987) comment, all these controversies fall into a category 
of public disputes called distributional disputes, which differ markedly 
26 
from a second category of public disputes which - centre - primarily-on the 
definition of constitutional or legal rights. According to Susskind and 
Cruikshank (1987), distributional disputes focus on the allocation of lands, 
resource use, the setting of standards or the siting of facilities, whereas 
constitutional disputes such as those concerned with the freedom of 
information, homosexual rights and affirmative action hinge primarily 
on court interpretations of constitutionally guaranteed rights. 
Susskind and Cruikshank (1987) and Adler (1987) argue that constitutional 
and legal rights are not negotiable and are best resolved by the judicial 
system. Adler notes that most parties involved in constitutional or rights 
disputes usually prefer to use the courts to establish legal precedence and 
so promote changes in the law. 
However, when the focus is on the distribution of tangible gains 
and losses, and not on whether something is legal or illegal, we 
are firmly convinced that consensus building strategies can help 
(Susskind and Cruikshank 1987: 17). 
The distinction between these two categories of disputes may be clear or 
they may become entangled, and final distributional decisions are, in 
most instances, postponed until the questions of fundamental rights can 
be resolved. Then the distributional dispute can begin in earnest (Susskind 
and Cruikshank 1987: 19). 
Public distributional disputes have historically been resolved by political 
compromise as disputants concentrate on winning. The classical 
techniques of political bargaining include coalition building, manipulation 
of the mass media to alter public opinion, referenda, promises of political 
or financial support and vote exchanges (Susskind and Cruishank 1987). 
The disadvantage of these strategies is that the results are often barely 
acceptable to any of the parties, stalemates and deadlocks are frequent, 
the substantial issues often remain unresolved, and conflict remains at a 
barely manageable level, the "losing" side feeling cheated. 
In place of political compromise, Susskind and Cruikshank (1987) argue 
for voluntary agreements that offer the wisest, fairest, most efficient, and 
most stable outcomes possible. 
Ideally, distributional disputes should be settled by the parties themselves, 
that is using unassisted or private negotiation (Susskind and Cruikshank 
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1987: 33). However, as many distributional disputes are multiparty and 
multi-issue disputes, with the parties unable to resolve their differences, 
assisted negotiation is often necessary. 
If that is the case, then the disputing parties have only two choices: they 
can resort to the conventional, legislative, administrative or judicial 
means of resolving distributional disputes, or they can seek the help of a 
nonpartisan intermediary - a facilitator, mediator or arbitrator - and engage 
in assisted negotiation (Susskind and Cruikshank 1987: 137). 
3.3 Environmental Mediation Defined 
Parties involved in disputes have a variety of choices concerning the 
means chosen to resolve their differences (Moore 1987). These choices of 
dispute resolution processes can be placed on a continuum from private 
and voluntary to public and compulsory. The range of choices reflects 
the diversity and complexity of dispute resolution options available and 
includes a category of processes known as alternative dispute resolution 
(ADR), that is, processes that provide a non-adversarial alternative to 
litigation and adjudication in the resolution of disputes: "it is the use of 
an experienced and well qualified third party that generally establishes 
alternative dispute resolution (ADR)" (Newton 1989: 2). 
ADR processes are readily applicable to EDR. However they have yet to 
be used in environmental dispute resolution in Tasmania, and to the 
best of the author's knowledge, they have not been used to resolve 
environmental/ public disputes in any other Australian state. All the 
ADR options outlined below are practiced in the USA and Canada and 
many are now available to disputants in New South Wales and Victoria 
(and, to a lesser extent, in other states) where ADR has become recognized 
as an effective alternative to litigation in the resolution of community 
and commercial disputes (Faulkes 1986; Bryson 1986; David 1988). 
The most generally accepted dispute resolution options (including those 
identified as ADR processes) are negotiation, facilitation, mediation, 
independent expert appraisal, conciliation, arbitration, adjudication and 
legislative resolution. 
(i) 	Negotiation is the process in which parties voluntarily enter into 
a temporary bargaining relationship to resolve a perceived or actual 
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conflict of interest in a structured and private dispute resolution 
process (Moore 1987). 
There is no independent third party present. 
(ii) Facilitation is where an impartial third party acts to bring the 
participants together for the purpose of dispute settlement (Newton 
1989). The facilitator provides the parties with a problem-solving 
process. It is less directive, more informal and generally less 
appropriate for polarized disputes than is mediation (Moore 1989: 
893). 
Facilitation is particularly appropriate for scoping issues to be 
examined in an EIA process and in the development of an EIS. It 
is also valuable in assisting interorganizational /interagency 
activities (Moore 1989). 
(iii) Mediation is most commonly used in intractable conflicts where, 
as Moore (1989) indicates: 
(a) the parties are highly organized and polarised; 
(b) the issues are fairly well defined; 
(c) the parties may have reached a deadlock in negotiations (an 
"impasse"); 
(d) the parties' power has been tested, or the consequences of 
its future use would be mutually damaging; and 
(e) disputants need more procedural structure or direction from 
an impartial third party to achieve settlement. 
Mediation is variously defined as: 
(a) 	the process by which the participants, together with the 
assistance of a neutral person or persons, systematically isolate 
disputed issues in order to develop options, consider 
alternatives, and reach a consensual settlement that will 
meet their needs. It is a process that emphasises the 
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participants' own responsibilities for making decisions that 
affect their lives (Folberg and Taylor 1984: 7); and 
(b) 	an extension and elaboration of the negotiation process which 
involves the intervention of an acceptable, impartial and 
neutral third party who has no authoritative decision-
making power, to assist disputing parties reach a mutually 
acceptable settlement of issues in the dispute. It is a voluntary 
decision-making process in which the decision-making 
power remains in the hands of the people in conflict (Moore 
1987: 6). 
However mediation is defined, it is characterized as a voluntary 
and private process whereby an independent third party neutral 
assists parties to identify, address and resolve the issues in dispute. 
Mediation is usually initiated when the parties no longer believe 
that they can handle the conflict on their own and when the only 
solution appears to be the use of a third party (Moore 1987: 6). 
(iv) Conciliation is never voluntary for the respondent and may or 
may not be voluntary for the initiating party. The third party 
neutral, the conciliator, controls the process and the conciliator 
and the parties control the outcome. The parties are not necessarily 
in direct contact (David 1986: 51). However David (1988) notes 
similarities between conciliation and mediation and between 
conciliation and independent expert appraisal. She suggests (1988: 
11) that it would be more appropriate to call conciliation either 
mediation or expert appraisal to avoid confusion. 
(v) Independent expert appraisal.  This is the Australian equivalent of 
"fact finding" in the USA (David 1988: 10). It is a voluntary and 
non-binding process whereby a third party neutral is engaged by 
the parties, is informed of the details of the dispute, and gives an 
independent expert opinion as to how the dispute can be resolved 
(Newton 1989). 
The process is particularly appropriate for disputes over factual 
issues (David 1988: 10). It can be combined with other processes 
such as facilitation and mediation in environmental disputes. 
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(vi) Administrative or executive dispute resolution. In this process, a 
third party at some distance from the dispute may make a decision 
for the parties in dispute. The process may be private, as within a 
company, or public if it is conducted in a public agency by another 
administrator. Administrative or executive dispute resolution 
generally attempts to balance the needs of the entire system and 
the interests of the individual (Moore 1987: 7). 
(vii) Arbitration is a general term for a voluntary process in which the 
participants request the assistance of an impartial neutral third 
party to make the decision for them regarding contested issues. 
The outcome may be binding or advisory (Moore 1987: 7). 
People often select arbitration in preference to a judicial resolution 
as it is more informal, faster, less costly and private, but what 
distinguishes it from ADR, including mediation and facilitation, 
is the fact that it is the third party neutral rather than the parties 
who controls both the process and the outcome; that is, the arbitrator 
decides the outcome - it is an imposed decision. 
(viii) Adjudication is the traditional formal method of dispute resolution 
by the courts using an adversarial approach (David 1987). It involves 
the intervention of an institutionalized and socially recognized 
authority into private dispute resolution. It is a public and 
compulsory process and a judge (or jury) makes a decision based 
on case law and legal statutes. The results are binding and 
enforceable and although the disputants lose control of the outcome, 
they obtain a decision which reflects socially sanctioned norms 
(Moore 1987). 
Both the Magistrates' and the Mining Warden's Court and 
administrative appeals tribunals are adjudicators in public disputes 
in Tasmania. 
(ix) Legislative resolution is a public or legal means of resolving a 
conflict. It is used primarily for large disputes affecting broader 
populations (as is the case with environmental issues) and the 
decision is made by voting - a win/lose process. However 
compromises are usually negotiated in the form of amendments 
and/or new bills (Moore 1987: 8). 
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Using this categorization of dispute resolution options, there are thus 
nine choices of process that parties can make to resolve a particular dispute. 
These can be grouped into private negotiation, alternative dispute 
resolution (ADR), and litigation. 
ADR is thus a generic term for a collection of processes including 
facilitation, mediation, and independent expert appraisal which involves 
the intervention of a third party neutral and which may be used in 
combination or on its own to resolve disputes ranging from 
neighbourhood and community justice disputes, to labour, commercial 
and environmental disputes on a local, state or national level. The 
essential ingredient is the presence of an independent third party neutral. 
EDR is the application of ADR processes to environmental or public 
disputes. According to Bingham (1986: xv): 
the term environmental dispute resolution refers collectively to a 
variety of approaches that allow the parties to meet fact to face to 
reach a mutually acceptable resolution of the issues in a dispute or 
potentially controversial situation. Although there are differences 
among the approaches, all are voluntary processes that involve 
some form of consensus building, joint problem solving or 
negotiation. Litigation, administrative procedures and arbitration 
are not included in the definition because the objective in those_ 
processes is not consensus among the parties. 
Bingham also comments that EDR processes can occur with or without 
the assistance of a mediator. 
By Bingham's definition, negotiation, facilitation and mediation are EDR 
processes but conciliation and arbitration are not for, although they involve 
third party neutrals, the processes are not voluntary. However Wehr (in 
Lake 1980: 98) defines conciliation in a manner which seeks to encourage 
its inclusion as an EDR process. In describing a case study he comments: 
The objective of this conciliation effort is to facilitate the articulation 
of the underlying values of citizens... and to develop a consensus 
so that political officials can determine if it should be approved, 
modified or vetoed. 
In spite of Wehr's objective of consensus building, the final outcome or 
decision is made by an external authority, as distinct from EDR where 
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the parties retain control over both the process and the outcome. 
Bacow and Wheeler (1983: 156) make the point that mediators should 
also not be confused with arbitrators and independent experts. The expert's 
report is not binding and may be rejected by one or all of the parties, in 
contrast with a mediated settlement which is agreed to by all the parties, 
and an arbitrator's decision which is imposed on the parties. Nevertheless, 
independent expert appraisal is often used to supplement mediation as 
part of an ED0R package. 
As with the use of EDR as a collective term, environmental mediation 
now also tends to be used as a collective term to cover all those ADR 
options in which an independent, neutral third party - a mediator - is 
used to assist parties to resolve or settle the issues in public dispute. The 
key features of mediation, as noted by Folberg and Taylor (1984) and 
Moore (1987) are: 
(i) the intervention of an independent neutral third party acceptable 
to the parties; 
(ii) a voluntary consensual process in which the decision making power 
remains with the parties and is not vested in the mediator; 
(iii) values and principles of the parties rather than those of the mediator 
are utilized; 
(iv) a short-term process not a long-term intervention; 
(v) a finite process that produces specific outcomes; 
(vi) the outcomes are determined by the parties and not by the mediator; 
(vii) the outcomes must be agreed to but are not binding, although 
parties can choose to have them enforceable by means of a legal 
contract or by judicial, legislative or administrative ratification. 
The definition of environmental mediation employed in this thesis will 
embody the principles and processes identified by Moore and Folberg and 
Taylor and will include both facilitation and mediation as described 
previously. Environmental mediation may be used as a dispute resolution 
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process in its own right or it may be used as part of an EDR package 
which includes other EDR processes such as independent expert appraisal. 
A mediator often has an educative role to play in this regard so that the 
parties are aware of the range and the value of the options available. 
However it remains the decision of the parties to decide which processes 
they wish to use in order to resolve the dispute in question. 
3.4 Environmental mediation - in history 
That environmental mediation is a relatively recent innovation in 
environmental dispute resolution is reflected in the literature. A literature 
search revealed that all the literature on EDR has been written since the 
mid 1970s. Environmental dispute resolution as it is specifically 
understood is therefore less than 20 years old. However mediation as a 
dispute resolution process is not a new phenomenon, nor is it restricted 
to western democratic and industrialized countries. There appears to be 
no comprehensive description or analysis of the development of ADR 
internationally, information on its history in other than industrialized 
countries being gleaned from brief references by Moore (1987) and others 
as indicated. 
According to Moore (1987), Latin America and other Hispanic cultures 
have a history of mediated disputes and in one process (in Mexico) judges 
assist parties in making consensual decisions (Nader 1969). Mediation is 
also used in Africa (Gulliver 1971) and in Melanesia (Gulliver 1979). 
3.4.1 The People's Republic of China 
Mediation has been widely practiced in China and Japan, countries where 
religion and philosophy place a strong emphasis on social consensus and 
harmony in human relations, for centuries (Brown 1985). Mediation is 
currently widely practiced in the People's Republic of China through the 
People's Conciliation Committees (Ginsberg, in Moore 1989: 26) which 
operate under the direction and regulations of provincial governments, 
supported by provincial Bureaux of Justice (Bryson 1986: 96). Bryson 
further notes (1986: 99) that as the Chinese court system is distinct, 
inaccessible, and even unpredictable, the mediation system is the primary 
source of dispute resolution for most people, and the scale of Chinese 
community mediation is enormous. 
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3.4.2 Japan 
Articles in English on environmental dispute resolution are few, however 
Japan has a readily identifiable system for resolving environmental 
pollution disputes under the Law concerning the Settlement of 
Environmental Pollution Disputes which was enacted in 1970 (Harashina 
1988: 31). This system contains out-of-court ways for resolving disputes 
such as conciliation, mediation, arbitration and ad judication and disputes 
are settled at the central and local level of organization according to the 
characteristics of each dispute (Harashina 1988: 31). 
Mediation is the most popular procedure in Japan and has been used, for 
example, to resolve highway artery construction projects in Tokyo. Of 21 
cases of mediation in 1984, 19 involved local construction projects, and 
between 1970 and 1986, 561 of 576 cases were resolved by mediation at the 
central organization, the Environmental Dispute Coordination 
Commission. Some 314 of 351 cases were resolved by mediation at the 
local level, the Prefectural Environmental Pollution Council (Harashina 
1988: 31). 
3.4.3 USA 
In the USA, mediation was used in dispute resolution by Puritans and 
Quakers and Chinese and Japanese ethnic groups. Until the twentieth 
century, when it became formally institutionalized and developed as a 
recognized profession, mediation was performed by people with informal 
training (Moore 1987: 21). 
According to Simkin (1971), the first arena in which mediation was 
formally institutionalized in the USA was in labor-management relations. 
In 1913, the U.S. Department of Labor was established and a panel of 
commissioners of conciliation was appointed to handle conflicts between 
labor and management (Moore 1987: 21). A Federal Mediation and 
Conciliation service (FMCS) was established and its work was guided by 
the Wagner Act and the National Labor Relations Board (Adler 1988). 
These agencies developed in the context of economic depression and 
class conflict. After the unions had fought for and achieved important 
economic and legal victories, collective bargaining as a more stable process 
of conflict resolution became a reality (Adler 1987: 64). 
35 
As Adler (1987: 64) further notes, this pattern of ADR methods gaining 
in credibility and favour as dispute resolution mechanisms, could also be 
seen in other sectors, such as the Community Relations Service (CRS) 
which was established to resolve social and ethnic disputes. 
Adler sums up the evolution of ADR legitimacy thus: 
the idea of mediating such conflicts probably could not have come 
into place without the economic, social and political confrontations 
of the 1960s and, more specifically, without the Civil Rights Act of 
1963. Concurrent with the civil rights movement, the 1960s also 
brought environmental issues to the forefront (1987: 64). 
With the creation of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) in 
1969 and a national network of enforcement agencies, the stage was 
theoretically set for an increased number of negotiated rather than litigated 
settlements between pro and anti-development forces (Adler 1987: 64). 
Rivkin (1977) notes that NEPA was also accompanied by a movement 
towards citizens' environmental activism. It was a movement that created 
conflict which intensified in the early 1970s. He notes further that 1975 
in the USA saw a recession that crippled the building industry and: 
adverse economic conditions helped finish the job begun by 
environmental activists and government imposed moratoria on 
new construction permits (Rivkin 1977: 3). 
This resulted in increased support for developers and industry by workers 
and the unemployed, which in turn added legitimacy to governmental 
participation in the negotiation of ad hoc solutions for individual projects 
while a search for more comprehensive guidelines continued (Rivkin 
1977: 3). 
The earliest experiment with mediation for the resolution of 
environmental disputes is generally credited to Cormick and McCarthy 
who successfully pioneered the mediation of a site-specific dispute which 
became known as the Snoqualmie Dam dispute. Over a period of 11 
months in 1973-74, Cormick and McCarthy resolved a long-standing 
dispute involving government agencies, numerous environmental 
groups, private citizens and landowners. The dispute had originated in 
1968 with a government proposal for large flood control dams on the 
Snoqualmie River. It escalated and reached an impasse in 1972 as 
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government agencies delayed making a decision on the- project in the 
face of mounting public opposition. Mediation was initiated in late 1973 
and a binding agreement ratified and endorsed by the governor in late 
1974 (Lake 1980; Bingham 1986; Amy 1987). 
The Snoqualmie Dispute was the genesis of environmental mediation as 
it is known today. 
By 1975, the Conservation Foundation had made dispute resolution a 
major priority. A Program in Business and the Environment directed at 
alleviating the polarization that was inhibiting the implementation of a 
number of environmental laws and programs in the USA, was developed 
(Reilly 1986; Brunner et. al. 1981; Gilbreath 1984). At that stage there was 
wariness among environmental groups and corporations about 
mediation, policy dialogues, and related alternatives to the more 
accustomed avenues of litigation, administrative proceedings and the 
legislative resolution of conflicts (Reilly 1986). However, by the late 
1970s, an increasing number of scholars, environmentalists and developers 
had begun to explore the possibilities and potential of mediation, and by 
the 1980s environmental mediation had moved out of the experimental 
stage and was more institutionalized and professionalized (Amy 1987). 
From the first mediated dispute in 1973 to mid 1984, mediation had been 
employed in over 160 environmental disputes in the USA (Bingham 
1986: XVII). In fact by 1986 the practice of environmental dispute resolution 
had grown beyond the resolution of disputes on a case-by-case basis to 
the institutionalization, by statute, of procedures for resolving 
environmental disputes through negotiation, mediation and arbitration 
(Bingham 1986: XVII). 
Why this rapid growth in the use of mediation for EDR in the 1980s? 
According to Bingham (1986), the motivation to find alternatives to 
traditional dispute resolution processes for controversial environmental 
issues has come principally from the parties' discontent with traditional 
adversarial processes: 
When decisions in a dispute are seen as choices between winners 
and losers or when decisions are based on narrow procedural 
grounds, the interests of one, sometimes all of the parties to the 
dispute often remain unsatisfied. Instead, environmental disputes 
usually need solutions that make both good economic and good 
environmental sense... Innovation has occurred in environmental 
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dispute resolution processes because of people's desire for more 
effective and efficient opportunities to find solutions'to 
controversial environmental issues (Bingham 1986: 2). 
Time taken, the expense of protracted disputes, the loss of control of the 
decision making process and the inability to affect the outcome are other 
reasons given by parties dissatisfied with the traditional adversarial 
processes (Bingham 1986: 2). 
The following quote from Susskind, an eminent proponent of 
environmental mediation, perhaps best sums up the reasons given in 
support of mediation: 
Mediated negotiation is appealing because it addresses many of the 
procedural shortcomings of the more traditional approaches to 
resolving resource allocation conflicts. It allows for more direct 
involvement of those most affected by decisions than other 
administrative and legislative processes, it can produce settlements 
more rapidly and at lower costs than in the courts, and it is more 
flexible and adaptable to the specific needs of the parties in each 
unique situation (1984: 2). 
The USA is undoubtedly the world leader in the use of mediation to 
resolve environmental disputes. Whether mediation will increasingly 
replace litigation as a means of resolving environmental disputes into 
the 1990s, as its proponents believe, and whether or not it can live up to 
the high expectations of Susskind remains to be seen. Nevertheless, 
mediation has already become a significant development in the area of 
environmental politics (Amy 1987) and thus merits careful analysis. 
3.4.4 Canada 
Environmental conflict resolution, in the sense the term is 
understood in the United States, is a relatively novel but emerging 
idea in Canada,... and despite differences in the political and legal 
system in Canada, there are enough similarities to make 
comparisons worthwhile (Sadler 1986: 1). 
Canada, unlike the USA, has a Westminster system of government 
modelled on the British system and a judicial system based on the common 
law. Jurisdiction over environmental matters in Canada is evenly divided 
constitutionally between the federal government and the provinces and 
the framework for environmental law is quite complex with a considerable 
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degree of overlap -and duplication; legislation usually - contains provisions 
for dealing with disputes, and dispute resolution, in the context of 
environmental issues, has usually been adversarial in nature: "the nature 
of this system has therefore made it difficult for what may be called 
participatory decision-making and negotiation" (Grenville-Wood 1987: 
180). 
Dispute resolution mechanisms have therefore traditionally focused on 
a regulatory system and its associated administrative tribunals, such as 
the Environmental Assessment Board of Ontario, which have no 
counterparts in the USA. In the opinion of Grenville-Wood (1987: 181), 
this lack of an administrative tribunal form of regulatory system such as 
exists in the USA means that environmental disputes in that country are 
more likely to come before the courts. In Canada, however, the resolution 
of environmental disputes through the use of the common law and the 
judicial system is cumbersome and rarely used (Grenville-Wood 1987: 
181), though Conflict Management Resources considered that: 
Recent judicial decisions following the passage of the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, however, appear to signal 
movement toward an expanded Role for the judiciary in settling 
environmental disputes (1986: 4). 
According to Sadler (1986) the Canadian EDR scene in the mid-1980s was 
roughly comparable to the American situation of the late 1970s. However 
he cautioned that it would be unrealistic to expect the explosive growth 
that had characterized the 1970s-1980s in the United States, for several 
reasons: 
(i) Canada's political culture is more conservative; 
(ii) the incorporation of negotiation as an integral part of the decision 
making process, rather than as an occasional supplement, will 
require structural change in the system of government which 
implies a degree of transfer of power; and 
(iii) professional environmental mediators are very scarce in Canada. 
In spite of this somewhat pessimistic scenario, mediation to 1986 had 
been successfully used to resolve several multiparty disputes. It was also 
being used within judicial and administrative decision making systems. 
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In 1977, a major hydro electric development was successfully mediated, 
so ending a bitterly divisive two year dispute between local native Indian 
communities, a provincial government, the Canadian Federal 
government and Manitoba Hydro. The mediated agreement is now known 
as the Northern Flood Agreement. 
Another example of mediation in action is the mediation process that is 
employed by the Ontario Environmental Assessment Board, which is a 
quasi-judicial administrative hearing process, but which remains largely 
adversarial in nature. Jeffrey Q.C. (1987) supports the use of 
mediation/negotiation in appropriate cases as one tool for environmental 
dispute resolution. He sees it as an adjunct to the existing adjudicative 
process rather as an alternative to that process (as is practised in the 
USA). Jeffrey has a number of reservations about the use of mediation 
and strongly supports retention of the hearing process as the principal 
model for EDR. This is not, perhaps, surprising, given that Jeffrey is a 
lawyer and Chairman of the Environmental Assessment Board. 
Several other environmental mediations were in progress in Canada in 
1986. They were the mediation of a toxic landfill siting which was 
sponsored by the Ontario Environmental Assessment Board; a facilitated 
policy development process on the management of toxic chemicals in 
three provinces; and the mediation of an oil sands mining impact dispute. 
A recent innovation has been a proposal to develop a system for the 
resolution of wilderness disputes in British Columbia using an ongoing 
environmental mediation process conducted under the auspices of a 
Natural Areas Advisory Council (Rankin 1989). 
The administrative tribunal process provides a structure for mediation 
that is not found in the relatively unstructured regulatory framework in 
the United States (Grenville-Wood 1987), and it appears that 
environmental mediation in Canada is likely to continue as a supplement 
to traditional planning, regulatory and administrative procedures rather 
than as alternative to them, at least for the foreseeable future (Sadler 
1986). 
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3;4.5 New Zealand 
As with Canada and Australia, New Zealand has a Westminster system 
of government and a judicial system based on British common law. 
According to Hayward (1988: 3), there is a widespread view that New 
Zealand's concern for the environment began with proposals in the 1960s 
to raise the levels of two lakes. While that issue was important, in 
Hayward's opinion it is the fundamentally different world views and 
values of the Maoris and the European settlers that are at the core of 
environmental conflict in New Zealand (Hayward 1988). However, 
according to Hayward (1988: 12), members of the judiciary are divided on 
this matter. Turner (1987) considered values to be not judiciable matters 
while Chilwell (1987) found that Maori spiritual and cultural values 
could not be excluded from consideration under the Water and Soil 
Conservation Act (1967). Hayward (1988: 12) concludes that, given the 
difficulties of adjudicating in such circumstances of fundamental cultural 
value clash, there is a need for much greater use of non-judicial approaches 
in the resolution of associated environmental and natural resource use 
conflicts. 
New Zealand is currently engaged in a major reform of its resource 
management law. This commenced in 1988 and is still proceeding via 
an extensive public consultation process (New Zealand, Ministry for the 
Environment 1988). 
Public input and submissions to the review have strongly favoured an 
administrative tribunal rather than a court as the appeal body and have 
called for greater provision in the law for mediation. In fact this aspect 
of the appeals proposals drew the most comment, and submissions were 
overwhelmingly in favour of greater legislative provision for mediation 
as an effective, time saving and less costly process for environmental 
dispute resolution (New Zealand, Ministry for the Environment 1989: 
28). Other comments supported mediation in scoping, in pre-hearing 
conferences, and to resolve technical and scientific issues: 
The non-adversarial process is particularly important for technically 
complicated resource development projects, for example, gold and 
coal mining. For these projects, decisions based on technical 
information should in most cases, be better than those influenced 
by legal manipulation in a court room situation (KRTA Ltd 1988: 
29). 
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The Resource Management Law Reform Process has yet to be completed 
and it remains to be seen what provisions are made for mediation in the 
new environmental dispute resolution system. There are, nevertheless, 
definite indications that public preference is for non-judicial 
determination of environmental disputes and for the majority of natural 
resource and environmental decision making to be made at a regional 
level (Hayward 1988). 
3.4.6 Australia 
In 1982, Faulkes stated that: 
the use of community based mediation as an alternative to court 
action for the resolution of minor civil or criminal disputes is in 
its infancy in Australia (Faulkes 1982: 1). 
If community mediation was in its infancy in 1982, environmental 
mediation remains foetal in 1989. 
It is really only in the 1980s that interest in ADR processes and programs 
has taken off in Australia (David 1987). The reasons given by David for 
this upsurge in interest are: 
(i) increased litigation resulting from an increase in legislated rights 
and courses of action to enforce them; for example, anti-
discrimination and environmental protection legislation; 
(ii) decline in informal dispute resolution processes such as public 
negotiation where third parties came from the community, church 
or family; 
(iii) advances in technology which have increased the likelihood of 
harm being traced to its perpetrator; for example, in cases of 
environmental damage; 
(iv) court delays; 
(v) problems with adjudication including the high cost; time lost 
through protracted disputes and court delays; the limited remedies 
available; the depersonalisation of disputes; the adversarial 
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approach; and the incamprehensibility of proceedings because of 
the procedural emphasis; and 
(vi) community empowerment resulting from the 1960s movement to 
return control over disputes and their resolution to the disputants 
and the community (David 1987: 4-5). 
In 1980, the New South Wales Government established a Community 
Justice Centres Pilot Project to develop community based dispute 
resolution in New South Wales, and the Community justice Centre (Pilot 
Project) Act 1980 was passed (Faulkes 1982). 
In 1984 a Community Mediation Service was established in Adelaide. In 
1986 the Victorian Attorney-General announced the government's 
intention to establish four Neighbourhood Mediation Service Centres in 
urban and rural Victoria and, in that same year, Western Australia tabled 
a Community Justice Centre (Pilot Project) Bill and established a Family 
Neighbourhood Mediation Service (Bryson 1986). 
Mediation in Australia has focused primarily on the resolution of 
community and neighbourhood disputes and it was not until the creation 
of the Australian Commercial Disputes Centre (ACDC) in January 1986 
as a private company limited by guarantee, that mediation branched out 
into the resolution of commercial disputes. ACDC was established by the 
New South Wales government following a survey of Sydney business 
people which showed: 
that there was very strong demand by the business community for 
a new option to resolve business disputes particularly as arbitration 
in Australia had become more expensive than litigation and just 
as complex (Newton 1989: 8). 
Newton, Secretary-General of ACDC, supports the perception that 
mediation has excellent potential to help resolve environmental disputes. 
However ACDC has no experience in environmental dispute resolution 
and although it has considered expanding its operations to include 
environmental mediation as a commercial operation, it is concerned 
about the difficulties of determining a fee structure for multiparty disputes 
in which there is an imbalance of financial resources - as is often the case 
in- environmental disputes (Sandford 1989b). 
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From a search of the literature and From regular contact with nationai -
and international networks of ADR and EDR colleagues, it appears that • 
mediation of environmental/public disputes in Australia has yet to begin 
in a formal sense. The only writings on EDR appear to be those of the 
present author, although there has been much debate and many 
publications in the areas of land-use planning and environmental law. 
In land-use planning, New South Wales established a system of public 
enquiries on planning and environmental issues in 1979 with the 
Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979. This created the 
statutory office of Commissioners of Inquiry to conduct public enquiries 
and report their findings to the Minister for Planning and Environment 
who is responsible for decision making under the Act (Woodward 1984). 
The procedures adopted are designed "to provide increased opportunity 
for public involvement and participation in environmental planning 
and assessment" (S5 (c)). 
Although the Commissioners contend that they provide a mediation 
service, it is not mediation as a voluntary process in which the process 
and outcomes are controlled by the parties rather than by the mediator. 
Rather, the Commissioners act as arbitrators in that they make 
recommendations to the Minister on the decision to be taken. 
One trend evident in environmental law in Australia, is the promotion 
of an ecocentric rather than an anthropocentric approach. From the 
ranks of Australian environmental law has come a sustained call for a 
new ethic of "social ecology" rather than the traditional anthropocentric 
ethic, to underpin environmental law and decision making (Boer 1984), 
and (Preston 1987) advocates the adoption of ecological criteria as the 
basis for the development of effective environmental laws. 
That environmental law in Australia still favours a traditional adversarial 
and litigious approach is not surprising, given that even environmental 
lawyers are the product of adversarially focused training and that most 
operate from a private enterprise base. In November 1989 at the National 
Environmental Law (Australia) Conference, Adelaide, Fowler promoted 
the idea of a national environmental law firm to undertake environmental 
litigation on behalf of groups/individuals concerned about environmental 
protection. Such firms are in operation in the USA and are generally 
funded from philanthropic trusts. This is the model Fowler proposes for 
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Australia. It does, liOwever, appear to contradict David's assertion - (1987: 
15) that there is a move away from adjudication in Australia towards 
ADR. On the other hand, David was referring to the use of ADR for the 
resolution of community and commercial, rather than environmental, 
disputes and as has been the pattern in both the USA and Canada, EDR 
tends to follow ADR. 
It seems probable that this will also be the case in Australia as dissatisfaction 
with adversarial processes, both judicial and administrative, increases. 
This dissatisfaction has been the precursor of the rise of EDR in the USA 
and Canada and there is every indication that it is already gaining 
momentum in Australia. The disputes profiled in the following chapter, 
and the call for legislative and administrative review of environmental 
decision making processes in Tasmania by government, industry, 
members of the judiciary, and the community, support this view. 
3.5 	Mediation and public disputes - in theory 
In order to appreciate why and how mediation is so effective in the 
resolution of distributional disputes, it is necessary to understand the 
primary sources of environmental controversies, the characteristics of 
environmental/public disputes, and the stages in their development. 
This then places in context the mediation process itself, including the 
roles of the mediator and the techniques used in environmental 
mediation: 
If there is a secret of environmental mediation - a characteristic 
that accounts for its ability to generate successful agreements - it 
lies in the informal nature of the process (Amy 1987: 43). 
What is unique about mediation is that it allows for the direct participation 
of the parties relatively unencumbered by the formal rules of procedure 
of the courts and administrative processes and, most importantly, it enables 
parties in an environmental controversy to identify and discuss the real 
sources of their conflict. Amy comments (1987: 43) that environmental 
conflicts can never be finally resolved unless the parties have an 
opportunity to address the real obstacles that lie in the way of their 
agreement and this is just what traditional adversarial approaches fail to 
do. For example, litigation rarely addresses the substantive issues in 
disputes, and courts are inhibited by rules of evidence, restrictive rules of 
standing and procedural inflexibility. The public hearings and 
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administrative tribunals are also adversarial and are resiiik:ted to 
addressing the specific legislation or regulation being considered. The 
following case illustrates this. 
In 1986, the Tasmanian Environment Protection Appeal Board (EPAB) 
handed down its determination on appeals against the decision by the 
Director of Environmental Control to grant an operating licence to 
Tasmanian Silicon Smelters Pty Ltd, an issue popularly known as the 
Electrona case. The EPAB ruled, as a threshold matter, that economic 
issues generally were not relevant unless impinging upon hardship to 
any person. 
This effectively dismissed the economic impact component of the appeals, 
although the EPAB subsequently stated: 
It is not the duty or function of this Board to enter the field of law 
reform, but it is obvious to us that the Act needs revision in order 
that its substantive provisions and procedures are fair to all parties 
(Tasmania, EPAB 1986: 58). 
In short, when environmental disputes are addressed in the context of 
traditional judicial and administrative institutions they are often framed 
in a way that inhibits their resolution. In contrast, mediation can allow 
the parties to more easily address and resolve the issues separating them 
(Amy 1987). 
Mediation is not, however, an automatic process of enlightenment, and 
the mediator presence is critical in getting the parties to address the real 
sources of their conflicts. Amy further states that "in long and bitter 
controversies, parties often come to assume that the dispute is a win/lose 
one based on irreconcilable differences and interests" (1987: 43). The role 
of the mediator here is to assist parties to identify the issues and the 
common ground so that they come to see the problem as less intractable 
than it first appeared. The marine farm dispute cited in Chapter 4 is such 
an example, where the problem was based on misinformation and 
miscommunication but where there was a significant amount of common 
ground, and so room to negotiate, had mediation been able to proceed. 
It is this process of reframing the issues that accounts for the ability of 
environmental mediation to generate mutually satisfactory agreements 
to difficult controversies (Amy 1987: 44). 
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3.5.1 Sources of environmental controversy 
There are three (3) primary sources of environmental controversy 
according to Amy (1987). They are: 
(i) Psychosocial disputes that revolve around negative stereotyping 
and overheated emotions; 
(ii) Data disputes that centre around scientific arguments; and 
(iii) Interest disputes that involve competing or different interests. 
(i) 	Psychosocial disputes  
Values, attitudes and ideology are central to many environmental/public 
disputes as they underlie the positions adopted by the parties and can act 
as a barrier t , resolution of the substantive issues and, ultimately, to 
agreement. Psychosocial factors cannot be addressed by conventional 
judicial and policy making processes. 
The informality of the mediation process provides a constructive 
alternative forum where these issues can be addressed. At times mediators 
are required to act in a quasi-therapeutic role in mediations (Amy 1987; 
Knaster 1989). However, when a mediator becomes aware that it is a 
personality or psychosocial factor and not a substantive issue that is 
blocking settlement, she/he is often in a position to recommend a change 
of negotiator as the representative of a particular party or interest group. 
"Substituting a different representative can sometimes be the key step 
towards facilitating an agreement" (Amy 1987: 48). 
Another psychosocial barrier is negative stereotyping. Amy (1987: 52) 
considers that stereotyping and adversarial approaches are mutually 
supporting, and mediation seeks to break this cycle by undermining these 
dysfunctional images. Bingham's analysis (1986) of stereotypes in public 
disputes supports Amy's contention. Bingham noted that the common 
stereotype of public disputes is that of conflict between developers and 
environmental or public interest groups. This is an oversimplification. 
Reality is somewhat different. In fact, in an analysis of mediated site-specific 
disputes in the USA, Bingham (1986: XIX) identified the parties at the 
negotiating table as follows: 
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Environmental groups and private 
companies only (the stereotype) 
Environmental group plus others 
Private corporations plus others 
Federal, State and Local 
government plus others 
21% (of all mediated disputes) 
35% (of all mediated disputes) 
34% (of all mediated disputes) 
82% (of all mediated disputes) 
Bingham also noted that many mediated disputes involve only public 
agencies. 
In summary, it is this ability to deal with the psychosocial dimensions of 
environmental controversies that helps mediators to succeed where 
traditional approaches have failed (Amy 1987). 
(ii) 	Data disputes 
Many environmental disputes revolve around complex scientific and 
technical issues. Scientific argument is often central to a particular dispute 
where experts disagree on scientific facts or their interpretation, rather 
than about the broader issues of the dispute, such as whether or not to 
construct a facility. 
That the adversarial arena is inadequate for dealing with scientific evidence 
is accepted by Jeffrey (1986). However, he is also of the opinion that in 
the absence of a viable alternative to fully replace the adversarial legal 
process, the existing system should be retained. He is not convinced that 
a system of peer review or ADR would be an improvement. In contrast, 
Ozawa and Susskind (1985) consider that science-intensive disputes 
warrant special attention, and that the usual adversarial approach does 
not provide for an understanding of scientific evidence or the resolution 
of scientific agreement. These differences in opinion between Jeffrey and 
Ozawa and Susskind are attributable in part to their differing professional 
perspectives. Jeffrey is a lawyer (and Chairman of the Ontario 
Environmental Assessment Board) while Ozawa and Susskind are 
professional mediators and academics from the Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology. 
Ozawa and Susskind point out that "scientific investigations often produce 
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vifying results depending on the institutional environments -in- which 
they are undertaken and the political orientation of the investigators" 
(1985: 25). They maintain that there are four underlying causes of scientific 
disagreement: miscommunication, differences in the design of scientific 
methodology, errors in scientific study, and differences in the 
interpretation of their findings. 
In the opinion of Ozawa and Susskind, mediation offers a greater 
opportunity than do traditional means for interaction among scientists, 
affected parties and decision makers, as a range of mediation techniques 
such as information sharing, joint fact finding, an independent expert, 
and collaborative model building can be used. Ozawa and Susskind 
consider that mechanisms that seek to resolve disagreements among 
scientists by separating them from decision makers and affected interests 
are undesirable as they place unwarranted power in the hands of scientists 
(1985: 36). Scientific or data disputes are usually only one component of 
an environmental issue and scientists must remain accountable to the 
public. 
Mediation helps clarify the power and limitations of scientific analysis by 
uncovering the basis of the scientific disagreement (Ozawa and Susskind 
1985: 36). It also provides a hitherto absent mechanism for ensuring that 
people have access to accurate information and can share information in 
a constructive manner. 
(iii) 	Interest Disputes 
Interest disputes are the stereotype of environmental disputes; that is, 
resource exploitation versus resource preservation. Contrary to popular 
belief such disputes are not intractable and there is often considerable 
common ground on which the parties can negotiate. Some mediators 
maintain that there are three kinds of interests present in any 
environmental controversy - conflicting interests, different interests and 
common interests (Fisher and Ury, in Amy 1987: 58). Mediators can 
assist parties to differentiate between their position on a particular issue 
and their interests. More often than not it is the parties' public positions, 
rather than their underlying interests, that are in conflict. The private 
and voluntary nature of environmental mediation affords parties the 
opportunity to discuss these interests without a public loss of face. 
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As Amy (1987: 60) notes, in most traditional policy approaches, the focus 
of discussion is usually on the legal or policy issues and not on the 
underlying motivations. When the focus is on policies, parties take up 
positions that are often directly conflictual, so that a focus on policy 
merely encourages an adversarial atmosphere: 
In mediation, the focus can become interests rather than policies. 
This can introduce greater flexibility and creativity into the process, 
and this greatly increases the chances of settlement (Amy 1987: 60). 
The value and appeal of mediation therefore lies in its ability to achieve 
breakthroughs in controversial and perhaps protracted disputes. By 
bringing the parties together in an informal atmosphere, a mediator uses 
a range of techniques to encourage communication and negotiation in 
order to examine and reframe the dispute so that a mutually satisfactory 
settlement is reached. 
3.5.2 Characteristics of public disputes 
Environmental/public disputes have a number of characteristics which 
distinguish them from labour-management, community justice and 
commercial disputes. In fact Carpenter and Kennedy (1988) maintain 
that public disputes are decidedly different from these disputes in which 
the adversaries are few and clearly identified. Although no dispute is 
identical with another, public disputes do have common characteristics. 
They are: 
(i) 	A complicated network of interests: 
(a) new parties emerge as the dispute proceeds; 
(b) varying levels of expertise; 
(c) different forms of power; 
(d) lack of continuing relationships; 
(e) differing decision making procedures; and 
(f) unequal accountability. 
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(ii) 	Procedures are not standardized: 
(a) no formal guidelines; and 
(b) influence of government rules and regulations. 
(iii) A broad range of issues: 
(a) new issues emerge as the dispute proceeds; 
(b) the importance of scientific/technical information; and 
(c) strongly held values. 
To discuss each characteristic in turn: 
(i) 	A complicated network of interests  
(a) It is not uncommon for a public dispute to involve 30 or more 
parties, parties being government agencies, public interest groups, 
private corporations and industry organisations. It is also not 
uncommon for new parties to emerge as a dispute progresses. Issues 
identified initially as either central or peripheral can reverse in 
importance, bringing with them new parties to the negotiating 
table who were not originally identified as stakeholders in the 
dispute. 
(b) Levels of expertise also vary. Public disputes often involve complex 
problems of scientific/technical information and debate; economic 
impact; employment issues; complicated legal and regulatory 
procedures; and not all parties have the same level of expertise in 
each area. This can result in misinformation, distrust and a 
perceived imbalance of power. 
(c) Power, real or perceived, can take many , forms: information; 
financial resources; communication, negotiation and media skills; 
personal networks; and capacity to exert political pressure are all 
sources of power. Power is not vested solely in government agencies 
and private corporations or industry groups. As indicated it can 
take many forms, and a small community group, not restricted by 
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bureaucratic hierarchies an-d—fegulations and with ready access to 
the media, local networks and politicians, can equalise what was 
originally perceived to be a power imbalance in a dispute. 
(d) A lack of continuing relationships is another feature of network 
interests in public disputes (Carpenter and Kennedy 1988: 6). This 
may be the case in large urban areas but experiences in rural areas 
and in Tasmania are likely to be different. In these instances the 
overlap between private and public relationships is marked. More 
often than not, employment, social, religious, sporting and family 
networks overlap - if not collide - which then makes the negative 
impact of a public dispute potentially all the more devastating for 
both the individual and the local community. This has certainly 
been the experience in Tasmania. 
(e) Another network complication is that different organisations have 
different decision making processes and procedures. Government 
agencies and corporations have hierarchical decision making 
structures while many community groups work on a consensus 
model. This can create tensions among parties to a dispute when 
quick decisions are required and the consensus representative has 
to return to his/her group to obtain agreement. 
(f) Accountability also varies among groups. Government agencies 
are accountable in the public interest; private sector companies are 
accountable to their shareholders and have legal obligations. Public 
interest/community groups are accountable to their members but 
they are not usually legally bound in the same way as private 
companies and public agencies. 
(ii) 	Procedures are not standardised 
(a) 	As has already been demonstrated, one of the major difficulties 
with the management of public disputes has been the lack of formal 
guidelines and mechanisms or structures for resolving disputes. 
Current structures are adversarially-oriented, inflexible and unable 
to deal with the complexities or the substantive issues inherent in 
public disputes. 
The multiplicity of jurisdictions and the lack of clarity in relation 
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to legislative superiority is clearly demonstrated in discussion of 
the approvals processes in Chapter 4. 
(b) 	Government agencies are often parties to public disputes and 
decision makers in the public interest. It is therefore understandable 
that they may be perceived to have a conflict of interest in disputes 
in which they are involved. Public suspicions may also be 
compounded by the limited opportunities for public consultation 
and the restrictive rules of standing. Governmental dispute 
resolution capacities are further inhibited by regulations, policies, 
hierarchical decision-making and, some may say, the politicization 
of the bureaucracy. 
(iii) A broad range of issues 
(a) Public disputes usually involve a wide range of complex issues 
(Carpenter and Kennedy 1988), and new issues frequently emerge 
as a dispute progresses. For example, in the Brunswick-Richmond 
Powerline dispute, potential health hazards posed by 
electromagnetic radiation only emerged later in a dispute which 
was originally focused on technical and engineering solutions to 
ensure security of electricity supply to an inner urban area of 
Melbourne (Victoria, Powerline Review Panel 1989). 
(b) Scientific and technical data and information are often very 
important issues in a public dispute. An understanding of these 
issues is necessary in order to comprehend the nature and 
dimensions of the dispute and identify possible settlement 
alternatives. Scientific information can also constitute an area of 
dispute within the broader conflict as experts indulge in debate on 
the relative merits of a particular scientific issue and the viability 
of alternative approaches to resolution. 
Another difficulty here is that little scientific information is 
presented in a manner that is easily understood by the less 
technically experienced parties. 
(c) 	As mentioned previously, values and attitudes are critical variables. 
Some are explicit and others implicit. They underpin the positions 
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adopted by the patties and their significance in the final resolution 
is often underestimated. Parties need not share the same values 
to resolve a dispute, but they must learn to appreciate that an 
opposing party's values are important to it and are not necessarily 
"just tactics". 
3.5.3 Public disputes as unmanaged conflict 
Identification of the characteristics of and stages in an environmental/ 
public dispute assists in understanding not only the evolution of the 
dispute, but the role of the mediation process in dispute resolution. Public 
disputes are dynamic and often volatile. They display common 
characteristics as described and they also develop sequentially, or in stages. 
The risk is that a conflict that commences as a resolvable problem, as is 
the case with all the disputes profiled, can spiral out of control into a 
destructive and costly dispute in which there are no real winners; what 
Carpenter and Kennedy (1988) call a spiral of unmanaged conflict. 
The Franklin Dam dispute is such an example. The High Court decision 
in 1983 did not resolve this dispute. It provided a legal decision but did 
not resolve the substantive issues in the dispute, such as the value of 
wilderness, which re-emerged in another form as public disputes over 
the logging of the Southern and Lemonthyme Forests. The author 
contends that there were no real winners in the Franklin Dam dispute. 
It created bitter divisions in all strata of Tasmania society and the state 
still bears the scars today. It was a Pyrrhic victory. 
Figure 1 is taken from Carpenter and Kennedy (1988) and effectively 
illustrates the development of this spiral of unmanaged conflict and the 
positions of the parties at each stage. 
According to Carpenter and Kennedy (1988), this spiral emphasises several 
important points: 
(i) 	Unmanaged conflicts become more serious as psychosocial factors 
tend to escalate in the absence of knowledge about the interests of 
the other side. Consequently the stakes are progressively raised by 
all parties, risks and costs increase, and as Carpenter and Kennedy 
note, complex public disputes can become sinks for resources that 
the parties never meant to commit (1988: 16). 
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FIGURE 1 
Spiral of Unmanaged Conflict 
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(ii) Conflicts that commence as resolvable problems become 
unmanageable because they are not dealt with in the early stages 
of their development. There are two points of view on this. 
The first considers that the earlier the issues in dispute are identified 
and addressed, the greater is the likelihood of minimising the 
destructive impact of polarisation of issues and emotions. The 
second point of view favours allowing the dispute to reach an 
impasse so as to provide an additional incentive for the parties to 
resolve the dispute. 
A case can be put for each, but much depends on the dispute. Each 
dispute must be treated as unique. 
(a) Early intervention 
Jay Hair of the National Wildlife Federation, USA, argues (1984) 
that mediation, if initiated early in a dispute, has the ability to 
achieve true consensus rather than just a "deal" or "bargain". He 
also considers that mediation is only effective in the prelitigation 
phase. The use of mediation in the environmental impact 
assessment (EIA) process is an example of the value of early 
intervention. 
(b) Impasse intervention 
On the other hand, Adler (1987) emphasises "ripeness" of a case, 
that is, a case at impasse. The parties cannot proceed further and 
there is usually a deadline, be it a development plan, or government 
or court imposed decision. 
Proponents of this point of view consider an impasse situation 
provides an additional incentive to negotiate and is more likely to 
ensure commitment of the parties to the mediation process. 
(iii) The cost of continuing destructive conflict is enormous. Not only 
does it include the tangible costs of legal fees, loss of commercial 
advantage, time out from work, personal time, and resource loss, 
but, as can been seen in the Tasmanian disputes cited, it includes 
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incalculable damage to personal and community relationships and 
professional reputations. 
Resources are spent on carrying on the fight rather than solving 
the problem, and the damage to the community may be irretrievable. 
In concluding their expose of the stages in a spiral of unmanaged 
conflict, Carpenter and Kennedy emphasise that this spiral of 
confrontation is not inevitable but that it is predictable when 
nothing is done to manage it (1988: 17). The mediation process 
provides a mechanism whereby conflict can be managed in the 
early stages or, alternatively, mediation can be used to resolve a 
deadlock or impasse and so minimize the costs, tangible and 
intangible, to all parties. 
3.5.4 The mediation process - techniques, mediator roles and 
functions  
Mediators may effectively intervene in environmental conflicts at several 
points in the early stages of conflict development or at impasse. They 
may also enter conflicts at a variety of levels according to their degree of 
organisation and intensity - latent, emerging and manifest (Moore 1987). 
As described by Moore: "latent conflicts are characterized by underlying 
tensions that have not fully developed and have not escalated into highly 
polarized disputes" (1988: 16). 
In these cases, the mediator works with the parties to identify the affected 
interests, educate all parties as to the issues and interests involved, and 
then assists the parties to develop a problem solving process. 
In emerging conflicts, the parties are identified, they acknowledge that 
there is a dispute, most issues are apparent, but no problem solving 
mechanism or process exists. Emerging conflicts have the potential for 
escalation if a resolution procedure is not implemented. In these conflicts, 
the mediator assists the parties to develop a negotiation process and then 
to communicate and problem-solve until agreement is reached. 
In manifest conflicts, parties are engaged in an ongoing dispute which 
may have reached an impasse. Mediator intervention is often targeted at 
reframing the issues and changing the negotiation process to break the 
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-deadlock: 
To work effectively on conflicts, the intervenor needs a special 
road map or "conflict map" of the dispute that details why a conflict 
is occurring, any barriers to settlement and procedures to manage 
or resolve the dispute (Moore 1987: 26). 
Moore argues that most conflicts have multiple causes and the principal 
tasks of the mediator and the parties are to identify the central causes of 
the conflict and take action to address them. As we have seen, there are 
three primary sources of environmental disputes; psychosocial factors, 
data/scientific disagreements, and competing or conflicting interests. 
Mediator intervention is then tailored to address and resolve the causes 
of the dispute. Figure 2 is taken from Moore (1987) and it illustrates the 
relationship between causes and interventions in environmental conflicts. 
Having determined the causes of the conflict and the nature of the 
intervention required, the mediator is likely to provide assistance in one 
or more of three areas (Moore 1989: 894). 
(i) The assessment of the dispute and its readiness (or "ripeness") for 
resolution, the identification of parties and issues, and the 
convening of negotiations; 
(ii) the design and implementation of a process for mediated 
negotiations; and 
(iii) aid in breaking a specific deadlock, the resolution of which will 
allow the parties to proceed with successful negotiations. 
Most mediation practitioners identify stages in the mediation process 
which correlate with the three areas of assistance proposed by Moore 
(1989). In 1987, Moore identified twelve stages in the mediation process, 
Carpenter and Kennedy in 1988 identified three stages, and Knaster (1989b), 
four stages. In the compression of the mediation process into three or 
four stages rather than twelve, it is fair to say that each of these stages 
contains a number of sub-stages or components, which Moore would 
have classified as discrete stages. 
The four stages identified by Knaster (1989b) in the mediation process 
are: 
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FIGURE 2  
Sphere of Conflict - Causes and Interventions 
Possible Interest-Based Interventions 
Possible Data Interventions 
Reach agreement on what data are important. 
Agree on process to coiled data 
Develop common criteria to assess data. 
Use third-party experts to gain outside opinion 
or break deadlocks. 
Data conflicts are caused by 
Lack of information. 
Misinformation. 
Different views on what is 
relevant. 
Different interpretations of 
data. 
Different assessment 
procedures. 
Relationship conflicts are caused 
by 
Strong emotions. 
Misperceptions or stereotypes. 
Poor communication or 
miscommunica Lion. 
Repetitive negative behaviour.  
Focus on Interests, not positions. 
Look for objective criteria. 
Develop integrative solutions that address 
needs of all parties. 
Search for ways to expand options or resources. 
Develop trade-offs to satisfy interests of 
different strengths./ 
Interest conflicts are 
caused by 
Perceived or actual 
competitive: 
Substantive (content) 
interests; 
Procedural interests; 
Psychological 
interests. 
Structural conflicts are caused 
by 
Destructive patterns of 
behaviour or interaction. 
Unequal control, ownership, or 
distribution of resources. 
Unequal power and authority. 
Geographic, physical, or 
environmental factors that 
hinder co-operation. 
Time constraints. 
Value conflicts are caused by 
Different criteria for evaluating 
ideas or behaviour. 
Exdusive intrinsically valuable 
goals. 
Different ways of life, ideology, 
and religion. Possible Structural Interventions 
Possible Relationship 
Interventions 
Control expression of emotions 
through procedure, ground rules, 
caucuses, and so forth. 
Promote expression of emotions 
by legitimizing feelings and 
providing a process. 
Clarify perceptions and build 
positive perceptions. 
Improve quality and quantity of 
communication. 
Block negative repetitive 
behaviour by changing structure. 
Enviru rage positive 
problem-solving attitudes. 
Possible Value-Related 
Inteventions 
Avoid defining problem in 
terms of value. 
Allow parties to agree and to 
disagree. 
Create spheres of influence 
in which one set of values 
dominates. 
Search for superordinate goal 
that all parties share. 
Clearly define and change roles. 
Replace destructive behaviour 
patterns. 
Reallocate ownership or control of 
resources. 
Establish a fair and mutually 
acceptable decision-making process. 
Change negotiation process from 
positional to interest-based 
bargaining. 
Modify means of influence used by 
parties (less coercion, more 
persuasion). 
Change physical and environmental 
relationships of parties (closeness and 
distance) 
Modify external pressures on parties. 
Change time constraints (more or less 
time. 
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(i) assessment of the dispute - identifying the issues, causes and parties; 
(ii) convening - negotiating the process to be used; 
(iii) negotiation - negotiating the issues in the dispute; and 
(iv) implementation - enforcement and evaluation of the agreement. 
(i) 	Assessment  
The objective of this preliminary review or exploratory phase is to 
determine if the parties in dispute are interested in dispute resolution 
before the mediator proceeds with a full-scale analysis (Wondolleck, in 
Carpenter and Kennedy 1989: 74). Information is obtained from initial 
contacts with the parties, usually separately, and From secondary sources 
such as government reports, media coverage and discussions with others 
who are knowledgeable about the situation. 
If the parties are interested in considering mediation, a formal conflict 
analysis commences. Information is collected both directly and indirectly 
From the parties and relevant others and assessed. This conflict analysis 
forms the basis for the development of a conflict management plan. 
Knaster (1989b) considers that there are several key questions to be asked 
of the parties at this stage: 
of the developer - "What would you be willing to do to modify 
your operations in order to obtain approval to proceed From your 
opponents?" 
of the environmentalists - "What would it take for you to agree to 
let the developer (whom you oppose) proceed with his/her 
operations?" 
of both parties - 
- 	"What will you win, if you win in court?" 
"What will you win, if you win politically?" 
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"How long will it take you to win it?" and 
"Is that better than negotiating?". 
Once the parties agree to negotiate, the mediator can then commence 
designing a mediation process strategy and a program to implement this. 
(ii) 	Convening 
In an environmental mediation process the mediator plays the role of 
convenor by helping the parties to negotiate a framework/process for 
their deliberations that reflects their needs and relationships (Knaster 
1989a: 11). In this way the mediation process provides a mechanism for 
convening face-to-face interaction. 
The first step in this phase is deciding the "shape of the table", that is, 
who needs to participate. It is essential for the success and stability of the 
outcome that all stakeholders are represented. It is not feasible to have 
large numbers of people participating directly in negotiation, and is more 
manageable if categories of parties such as a local community or public 
interest group can nominate a representative or spokesperson who has 
authority to speak and make decisions on their behalf. This authority to 
make decisions at the negotiating table, without the need to constantly 
return to seek group endorsement, is important. Although it can pose 
significant difficulties for community groups which operate on a consensus 
model, the group must have full confidence in the ability of its 
representative to negotiate on its behalf. Any group which is considering 
using mediation, must therefore have resolved this issue prior to the 
commencement of mediation. 
In addition to deciding on who needs to participate, the parties must 
decide on procedures for exchanging information, establish a timetable, 
and set goals for the outcome (Knaster 1989a: 11). 
Ground rules for the conduct of parties and procedures to be adopted are 
also agreed upon, as a clearly defined process is essential when dealing 
with complex and contentious issues. For example, the parties may agree 
not to speak with the media during the mediation process, not to attack 
each other's motives or values, and to decide on the types of data to be 
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obtained -and the methods by which that ciata will be obtained (Carpenter 
and Kennedy 1989: 131). The parties also need to agree upon ways to 
handle crises that may arise during the course of negotiation. 
It is in this phase that the parties decide on the role of technical/ scientific 
experts. They may decide to seek independent expert appraisal on technical 
issues and the mediator can assist the parties in reaching agreement on 
the source of the expertise. 
By designing the negotiation process together and with the assistance of 
the mediator, the parties build a basis of mutual trust and cooperation. It 
is a psychological preparation for the negotiation of the substantive issues 
in the dispute, helps check perceptions of negative stereotypes, and 
develops a recognition of the legitimacy of the parties and the issues 
(Moore 1987). 
(iii) Negotiation 
In this stage, the mediator assists the parties to identify their important 
issues and to voice their own concerns about the issues, face -to-face and 
often for the first time. It provides a non-threatening forum for interaction 
and for each party to review the history and context of the dispute, to 
reach agreement on a common data base, and to discuss underlying 
interests rather than the public positions of the parties. 
Essentially the mediator helps the parties to talk through the issues and 
to consider the interrelationship of the issues and how to package these. 
For example, the parties may identify a hundred or so individual issues 
which can be effectively packaged into, say, five packages. 
During this stage, the mediator usually engages in "shuttle diplomacy", 
caucusing separately with the parties, interspersed with joint sessions 
and educating the parties about each other's interests. Mediator observance 
of and respect for party confidentiality is critical as the basis of trust and 
credibility. 
During this stage any hidden interests of the parties are uncovered in 
addition to their substantive, procedural and psychological interests 
(Moore 1987). 
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The identification of common ground is the most critical step in the 
balancing of interests. As Knaster (1989a: 11) says: "even though the 
common ground may be based upon very general premises or ideals, 
identifying the commonality of interests provides the basis for reaching a 
negotiated settlement". She gives examples of general principles and 
goals as being: improving the regional, state or national economy; utilizing 
national resources in a sustainable manner to benefit all; and preserving 
unique or valued areas. 
The mediator plays an important role in the identification of common 
ground by steering the parties away from starting positions and demands 
and towards considering what they can agree upon (Knaster 1989a: 12). 
In this negotiation stage, options for settlement are also identified or 
generated. Parties are often willing to settle some issues but to defer 
others for further research or for litigation. Settlement options are often 
better consolidated in a single settlement agreement or package. This 
ensures that the parties are bound to accept all the options, so that rejection 
of one option means that the entire package is rejected (Lake 1980). Parties 
are less likely to jeopardise an entire package than they are a single issue 
or option. It is more effective and efficient and more likely to produce a 
stable and lasting outcome. The construction of settlement options or 
packages is a case of assessing how the parties' interests can be met by the 
available options, and also an assessment of the costs and benefits of 
selecting the options (Moore 1987). 
Settlement agreements should be written and can take the form of a legal 
contract or they can be ratified by a court or administrative tribunal (Jeffrey 
1987), if the parties so wish. 
As Knaster (1989a: 11) notes, the negotiation process is solution oriented. 
The outcome or solution is designed and agreed to by the parties, rather 
than being designed by the mediator or an external arbitrator or adjudicator. 
This being the case, the parties are more likely to support its 
implementation and so ensure its success, thus avoiding the problem of 
issues re-emerging at a later date and/or in another form or jurisdiction. 
(iv) Implementation 
Having reached a final resolution, it is essential that the agreement is 
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Implemented. As Carpenter afid Kennedy (1988: 149) state, "the key to 
carrying out agreements is to include a plan for implementation in the 
final agreement, not to produce one as an Afterthought". 
Procedural steps to operationalize the agreement are usually established 
(Moore 1987: 248), as is a plan for dealing with setbacks and violations of 
the agreement. For example, the parties may decide to establish an 
evaluation and monitoring procedure to ensure that the agreement is 
carried out, and an independent agency or individual may be appointed 
to oversee this. An enforcement and commitment mechanism may also 
be implemented. The monitoring committee may not only take 
responsibility for identifying and investigating a suspected violation of 
the agreement, but it may also be given the authority to apply monetary 
penalties, or remove privileges. 
The final step in the implementation process is to determine the future 
role of the mediator. The parties may decide that they are confident of 
their ability to implement the agreement and that there is no further 
role for the mediator. Alternatively they may decide that there is value 
in a continuing role to assist in handling future difficulties such as breaches 
of the agreement. 
3.5.4.1 The mediator's roles and functions 
The roles and functions of a mediator are as diverse as the disputes that 
she/he mediates. In essence, the mediator has a responsibility for ensuring 
the success of the conflict management or dispute resolution process, 
and she/he achieves this objective by carrying out a number of functions, 
some of which have been outlined in the intervention strategies described 
in the previous section. 
Mediation literature contains numerous "shopping lists" of mediator 
roles, functions and qualities, both professional and personal. There are, 
however, significant areas of agreement among the authors which can be 
summarised using, primarily, information obtained from Stulberg (1981) 
and Carpenter and Kennedy (1988) in order to provide an overview of 
the core roles and functions of a mediator of environmental/public 
disputes. Much EDR literature on the roles and functions of mediators 
fails to adequately define and to differentiate roles and functions. Stulberg 
identifies seven roles for mediators. He describes these as "functions", 
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though they could be more appropriately designated "roles", being the 
part, or "character", played by the mediator in the context of the dispute. 
On the other hand Carpenter and Kennedy, in their description of mediator 
functions (1988: 191), describe the actions or activities undertaken by a 
mediator as part of his/her "role" as mediator in a dispute. Differentiating 
thus between Stulberg's mediator "functions" and those of Carpenter 
and Kennedy, the roles played by mediators in dispute resolution, as 
described by Stulberg (1981) are: 
(i) Catalyst.  The very presence of the mediator affects how the parties 
interact. Irrespective of whether the mediator maintains a relatively 
passive procedural role or undertakes a more active role (which 
could include suggesting substantive resolutions to the dispute as 
suggested by Susskind 1981), the mere presence of a third party 
neutral will impact significantly on interaction among the parties 
and their reactions to one another. Stulberg (1981: 91) contends 
that, given this situation, a mediator takes on a unique responsibility 
for the continued integrity of the discussions. 
(ii) Educator.  As has been noted, the mediator must educate the parties 
as to the process, issues, options and value of a mediated settlement. 
To accomplish this she/he must have a thorough knowledge of 
the parties' positions, interests and constraints, the dynamics of 
the controversy, and the political limitations, to enable her/him 
to explain the reasons for a party's stance or proposal. 
(iii) Translator. As Stulberg succinctly puts it, "the mediator's role is 
to convey each party's proposals in a language that is both faithful 
to the desired objectives of the party and formulated to ensure the 
highest degree of receptivity of the listener" (1981: 92). 
(iv) The presence of the mediator expands the resources available to 
the parties. The mediator can often facilitate the access by parties 
to information or data that was previously inaccessible. 
(v) Bearer of bad news. Negotiations are often emotional, do not 
proceed smoothly, concessions are not easy to make, parties often 
become defensive if they consider they are under attack and parties 
frequently reject a proposal in whole or in part (Stulberg 1981: 93). 
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(vi) An agent of reality. Parties often become fixed on one solution to 
a problem and have difficulty acknowledging viable alternatives. 
The mediator is in the best position to inform the party, as directly 
and candidly as possible, that its objective is simply not obtainable 
through those specific negotiations (Stulberg 1981: 93). 
(vii) A scapegoat. Parties often think that they could have done better 
had they waited longer and demanded more, or that the settlement 
was forced on them. As Stulberg again says, "in the context of 
negotiation and mediation, that focus of blame - the scapegoat - 
can be the mediator" (1981: 94). While being a scapegoat is not a 
comfortable position, it helps circumvent the parties blaming each 
other and thus contributing to a further deterioration in the 
relationship. 
While performing in these roles, which are not sequential and which 
often overlap or change in the course of a mediation, the mediator carries 
out a range of activities or functions in order to achieve a dispute resolution 
objective. As with the mediator's roles, her/his functions are undertaken 
in different combinations and with a variety of emphases, but the 
techniques are well standardized, and a skilled mediator will perform 
some or all of the following functions (Carpenter and Kennedy 1988: 
191). 
(i) Analyse the conflict. This has already been discussed in detail. 
(ii) Design a strategy. The mediator assists the parties to design a 
constructive process for the parties to resolve their differences. 
(iii) Establish productive communication.  A mediator can set up a 
system for communication that promotes the productive exchange 
of information and protects the parties from harm. 
(iv) Manage the Process. A mediator can conduct the entire negotiation 
program, or a mediator's services may be called upon after the 
parties' own efforts to negotiate have failed. 
(v) Deal with data. A mediator can work with the parties to determine 
the nature and type of information required, assist them to collect, 
organize and analyse the relevant information, and to reach 
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agreement on what data has relevance (where the parties are in 
dispute over this). 
(vi) Build and maintain teams within constituencies.  Many public 
disputes involve constituency groups that are neither well 
organized nor familiar with negotiation procedures (Carpenter and 
Kennedy 1989: 192). A mediator can help groups with similar 
interests to form coalitions, select representatives, and select 
replacement representatives if problems arise. The mediator can 
also assist in resolving factional disagreements. 
(vii) Provide a neutral ground. A mediator can provide a neutral and 
private venue for the parties to meet. There is less risk of loss of 
face and feelings of powerlessness than may be associated with 
meeting on a party's traditional ground. 
In addition to considering the core roles and functions of mediators, 
most authors place considerable emphasis on the personal attributes or 
qualities of a mediator. Again, there is general agreement that integrity, 
confidentiality, patience, a non-judgemental approach, excellent 
communication skills and professional standing and credibility are 
paramount. Further qualities identified by Stulberg (1981) as essential 
are: 
(i) the capacity to appreciate the dynamics of the environment in 
which the dispute is occurring - the real world of constraints, 
pressures and frustrations; 
(ii) the mediator must be intelligent, although Stulberg does not 
necessarily agree with Susskind (in Stulberg 1981: 95) who suggests 
that a mediator needs to possess some substantive knowledge about 
the dispute. Stulberg (1981: 94) argues instead that the mediator 
should possess both process (communication) skills and content 
knowledge to be credible to the parties. He further makes the 
distinction between a mediator having the intelligence and capacity 
to ask penetrating questions and the need for a mediator to be an 
expert; 
(iii) a mediator must be neutral with regard to outcome. To quote 
Stulberg: 
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If the mediator's job is to assist the parties to reach a resolution, 
and his commitment to neutrality ensures confidentiality 
then, in an important sense the parties have nothing to lose 
and everything to gain by the mediator's intervention. 
Trust of the mediator by the parties is critical to the success of 
the process and this is secured and reinforced only if the 
mediator is neutral, has no power to insist on a particular 
outcome, and honours the confidences of the parties (1981: 
96). 
There are numerous other mediator roles and functions that are variously 
categorized by proponents of the process. However, the majority have 
been covered in one form or another, the main differences being in the 
terminology used to describe them. Knaster effectively translated 
mediation terminology into "plain English" when she gave a public lecture 
at the Australian National University in 1989. She said that a mediator 
performed three primary roles: 
(i) as a referee between parties and between factions within parties; 
(ii) as a group psychiatrist, to help people feel good about compromise 
which "many still see as a dirty word"; and 
(iii) as an architect "to help parties design three-humped camels", that 
is, it does not matter what a settlement outcome or agreement 
looks like as long as the parties which designed it think it is alright 
and as long as it does the job. 
Environmental mediation runs the risk of being seen as a "quick fix" 
solution, a panacea for the environmental ills of the future. The process 
has considerable merit. Its proponents are very enthusiastic about its 
potential, as are most of the parties that have used it. However it is not 
without its critics. It is not infallible, and it is not desirable that a new 
mystique and a cargo of terminology and professional specialization be 
created to launch it as the "environmental face" of the 1990s. 
Mediation in practice takes different forms. It has its risks, issues and 
inadequacies as does any other process, be it judicial or administrative. 
In order to assess the effectiveness, efficiency and potential of mediation, 
it is necessary to go beyond the theory to the practice. 
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3.6 	Environmental mediation - in practice 
The shape of environmental mediation has changed considerably since 
its debut in the Snoqualmie River dispute in 1973. Through the 1970s 
and into the 1980s it has evolved from a rather ad hoc and reactive 
process initiated by interested parties into a more sophisticated and 
professionalized approach which now takes a number of forms. Mediation 
has typically been used to resolve local, site-specific disputes, and these 
still remain the popular hallmark of environmental mediation. It can, 
however, take other forms, including those classified as policy dialogues, 
joint problem solving and "reg-neg" (regulation negotiation). These are 
particularly significant for environmental disputes in which government 
agencies are a party. 
As Bingham (1986) found in her study, the largest number of mediated 
environmental disputes involve only public agencies, and many 
environmental disputes involve several government agencies at local, 
state and federal levels together with a variety of interest groups. This 
scenario translates readily to Tasmania, where all the disputes profiled 
involved at least one government agency and usually several public 
interest groups. From the author's experience of marine farm 
development in Tasmania, of a total of 18 parties with a direct interest in 
the siting of a salmonid farm, 12 were federal, state or local government 
agencies (Sandford 1989a). 
3.6.1 Forms of mediation 
(i) 	Site Specific Mediation 
In Bingham's analysis of 161 cases mediated in the USA as of 1984, 115 
involved controversies over site-specific issues and 46 involved issues of 
environmental policy (1986: 7). The scale of site-specific disputes can 
vary enormously From the small seven hectare marine farm discussed 
in Chapter 4 to multiple land-use conflicts and the construction of a 
multi-million dollar pulp mill or tourist development in an 
environmentally sensitive area. 
In Bingham's definition of a site specific dispute: 
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a case was considered to be site specific if it concerned a specific 
natural resource such as a river, lake or island or site that was 
defined by its proposed use whereas a case was considered to be a 
policy dispute if the area affected was designated by political 
boundaries such as a city, country, state or the nation as a whole or 
if it involved a type of natural resource than occurs in many 
locations, such as all rivers (Bingham 1986: 10). 
(ii) 	Policy dialogue mediation 
Policy mediation may be defined as: 
a proactive form of intervention that involves the use of a mediator, 
facilitator, or other third party to promote cooperative problem 
solving in complex multiparty conflicts with major policy 
implications (Laue 1988:). 
Policy dialogue does not take place over a particular site specific problem 
but over basic environmental policy issues (Amy 1987: 6). In the USA, 
the National Coal Policy Project was a successful effort to reach a consensus 
among business and environmental leaders on a major national 
environmental policy issue (Bingham 1986; Amy 1987). According to 
Murray and Gusman (cited in Bingham 1986: 18) this project "demonstrated 
a new process whereby individuals of opposing viewpoints could 
rationally discuss the issues until some agreement was reached". By 
1979, the first major policy dialogue on options for high level radioactive 
waste disposal had been convened (Ehrmann in Bingham 1986: 20). 
In the early days of policy dialogues, that is in the 1970s, government 
agencies were not represented as it was considered that this would 
encourage business and environmental leaders to communicate more 
freely (Bingham 1986: 20). However, as their exclusion proved to be an 
obstacle to successful implementation, government officials came to be 
included in all stages of policy dialogues. The 1980s have seen the growing 
use of policy mediation to shape and implement public policy and to 
resolve public policy disputes. 
Public policy mediation can be used to shape policy (that is, the policy 
formation which often culminates in successful legislation), implement 
policy (that is, the translation of laws and policy decisions into 
implementation through the institutionalization of mediation procedures 
in agencies at all levels of government), and to resolve policy disputes 
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(Laue 1988). As Laue concludes in support of the creative use of mediation 
in public policy dialogues: 
,policy makers, mediators and citizens need not wait for laws 
requiring or promoting mediation and other collaborative 
approaches to solving policy problems. In fact, once a procedure is 
formalized in law, it becomes part of the lawyer's system and loses 
some of the creative and informal character that makes it useful 
in complex disputes (Laue 1988: 1). 
However Ehrmann and Lesnick (1988: 98) make the point that "as with 
site-specific mediations, the policy dialogue is not a replacement for the 
traditional policy development mechanism but is rather a tool to 
complement traditional procedures in selected situations where the 
traditional approach may not be functional". Mediators also have a key 
role to play in the education of stakeholders and players in the public 
policy process who are not familiar with this approach. 
(iii) Regulation-negotiation 
The incorporation of negotiation into the administrative rule-making 
process (reg-neg) was proposed as early as 1986 (Bingham 1986). Amy 
considers reg-neg as "an example of a new and potentially very significant 
development in the area of environmental mediation - the formal 
institutionalization of mediation with governmental policy making 
processes" (1987: 6). This form of environmental mediation has been 
described as: 
one involving efforts by regulatory agencies to design 
environmental regulations by first negotiating with 
environmentalists and industry. The intention is to avoid the 
litigation that usually is used to challenge new rules (Bingham, in 
Amy 1987: 6). 
By 1988, negotiated rule making was being used as a way to incorporate 
consensus based decision-making into existing federal administrative 
procedures in the USA. According to Haygood (1988), in the process or 
model of reg-neg that is used in the USA, the agency responsible for 
proposing a regulation forms a federal advisory committee composed of 
representatives of groups with an identifiable stake in the regulation to 
develop a proposed regulation through face-to-face negotiations with 
stakeholders and interested parties. The absence of litigation subsequent 
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to the process is the ultimate measure of the success of-reg-neg. 
In the USA reg-neg has been used to develop emission standards for 
industry, the licensing of a high-level nuclear waste repository, the disposal 
of hazardous waste, and the Asbestos Hazard Emergency Response Act 
(AHERA) 1986 (Haygood 1988: 81). 
Application to Tasmania 
All these forms of environmental mediation could well be used in 
Tasmania. Mediation of site-specific disputes has already been discussed. 
However, public policy dialogues and reg-neg could be employed in the 
development of the proposed Land Conservation legislation or in the 
much needed rationalization of existing land-use planning and land 
management legislations (Mant 1981; 1989). The development of policies 
and codes of practice for the use of agricultural chemicals is another 
example. 
Mediation is undoubtedly an effective addition to the environmental 
decision-making process in its proactive forms of public policy dialogue 
and regulation-negotiation, and in its reactive form as a process for 
resolving disputes, be they site-specific, public policy or negotiation 
disputes. Just how effective the process is will remain an issue for debate 
and further study as the use of environmental mediation in Australia 
and elsewhere increases in the next decade or so. 
3.6.2 The effectiveness and efficiency of mediation 
Evaluating the success and effectiveness of mediation is not an easy task. 
As with any process there are few readily quantifiable or absolute results, 
and the question remains, how can intangibles such as improved 
communication and a lessening of confrontation be measured? Three 
questions appear to be central to the determination of the success of 
mediation as a process for environmental dispute resolution. They are: 
(i) Does mediation really work, and if so how well? That is, how is 
success defined? 
(ii) How do you know? That is, how do you evaluate this? 
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(iii) Who says? That is, who, or from what perspective, is the evaluation 
being undertaken. For example, is the analysis of the effectiveness 
of mediation undertaken by a lawyer, a physical scientist, a social 
scientist, a professional mediator, or a party to a dispute? 
In describing possible evaluation methodologies, Bingham (1986: 65) 
acknowledges that "people hold many and varied views, however, about 
what success means". She opts for relatively simple and observable 
measures in which the actual outcome of each dispute resolution attempt 
is compared with what the parties involved had hoped would occur. An 
alternative approach would be to measure each result against what 
mediation theory or theories of conflict resolution say should have 
happened. Bingham considers this approach inadequate, given the lack 
of agreement among social conflict theorists in relation to the prediction 
of outcomes and the lack of rigour of existing theoretical analysis (1986: 
65). 
Bingham applied three tests or measures of success in her study of 161 
mediated disputes. They were: 
(i) was an agreement reached? 
(ii) to what extent did the parties support the agreement through the 
implementation process? 
(iii) to what extent was the process valuable, whether or not an 
agreement was reached? 
She also analysed the objectives of the parties in each dispute and observed 
three categories of objectives: 
(i) to reach a decision; 
(ii) to agree on recommendations to a decision-making body not directly 
represented in the dispute resolution process; and 
(iii) to improve communications. 
Her results were as follows: In 29 of the 161 cases documented, the parties' 
"principal objective was to improve communications"; in 132 of the cases, 
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the parties' objective was to reach some form of agreement with one 
another. Of these cases, 99 involved site-specific disputes and 33 involved 
policy issues, whilst overall agreements were reached in 78 percent of the 
cases. 
Bingham found little difference in the success rates between site-specific 
and policy disputes in reaching agreement, although she did note 
implementation differences between site-specific and public policy 
disputes, in that some 80 percent of mediated site-specific disputes were 
fully implemented, 13 percent were partially implemented, and 7 percent 
were not implemented. However there was more difficulty in 
implementing the results of policy dialogues or negotiations in that only 
41 percent were fully implemented, 18 percent were partially implemented, 
and 41 percent were not implemented. 
As with the evaluation of any essentially qualitative program, 
determination of the success of mediation is neither easy - nor conclusive 
- in the minds of those more used to quantifiable results. 
Bingham (1986) identified five potential success factors as: 
(i) sound mediator assessment of the dispute at the beginning of each 
case to assist parties in deciding if they wish to proceed with 
mediation and the nature and ground rules of the process are then 
clearly identified and accepted by the parties; 
(ii) the parties must have some incentive to negotiate an agreement 
with one another; 
(iii) parties must be able and willing to appreciate each others' positions 
and to work on developing creative alternatives; 
(iv) the way the consensus-building process is conducted appears to be 
an important factor in whether or not agreements are reached. 
The likelihood of success is not adversely affected by the number 
of parties, issues or the presence of a deadline. 
(v) the most significant, measurable success factor appears to be whether 
those with authority to implement the decision are directly 
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involved in the process. Where they are not directly involved, 
implementation is less likely. 
In analysing factors likely to offset success Bingham commented that 
there were few absolutes and that "all remain hypotheses that require 
further study" (1986: XXII). 
Susskind and Cruikshank (1987) also identified four characteristics of a 
good mediated or negotiated settlement: 
(i) fairness - all the parties see the outcome as fair; 
(ii) efficiency - a better process produces a more efficient as well as a 
fairer outcome; 
(iii) wisdom - the key to wisdom is described as "prospective hindsight"; 
and 
(iv) stability of agreement - it should be feasible, flexible and the timetable 
should be realistic with built-in provision for renegotiation. 
Stability is also dependent on the development of a good working 
relationship so that parties feel able to come back and renegotiate 
if necessary. 
Like Bingham, Susskind and Cruikshank also have difficulty in identifying 
quantitative criteria against which to measure the effectiveness of 
mediation initiatives. It is this difficulty in the quantification of the 
success of the mediation process that tends to be seized upon by mediation 
sceptics. However participant responses appear to be more positive, for 
the parties involved are obviously most concerned about the outcome 
and the process. Parties evaluate the success of an outcome as being the 
extent to which it satisfies their interests and what they perceive to be the 
public interest, and the success of a process is gauged according to its 
fairness, legitimacy, efficiency and the extent to which the parties can 
influence the decision (Bingham 1986: 68). Where the parties have or 
wish to have an ongoing relationship, as is often the case in Tasmanian 
disputes, they are also concerned about their ability to communicate 
effectively with each other in the future. 
Efficiency is a criterion that is commonly used in the evaluation of success. 
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Where mediation is concerned, its proponents argue that it is less - 
expensive and faster than litigation but, as Bingham (1986: XXV) points 
out, "there has been little empirical evidence to support this assertion". 
She adds, however, that "very little information exists about how long it 
takes to either mediate or to litigate environmental disputes, and there 
are several conceptual problems in making comparisons between 
environmental dispute resolution alternatives and litigation" (1986: XXV). 
In comparing the time taken to litigate or to mediate a dispute, Bingham 
notes that law suits that go to trial may take a very long time, but that 
few law suits actually go to trial. This is confirmed by McGillis and 
Mullen (in David 1987: 15) who estimated that some 80-90 percent of 
cases that commence litigation are settled prior to the court hearing. 
Furthermore, as Bingham comments: "voluntary dispute resolution 
processes are not necessarily fast if the issues are complex" (1986: XXV). 
There are also the direct and indirect costs associated with dispute 
resolution. Here, Bingham suggests that the costs of preparing for 
negotiation may be comparable with the costs of preparing for some 
kinds of litigation, especially for public interest groups. A comparison of 
the two approaches vis-a-vis cost and time taken is difficult because of 
conceptual differences, and in many cases mediation is used after litigation 
has failed. In Bingham's opinion a major omission in such a comparison 
of the relative efficiency of litigation and mediation is an evaluation of 
the nature and quality of the outcome, and a more efficient process may 
not be desirable if it leads to a poor outcome as perceived by the parties. 
Bingham concludes that although environmental disputes tend to take 
longer to litigate than do civil suits, it is likely: 
that it is the threat of protracted litigation, not the length of the 
standard case, that creates the popular conception that mediation 
is faster than litigation (1986: XXVI). 
From this study, Bingham surmises that the median duration of EDR 
cases is 5-6 months, but that some 10 percent of the cases took over 18 
months to resolve, whilst "information about the costs of these cases is 
too sparse to report with any confidence" (Bingham 1986: XXVID. 
Further study of the evaluation of the effectiveness and efficiency of the 
mediation process as a complement to litigation and as a dispute resolution 
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process in its own right is required and no doubt this aspect of 
environmental mediation will be researched and scrutinised well into 
the 1990s. An important aspect of any such research will be the 
development of both quantitative and qualitative evaluation criteria, 
which together are capable of reflecting the versatility, process and outcome 
effectiveness of environmental mediation. 
3.6.3 Issues and inadequacies 
The author's examination of the environmental mediation literature 
revealed that critical analysis of mediation was scant relative to the 
literature espousing its value. This is probably symptomatic of a new 
process which has been embraced with enthusiasm as the solution to 
projected resource allocation crises in the twenty first century. The 
criticisms identified appear to emanate either from the legal profession, 
which decries the replacement of litigation with mediation as a prescription 
for second-rate justice, or from mediators who champion the need for 
perfection of the process and the development of a code of ethics and 
training for mediators. Supporters of mediation also express concern 
about the difficulties of ensuring continuity of funding for mediation 
services. There has however been very little attention given to the politics 
of mediation, with the outstanding exception of Amy (1987). 
Amy (1987) urges the need for a more balanced and critical analysis of 
environmental mediation. As he rightly says, mediation has generated 
much enthusiasm, it generates good press, and most of the literature on 
the subject is by professional mediators or mediation supporters. While 
acknowledging the significance and value of mediation, Amy also draws 
attention to some of the issues and criticisms associated with its rapid 
popularization. He discusses the need to separate myth from reality - is 
mediation really cheaper and faster than litigation? Are mediation and 
litigation mutually exclusive? Is mediation really important? Amy also 
refers to mediation as seduction, as its supporters argue that it is more 
democratic and fairer than traditional approaches. Finally, Amy expresses 
concern about the politics of mediation, particularly the imbalance of 
power between developers and environmentalists, and the future role of 
mediation in environmental politics. 
The problem areas of mediation can be roughly categorized as: 
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(i) issues associated with a perception of mediation as a compromise 
and second-rate justice; 
(ii) issues associated with the politics of mediation; 
(iii) issues associated with the professionalization and 
institutionalization of the mediation process; and 
(iv) issues associated with the funding of mediation services. 
(i) 	Mediation as second-rate justice 
As mentioned, the majority of criticisms of this ilk appear to be legal in 
origin and centre on the contention that mediation is the "justice" parties 
"choose" when they cannot afford legal representation, the inference 
being that "quality" justice is only available through the traditional judicial 
system. Mediation is certainly perceived as a threat to traditional practice 
by many mainstream lawyers. There are, however, those within the 
profession who support mediation and non-adversarial dispute resolution 
generally as a valuable addition to the traditional legal arsenal of skills 
and processes. 
Another related concern is that the use of mediation may perpetuate the 
power imbalance between the advantaged and disadvantaged (in the case 
of environmental disputes, developers and environmentalists), the 
disadvantaged being denied access to legal empowerment by lack of 
financial resources. That is, mediation could be used as a sop to avoid 
reform of the legal system, thus perpetuating (rather than alleviating) 
distributional inequities. 
Finally, it has also been persuasively argued by disputants, members of 
the judiciary and mediators that the adversarial and limited nature of 
the judicial system is not conducive to the resolution of the substantive 
issues in environmental disputes and the achievement of mutually 
satisfactory and stable outcomes. 
Whilst understanding the criticism of mediation as second-rate justice, it 
must be emphasised that mediation should not be viewed solely as an 
alternative to litigation, but it should also be seen as an effective 
complement to the traditional judicial processes. Again, it is a case of 
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selecting the most appropriate and effective process for the resolution -of 
the dispute in question and the process selected remains the choice of the 
parties based on a sound knowledge of the options available to them and 
the outcomes desired - be they to establish a legal precedent and/or to 
realise the substantive issues in the dispute and establish a more 
constructive communication process as preventative of future conflict. 
A variation on mediation as second -rate justice, is that mediation is 
merely compromise in another guise. In fact Amy argues that: 
a significant portion of the environmental community does not 
agree that mediation is an unmitigated political boon. Some suspect 
that mediation represents not so much a new effort at cooperation, 
but a new form of cooptation (1987: 98). 
This contrasts with the opinions of Susskind and Cruickshank (1987), 
who contend that mediation is not synonymous with compromise. They 
argue that compromise requires each party to make concessions, to "give 
up" something, the end result being an outcome that rarely meets 
everyone's acceptable minimum - a political compromise achieved by 
splitting the difference. However, as Susskind and Cruikshank comment, 
"there is no midpoint between a hydro electric plant and a nuclear power 
plant" (1987: 20). Whilst acknowledging that mediation may sound like 
compromise, they state that it is rather a case of transforming win-lose 
disputes into all-gain agreements, and that "it involves the ' packaging' 
of items that disputants value differently" (Raiffa, in Susskind and 
Cruilcshank 1987: 33). In fact: 
All-gain solutions depend on each disputant's ability to invent a 
way of satisfying his or her own needs while meeting the opponents' 
needs. This requires cooperation even in the face of competing 
self interest (1987: 34). 
While some environmentalists such as Hair (1984) are avid supporters 
of the value and potential of environmental mediation, others (such as 
Brower in Crowfoot 1980; McCloskey in Steinhart 1984; Duxbury 1983; 
and Parenteau 1983) are less than enthusiastic. Central to their concern 
is the enthusiasm with which industry has taken to mediation. In the 
USA, several key environmental mediation services (such as the 
Conservation Foundation and the National Wildlife Federation) receive 
substantial financial support from industry. These organizations are 
perceived to be on the right of the environmental movement (Amy 
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1987: 99), and their close relationship with industry in the context of 
environmental mediation exacerbates the suspicions of many 
environmentalists that mediation is just anOther industry ploy, "intended 
to pacify environmental groups and distract them from pursuing more 
troublesome approaches to environmental problems like litigation" (Amy 
1987: 99). 
It is therefore not surprising that some parties are sceptical of the benefits 
of mediation and see it as compromise in another guise. 
(ii) 	The politics of mediation 
Environmental mediation is, unquestionably, an important part of 
environmental politics in the USA, and fundamental to politics is the 
issue of power. Amy notes that proponents of mediation are quick to 
point out that there are substantial power imbalances in traditional policy 
making forums such as the legislature and the courts. However, "they 
are less quick to realize that such imbalances are also a substantial problem 
in environmental mediation as well - a problem that can often undermine 
the legitimacy of the process" (1987: 161). 
Environmental mediation operates within the context of the political 
system. Inequities in the distribution of social, economic, and political 
power characterize all political systems and, as Amy argues, "these 
inequities will inevitably plague even new alternative political processes 
like environmental mediation" (1987: 161). 
Environmentalists have also expressed concern that mediation may be 
used to obscure fundamental issues by focusing on disputes as isolated 
incidents, which effectively depoliticizes a dispute and discourages the 
recognition of that dispute as a symptom of a wider social or environmental 
issue. 
Mediation as a form of political control is another concern (Amy 1987). 
Abel (1982) argues that throughout the history of the ADR movement in 
the USA mediation has been used as a way of undermining the political 
power of newly emerging political groups, and Amy supports this view, 
noting that it was only in the mid 1970s (that is post the National 
Environmental Policy Act 1969) when environmentalists began to exercise 
their expanded political powers and legal rights, that industry became 
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anxious to get environmental issues out of the courts. Amy interprets 
these actions of industry not as a desire to negotiate with envirO'nmentalists 
but as a strategy of disempowerment by distracting environmentalists 
from the possibilities offered by litigation since the passing of the National 
Environmental Policy Act. The use of environmental mediation to 
depoliticize environmental issues and to disempower environmentalists 
is, in Amy's opinion, "one of the most disturbing political implications 
of this new technique", although "what proponents fail to appreciate is 
that the main political biases in mediation emanate from the process, 
not the mediators" (1987: 197). 
Crowfoot considers that most mediators subscribe to a pluralist theory of 
political power, that is, they believe that power is distributed relatively 
equally among the competing interests in environmental controversies 
(Crowfoot 1980), and usually argue that some balance of power is possible 
because of the range of sources of power available to parties in an 
environmental dispute. Amy (1987: 130) cites money, organization 
membership, legal expertise, scientific expertise, political influence, legal 
standing, negotiating skills and favourable publicity as potential sources 
of power differentially available to groups. 
A factor that can, to some extent, redress an apparently skewed power 
imbalance, is the presence of a mediator. Susskind, (himself a very 
experienced mediator) in Amy (1987: 157) argues that a mediator may be 
able to assist in developing the basic negotiating capabilities of less 
experienced parties to ensure a more equal relationship. However, Amy 
(1987) and Carpenter and Kennedy (1988) are critical of this stance as, in 
their opinions, such action by a mediator may prejudice her/his neutrality, 
or at least the parties' perception of mediator neutrality. 
While acknowledging that the only long-term and viable solution to the 
problem of power inequities is the establishment of a more equal 
distribution of political and economic power between disputants (Amy 
1987: 162), some solutions to this problem of power imbalance in 
environmental mediation have been proposed. Cormick (in Amy 1987: 
140) suggests that a code of ethics for mediators should include the 
responsibility to ensure that all affected parties have an opportunity to 
participate. Sullivan (in Amy 1987: 140) recommends that environmental 
mediation should be mandated by law, as are labour-management disputes. 
Yet, as Amy points out, one of the most frequent complaints about labour- 
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management agreements is that they do not always reflect the public 
interest (1987: 141). 
Finally, Amy proposes the institutionalization and legalization of 
mediation; that is, a move away from the more usual ad hoc, informal 
arrangements to more formal and regulated ones mandated by legislation. 
Until this is achieved, Amy argues the problem of unequal -access is 
likely to persist (1987: 142). 
While not disagreeing with Amy's contention that power imbalances 
among parties are characteristic of many environmental disputes, to wait 
until these imbalances are redressed by the institutionalization and 
legalization of mediation as is proposed by Amy, is unrealistic. As 
discussed, mediation has proven successful in the prevention as well as 
the resolution of disputes and even Amy argues its value in policy 
formulation and regulation-negotiation. Ultimately, the value of 
mediation is judged by the parties and Bingham's analysis of party 
satisfaction found that the responses of the parties to mediation appeared 
to be more positive (about the process and outcome) than those of the 
mediation critics (Bingham 1986: 68). 
(iii) The professionalization and institutionalization of mediation 
Proponents of mediation and, in particular, mediators, have tended to 
focus on perfecting the process itself, the formulation of codes of ethics 
for mediators, and the development of skills and process-oriented training 
programs. It is only since the mid 1980s that attention has been focused 
on the politics of mediation (Amy 1987), and even this remains peripheral 
to those expounding the benefits and potential of non-adversarial dispute 
resolution. 
There now appears to be a movement away from the original concept of 
training people with diverse skills and experience as mediators, towards 
the promotion of mediation as a profession in its own right. In fact, 
mediation in the USA exhibits all the characteristics of a profession, 
including formal qualifications (Boreham et. al. 1976). Australia has yet 
to reach the level of sophistication and professionalization seen in the 
USA, however the indications are there. Law Schools in several Australian 
universities have now introduced into their curricula, formal units in 
ADR, albeit not specifically in EDR. 
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The institutionalization of mediation has been a feature of the mid 1980s 
with the establishment of state-wide offices for the resolution of public 
disputes in a number of American states (Haygood 1988). The consensus 
supporting this move is that it facilitates access to government decision 
making and the promotion and adoption of mediation across state agencies. 
These trends towards the professionalization and institutionalization 
appear to contradict the origins and purported value of the process as a 
non-elitist and flexible approach to environmental dispute resolution. 
However as Amy (1987: 16) notes, mediation has become a growth industry 
in the USA and the professionalization and institutionalization of 
mediation are both by-products of this rapid growth. Cynically, they may 
also constitute insurance for the future career prospects of a new breed of 
professionals. However, as mentioned previously, Amy considers that 
the institutionalization of environmental mediation may be a solution 
to the problem of power imbalance inherent in most environmental 
disputes; while professionalization as suggested by Cormick (in Amy 1987: 
140) would guarantee mediator standards of performance, ethics and 
training. 
Conceding that professionalization may go some way towards resolving 
the problem of "mediation as seduction" (1987: 121), Amy retains an 
ambivalent attitude to such a development (1987: 124). Nevertheless, 
the key question here is whether the "seduction" can 'be mitigated, given 
that it is unlikely to be eliminated. To this end, Amy concludes that the 
use of trained, independent mediators would help overcome the naivety 
and inexperience of some participants and would lessen the likelihood 
of fraud and trickery in negotiations (1987: 127). 
(iv) Funding of mediation services 
Another key issue about which mediation proponents are concerned is 
funding - the sources and continuity of supply of funding for mediation 
services. In the USA, mediation services have traditionally been subsidized 
by government or they have been underwritten by funding from 
philanthropic trusts such as the Rockefeller Foundation. However, 
"funding has always been the Achilles heel of environmental mediation" 
(Amy 1987: 221). 
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Freestanding public dispute centres -are -usually supported by foundation - 
grants or by fee for service contracts (Susskind and Cruikshank 1989); 
institutionalized state EDR offices are government funded, though some 
supplement their income by fee for service; and bodies such as the 
Conservation Foundation receive financial support from industry (as 
discussed previously). There are also private public dispute resolution 
services and consultants who charge on a fee-for-service basis. 
There is no uniformity of funding sources and many services are funded 
on a pilot basis, as with the five state offices of mediation which receive 
grants from the National Institute of Dispute Resolution (Susskind and 
Cruikshank 1987; Haygood 1988). Security and continuity of operation is 
thus often uncertain and fee-for-service for environmental disputes is 
neither easy to determine nor to administer when there are frequently 
multiple and changing parties, complex issues and, more often than not, 
an imbalance of power and financial resources among the parties. The 
questions of who pays the mediator and how much remain unresolved 
and an obstacle to the strategic development of many environmental 
mediation services. 
3.7 	Conclusion 
Environmental or public disputes are the most complex of the disputes 
addressed and resolved by non-adversarial dispute resolution processes 
such as mediation. With their multiplicity of issues and parties, and 
their focus on the public interest rather than on private interest, public 
disputes often cannot be satisfactorily resolved by traditional judicial and 
administrative means. 
Dissatisfaction with the inadequacies of traditional adversarial approaches 
to environmental dispute resolution prompted those involved to look 
for more effective and efficient processes which were also capable of 
addressing the substantive issues in distributional disputes relating to 
resource allocation and use. As a result alternative dispute resolution 
(ADR) techniques have been adapted for use in environmental dispute 
resolution (EDR) with considerable success. 
The use of mediation to resolve disputes is not a new phenomenon. As 
outlined, it has been widely practised in China and Japan to resolve 
community and social disputes and in the USA it was used by several 
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minority groups such as the Quakers - prior to being - formally 
institutionalized and professionalized in the twentieth century. 
Its progression as a process for the resolution of community disputes to 
labour, social, and most recently environmental disputes, has been rapid 
in an historical sense. Since the 1970s, it has been enthusiastically embraced 
in the USA in particular, as having the potential to both prevent and 
resolve environmental disputes where traditional judicial administrative 
processes have failed. 
Australia lags some way behind. As with Canada and New Zealand, it 
has a Westminster system of government and so differs from the USA. 
The extent to which mediation is both appropriate and successful here 
remains to be seen. Nevertheless, one of the recognized values of 
mediation is its potential to prevent the development and escalation of 
environmental disputes as in its application to policy dialogues and 
regulation - negotiation. 
There is a considerable body of literature on the characteristics of public 
or environmental disputes and the mediation process per se; including 
techniques, mediator roles and functions. There has also been much 
written on the use of mediation as a stand-alone strategy and process for 
the resolution of site-specific disputes. 
In fact success of environmental mediation in the resolution of site-specific 
disputes in the 1970s has resulted in its rapid growth in a number of 
countries, although the USA remains the world leader in this field. 
In spite of its popularization, as with any rapidly growing industry, issues 
and inadequacies have been identified for future debate and continue 
with rectification. 
Some issues requiring further research and analysis are the need for 
more rigorous evaluation of the success and effectiveness of mediation 
as a process for resolving environmental disputes; the politics of 
mediation, particularly the impact of mediation on the power differential 
among disputants, and issues relating to the funding of mediation services 
such as sources, continuity of supply and accountability. 
In the author's opinion a further issue and possible inadequacy is the 
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tendency for the majority of -the--literature -to focus on the practice of 
mediation as an alternative to traditional processes. More attention should 
be paid to the pros and cons of incorporating mediation in existing and 
proposed judicial and administrative systems such as those relating to 
EIA and development approval processes. The introduction of mediation 
at strategic points in these systems would expand the dispute resolution 
options available to disputants and government agencies and so assist in 
addressing prevailing criticisms of inflexibility, formality, and the inability 
of traditional systems and processes to resolve the substantive issues in 
disputes. 
However, it appears that environmental mediation in 1989 is a proven 
and effective EDR process which can readily complement existing judicial 
and administrative systems, or it can be used as an alternative to traditional 
processes in appropriate cases. It is in this context that Tasmanian 
environmental decision making and dispute resolution will be analysed, 
with a view to determining to what extent environmental mediation 
may be appropriate in this state as both an integral part of judicial and 
administrative systems and as a dispute resolution process in its own 
right. 
CHAPTER 4 
ENVIRONMENTAL DECISION MAKING AND DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION IN TASMANIA 
4.1 	Introduction 
Natural resource management is the key to Tasmania's future(Callaghan, 
1977). The State's economic dependence on the management of its 
resources guarantees that in the 1990s, effective resource planning and 
management will be critical if it is to survive economically, socially, 
environmentally and politically (Crowley, 1989). Further environmental 
disputes can be predicted with certainty as government, industries and 
public interest groups attempt to reconcile their divergent interests (Hay, 
1987). 
At present, management of the State's natural resources is handled by 
multiple jurisdictions and government departments, each with its own 
"package" of legislation, policies, administrative infrastructure, practices 
and procedures. At best it is fragmented, inconsistent and frustrating for 
all parties. It is a judicial and administrative quagmire that promotes 
rather than resolves environmental disputes. 
Environmental decision making is resource focused. Each resource, be it 
minerals, forests, fisheries, or land is managed as a discrete entity via a 
resource-specific legislative and administrative decision making system. 
There is no integrated resource management or land-use strategy or system 
for the State. 
In addition to this multiplicity of jurisdictions, there is often duplication 
and overlap of practices and procedures, there being no priority jurisdiction 
in most cases so that decisions of resource planning and management 
are subject to negotiation among the parties perceived to be responsible 
for the resource. It is a generally piecemeal approach to resource 
management. 
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The inadequacies and complexities of current systems are highlighted by 
multiple land-use issues such as industry proposals for forestry and mining 
operations in designated national parks and World Heritage areas. 
Traditional judicial and administrative systems which are products of 
the past when resources were regarded and were managed individually, 
are no longer appropriate in an age when resources are considered to be 
interrelated and interdependent elements of a total environmental system. 
Government departments, industries, public interest groups and members 
of the judiciary recognize the need for and the value of a more planned 
approach to resource management on a state wide basis. However 
difficulties arise in relation to the design and implementation of strategies 
and processes to achieve this. The uniqueness of each resource, and 
different philosophical and management objectives, priorities and 
practices must be reconciled. For example, mining and forestry are 
perceived to be resource exploitative and, in the case of mining, the 
exploitation of a non-renewable resource. On the other hand, land-use 
planning and environmental protection tend to be regarded as protective 
of resources. 
The potential for conflict is inherent in any decision making process, 
none more so than in that of environmental decision making where 
ideologies, power and emotions are often in competition for the control 
of limited or diminishing resources. Simplistically, the theme of most 
environmental conflict is resource exploitation versus resource 
conservation. 
Conflict in itself is not necessarily dysfunctional. It is the potential for it 
to escalate, to spiral out of control, that becomes a problem. This is not 
uncommon in environmental conflict where, as mentioned previously, 
there is a potentially explosive mixture of facts, emotions, and vested 
interests. A level of conflict between opposing parties may exist, or be 
'managed, for a prolonged period. However conflict which commences 
as a resolvable problem can readily spiral out of control into a bitter, 
destructive and costly dispute. 
No dispute, environmental or otherwise, is merely a factual, logical and 
legal event or sequence of events. All disputes comprise a complex 
interaction of law, values, perceptions, attitudes and emotions which 
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must be identified, addressed and resolved (Sandford 1988). 
Environmental disputes are public disputes, that is, they focus on public 
issues and the public interest rather than on private issues. They usually 
encompass a broad range of biophysical, socio-economic, cultural and 
political factors and can be site-specific or public policy disputes. In addition 
to their inherent complexity, environmental disputes are rarely clearly 
defined. More often than not they involve multiple issues and multiple 
parties, are dynamic - never static - and can rapidly become high profile 
media events and key issues in political campaigns (Sandford 1989b:1). 
Evidence of the complex, dynamic and potentially high profile nature of 
environmental disputes can be seen in the development of the Brunswick-
Richmond 220 kV transmission line dispute. What started as a proposal 
by the State Electricity Commission of Victoria (SECV), to implement a 
technological solution to ensure security of supply to a Melbourne network, 
escalated into an acrimonious public debate. From its commencement 
in 1969, the focus of the dispute shifted from technological issues to 
community concern about the potentially negative impacts of electro-
magnetic radiation on public health. The dispute culminated in the 
SECV's withdrawal of its proposal in 1989 - some twenty years after it 
was first initiated (Blake, 1988; Victoria Powerline Review Panel, 1989). 
In Tasmania, proposed construction of the Wesley Vale pulp mill in the 
north of the state, rapidly developed from a local dispute about the nature 
and siting of an industrial facility in a predominantly agricultural area, 
to a state, national, and even international issue which was instrumental 
in the demise of the Liberal government, the election of five Green 
Independents to the Tasmanian Parliament and the formation of the 
historic Labor-Green Parliamentary Accord. 
It is therefore not surprising that, in anticipation of the potential for 
conflict, environmental decision making processes incorporate systems 
and/or procedures for dispute resolution. These often take the form of 
objection and appeal systems within each jurisdiction (Jeffrey, 1987). In 
this way, they act as fail-safe mechanisms in the event of an error or a 
malfunction in the environmental decision making process. The purpose 
of objection and appeal systems is to minimize the negative impact of an 
inadequate or incorrect decision on the decision making process itself, 
and in so doing, protect the public interest. 
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4.1.1 EDR in Tasmania: operations and procedures 
There are two types of environmental dispute resolution (EDR) systems 
in operation in Tasmania. They are the judicial system in which disputes 
are heard in the Magistrates Court or the Mining Warden's Court, and 
the administrative tribunal system in which disputes are heard by a panel 
of appropriately qualified persons, one of whom usually has legal 
qualifications. It is quasi-judicial hearing process. 
Each resource has a unique objection and appeal system for the 
management of disputes which fall within its jurisdiction. It may be 
either a judicial or an administrative tribunal model. There is, however, 
a trend towards the use of administrative tribunals rather than courts 
both in Australia and overseas, the fundamental reason being the 
perceived ability of the former to more adequately address complex public 
interest and policy issues. This trend is also evident in Tasmania. 
The thesis will now examine dispute resolution in five (5) environmental 
decision making systems in order to gain an overview of the operations, 
procedures and effectiveness of EDR in Tasmania as these systems are 
the only formal processes by which environmental disputes can be resolved 
within each jurisdiction. 
It should be noted that since these EDR systems were examined in 1988 
and early 1989, there has been a change of government in Tasmania 
from a conservative Liberal government which was regarded by many as 
favouring the imperatives of development rather than those of 
environmental protection, to an Australian Labor Party-Green 
Independent Accord. The Green Independents now hold the balance of 
power in the House of Assembly which is the lower House of the 
Tasmanian Parliament. This innovative form of government has made 
political history in Australia and it is popularly perceived to be more 
environmentally committed than its predecessor. 
Although the change of government is politically significant, it has not, 
as yet, had an impact on EDR systems, having only been in office since 
June 1989. The major impact to date has been on organizational structures, 
rather than on processes. The new government has rationalized the 
public sector, reducing the number of Tasmanian State Service 
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departments trom 54 to 18. 
At this stage (October 1989) the authority and functions of the EDR systems 
examined in this thesis remain unchanged, although most former 
Departments now have divisional status within larger, restructured 
departments. The resource and EDR systems to be examined are as follows: 
Marine Farms, which come within the Sea Fisheries Act 1959 (Tas.), 
reprinted in 1987 to incorporate the 1982 marine farm amendments. 
The Act is administered by the Sea Fisheries Division, Department 
of Primary Industry, formerly the Department of Sea Fisheries. 
Mining, which is covered by the Mining Act 1929 (Tas.), and the 
Mining Amendment Act 1986 (Tas.). It is currently under review. 
The Act is administered by the Mines Division, Department of 
Resources and Energy, formerly the Department of Mines. 
111. Environmental Protection, comes within the jurisdiction of the 
Environment Protection Act 1973 (Tas.). It is administered by the 
Environmental Management Division, Department of 
Environment and Planning, formerly the Department of 
Environment. 
IV. Land-Use Planning, is covered by the Local Government Act 1962 
(Tas.). It is administered by the Planning Division, Department of 
Environment and Planning, formerly an independent Town and 
Country Planning Commission. 
V. Forestry, is bound by the Forestry Act 1920 (Tas.) and the Forest 
Practices Act 1985 (Tas.). It is administered by the Forestry 
Commission. 
As we have seen, environmental law is predominantly a product of 
legislation (Bates 1987) and as such it is an instrument of government 
which is dependent on the administrative systems and processes of the 
public sector for its implementation. The objection and appeal systems 
of the environmental decision making processes are, however, quite 
deliberately located outside the sphere of control, if not the sphere of 
influence, of the public sector. Objection and appeal systems are systems 
for the review of resource management decisions made by the bureaucracy 
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(and in some cases by one or other Minister)- which administers the• - 
relevant jurisdiction. It is therefore important to ensure that the review 
systems are independent of political decision making, hence this location 
outside the bureaucracy. 
In Tasmania, two of the objection and appeal systems are in the judicial 
mode - sea fisheries, which includes marine farms, and mining. The 
remainder, environmental protection, land-use planning and forestry, 
are administrative. 
Each dispute resolution system will be considered in the context of the 
relevant environmental decision making/approval process, which 
usually commences with the submission of an application for a 
development proposal to the appropriate administrative authority or 
government department. There are process and procedural parallels 
among the 5 systems studied in this thesis. There are also several issues 
raised and inadequacies identified in the management of disputes within 
each jurisdiction. These are highlighted by case studies of disputes. 
The jurisdictions will now be considered individually with the objective 
of identifying commonalities of issues, inadequacies, and process and 
procedure, so that it can be ascertained whether environmental disputes 
in those jurisdictions may be more appropriately handled by other means 
(such as environmental mediation). 
4.2 	Judicial objection and appeal systems 
4.2.1 Marine farms 
Aquaculture is a major growth industry for Tasmania. It is a lucrative 
industry with significant export potential and it has been hailed as a 
potential saviour of the Tasmanian economy. It is also considered more 
environmentally sound than many resource development or extractive 
industries and it has electoral and tourism appeal. The industry has 
expanded rapidly since 1982 when the first salmonid (Atlantic salmon 
and Rainbow Trout) farm was established with the State government as 
a Director and shareholder. Prior to the development of salmonid farming, 
aquaculture in Tasmania had concentrated on shellfish production such 
as oysters, which were grown on intertidal lease sites and on a relatively 
small scale. 
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As a capital-intensive, "glamour" industry salmonid farming has attracted 
considerable media and public attention. This has also impacted on 
shellfish production. 
The aquaculture industry is not without critics who view the apparent 
proliferation of marine farms in recreational waterways as uncontrolled 
development. This has aroused concern about the deterioration of water 
quality, noise, odour, security lighting at night, seal shooting on salmonid 
farms and, in particular, the restriction of public access to traditional 
fishing and recreational waters. Some marine farms also have processing 
facilities on land-based sites adjacent to the lease or permit. Conflict is 
therefore predictable; even inevitable. 
4.2.1.1 	Magistrates' Court 
Objections to lease/permit applications and appeals against the Minister's 
decision to grant or refuse an application are heard by a Magistrate sitting 
alone in the Magistrates' Court. Reasons for his/her decision are usually 
given in writing subsequent to the hearing. 
4.2.1.2 Marine farm approval process 
(i) The Act stipulates that an applicant must lodge a written application 
with the details of the proposed marine farm, induding maps of 
the intended area, which are then published in a newspaper with 
a general, rather than local circulation in the State. 
A potential marine farm developer cannot establish a farm without 
first lodging an application for a lease or permit with the Sea 
Fisheries Division, Department of Primary Industry. A lease confers 
exclusive possession of the sea bed and the waters above it within 
the lease area, while a permit applies solely to the waters specified 
in the permit. The former is used for shellfish farming and the 
latter for salmonid farming or for specific shellfish culture 
techniques such as deep water culture. 
(ii) The advertisement must be published not less than 28 days before 
the Minister makes a decision to grant or refuse the lease or permit 
application. 
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(iii) Objections to the granting of an application are made to thMinister 
and must be lodged within 28 days of the publication of the notice 
of application. 
The categories of persons who may object to the granting of an 
application are strictly limited and only persons who have lodged 
an objection under (S.18) have a right of appeal under S(23)(c). 
(iv) The decision to grant or refuse to grant an application is vested 
solely in the Minister for Primary Industry. If he grants the 
application he may impose such conditions or restrictions as he 
determines. 
The legislation does not provide criteria to be considered by the 
Minister in reaching his decision. As Hannon (1988: 287) indicates, 
"therefore it may be said that he has an unfettered discretion". 
(v) Appeals against the decision of the Minister to grant or refuse the 
application are made to a Magistrate and both the unsuccessful 
applicant and objectors have a right of appeal. 
(vi) Objections and appeals are heard by a Magistrate in the Court of 
Petty Sessions. Parties may choose to be legally represented. This 
is not mandatory but it remains an adversarial arena where parties 
who do not have legal representation are rarely able to counter 
those who do. There is a distinct imbalance of power in this 
situation. 
The Magistrate has the power to award costs against objectors but 
this is not usual practice. 
(vii) There is then a final right of appeal to the Tasmanian Supreme 
Court on points of law only. 
To quote Hannon (1988: 289), "the effect of this legislation as interpreted 
by the Courts is to exclude interest groups from participation in the 
objection and appeal process". Hannon (1988: 290) then concludes, 
"whether those provisions provide adequately for persons or concerned 
groups to protect a real or perceived interest is a matter of policy for 
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Government and not for the Courts to determine". 
In the author's experience, these legislative and procedural restrictions 
only serve to cloud the substantive issues of the dispute and engender 
misinformation, confusion, and suspicion among the parties as 
developers, objectors and appellants are forced into an adversarial arena. 
There is no provision for conferencing. Once an objection or appeal is 
lodged, Sea Fisheries staff are unable to confer with objectors as the 
Department, being the manager of the resource, is responsible for advising 
the Minister and for the enactment of the legislation. 
4.2.1.3 	Profile of a marine farm dispute 
Many of the disputes about the siting and/or expansion of marine farms 
could be resolved without the need to go to a public hearing process. 
The following dispute is one such example. 
The profile of this dispute was obtained from numerous discussions 
with objectors, a site inspection, attendance at public meetings and court 
hearings, and discussions with the developer and officers from the Sea 
Fisheries Division. The author did not have access to either the developer's 
file, nor that of Sea Fisheries Division. The objectors used the author as 
a resource in identifying the relevant legislation and regulations as they 
claimed that the Sea Fisheries Division refused them access to information. 
Reason for Dispute 
In 1989, the developer of an established oyster farm decided to apply for a 
permit to expand his operation. The original farm was an intertidal 
lease and the expansion was to incorporate deep-water culture and so 
make the lease more commercially viable. The developer also had a 
second intertidal lease, in a neglected condition, further up the bay. 
The marine farm was located in a sheltered bay, regularly used by a small 
number of professional fishermen and permanent local residents for 
fishing and recreational uses. The site is also on a popular tourist route. 
Sea access to and from the bay was via a deep water channel which 
skirted the southern edge of an island at the mouth of the bay. To the 
north of the island was a reef which made access via this alternative 
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route hazardous in certain weather conditions. 
Local residents and fishermen were concerned that if a permit were granted 
to extend the established farm, it would seriously hinder safe passage 
through the channel to the bay. Visual pollution was another objection 
compounded by local residents' prior knowledge of and experience with, 
the neglected condition of the developer's other intertidal lease site. There 
was also concern that marking buoys and lights which are mandatory on 
permits would be visually offensive. 
The developer disagreed and claimed the objections were emotional rather 
than factual. 
A public meeting was called. Significantly there was no accurate site 
map of the proposed permit, the advertisement published by Sea Fisheries 
Division being declared inaccurate by both the developer and the potential 
objectors. There was considerable debate, a lack of accurate data and 
information about the site, and an inadequate understanding by all parties 
of the administrative processes and the status of the site, be it a lease or a 
permit. There was no representative from Sea Fisheries present. 
The public meeting decided that all objectors who had standing as 
determined by the Act would lodge Objections. There was little time to 
do so, as the public meeting was called in response to the advertisement, 
local residents having had no prior knowledge of the intention to expand 
the farm. This meant that within a 28 day interval after the advertisement 
of the notice of application, a public meeting had to be organized, and 
decisions had to be made as to whether to object or not on the basis of 
inadequate and inaccurate information. Objections then had to be prepared 
and taken to Hobart for lodgement within the requisite 28 days. 
Now, 28 days may seem more than reasonable to government officials in 
Hobart. However for environmental and operational reasons most marine 
farms such as this one are sited in isolated areas and potential objectors 
must, by virtue of the very limited law of standing, be resident/working 
in the immediate area. Consequently the objectors' problems of access to 
information and communication with the relevant authorities were 
compounded by the isolation factor and the logistics of getting to and 
around Hobart during a 5 day public sector working week. 
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A hearing was duly scheduled in the Hobart Magistrates' Court.- - The 
developer had legal representation, whilst the objectors did not and could 
not have afforded representation as most were on age pensions or had 
low or seasonal incomes. 
In spite of the Magistrate's efforts to ensure a fair hearing, the procedure 
was intensely adversarial, and intimidating for the objectors whose 
personal integrity was questioned by the developer's legal representative 
as a strategy to undermine the credibility of several objectors. 
The hearing took two days, several weeks apart. The objectors had to 
travel to Hobart on each occasion and several objectors decided against a 
court appearance on the second day as they were intimidated by the 
procedure and convinced they could not cope with the approach by the 
defendent's lawyer, which they interpreted as personal attacks rather than 
"legal tactics". Their absence was then portrayed by the lawyer as indicating 
a lack of sincerity and substance in their objections. 
The Magistrate in handing down his decision made reference to the 
inadequacies of the legislative and administrative system (Bryan 1989). 
He noted: 
The absence of information from the Minister for Sea Fisheries as 
to whether a lease or permit was intended. It was decided that a 
permit was intended. This was significant as the grounds of 
objection and appeal for each differ and so, consequently, does the 
standing of potential objectors. 
Scenic beauty is not a ground for appeal, landscape integrity and 
tourism impact not withstanding. However Bryan disagreed with 
the precedent set by Hannon (1984) that visual impact was outside 
the terms of Section 18 (3), that is, the grounds for objection to an 
application for a lease or permit. In Bryan's opinion, to admire 
the scenic beauty of an area which is generally accepted as an area 
of such beauty is a legitimate use of that area and that an appreciation 
of the beauty of nature is a "use" of that area within the meaning 
of Section 18 (3). 
He therefore admitted the evidence of grounds of objection related 
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to scenic beauty of an area where it was proposed the permit would 
have been affective. 
Expert evidence on the negative environmental impact of such 
development on the local tourism industry was refused hearing 
by the Magistrate on the grounds that tourists were not persons 
whose use of that area, let alone their livelihood within the meaning 
of the section, would be affected by the working of the permit area 
(Bryan 1989: 5). 
Objections on the ground that the extension of the lease would 
constitute a navigational hazard were dismissed. The Magistrate 
noted that the area of the permit was some 7 hectares in a total bay 
area 1000 hectares or more and that the presence of navigation 
lights on hazards such as the permit site and the nearby island 
would resolve these problems. 
Bryan (1989: 8) concluded that "there will be no navigational 
inconvenience at all caused to those objectors by the fact of fish farming 
operations in the proposed permit area" and that in his view the point 
had not been reached whereby the extension of the farm would significantly 
change the nature of use of the bay as a scenic attraction and for recreational 
navigation. 
The decision was that all objections were unsuccessful. An attempt by 
the developer's lawyer to have costs awarded against the objectors was 
not upheld by the Magistrate nor supported by the Sea Fisheries Division. 
4.2.1.4 	Issues and inadequacies 
The limitations of the traditional judicial model in the resolution of 
environmental disputes such as this have been summarised by Michael 
Jeffrey, Q.C. (1986:317) as: 
little account is taken of the public interest; 
it is limited by rules of evidence; 
interest is centred on the adversarial relationship between 
proponent and those in opposition (objectors and/or appellants); 
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the inflexibility of procedures. 
To this can be added the legal representation of parties and the potentially 
high costs of litigation. 
In the marine farm dispute, as an example of judicial limitations in 
action: 
the private commercial interest of the developer was the central 
issue rather than the broader public interest, although a concession 
was made to the validity of scenic beauty; 
expert evidence from the tourism industry was not admitted as it 
did fit into the limited rules of standing of objectors; 
the adversarial arena disadvantaged the objectors. As indicated 
previously the objectors were less articulate, ignorant of the 
intricacies of the law and legal procedure and had difficulty coping 
with the legal tactics of the developer's legal representative; 
court protocol and procedures meant that although selective 
photographic evidence could be submitted by the developer, the 
Magistrate was not able to benefit from a site inspection which 
may have assisted him in understanding residents' concerns about 
navigational hazards from the intrusion of the farm into the 
channel. 
The role of the bureaucracy was a most significant factor in the perpetuation 
rather than the resolution of this dispute: 
all parties unanimously agreed that the Sea Fisheries Division's 
performance was sub-standard; 
information available from the Sea Fisheries Division was 
inadequate, inaccurate and inconsistent; 
the Division did not advise any party as to whether it was a lease 
or a permit that was to be granted; 
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site maps were not available and were merely approximations af... -- 
to dimensions and locations on iriippropriately large-scale maps. 
site dimensions and locations also changed depending on which 
officer was supplying the information; 
there were no readily identifiable channels of communication with 
the public. 
once objections were lodged, Sea Fisheries officers could no longer 
confer with and/or advise the objectors, as the Division was a 
party to the dispute in its capacity as the Minister's representative. 
This denies opportunities for Divisional officers to formally confer 
with parties in an effort to find a solution. 
Author's comment 
This dispute could have been readily resolved out of court using a third 
party neutral. Had there been a mechanism available to parties, whereby 
they could have come together to negotiate a resolution, the dispute 
need never have gone to court with its long-term negative impacts for 
all. 
Discussions by the author with the objectors indicated that the primary 
concerns revolved around the location of the permit boundaries and the 
degree of intrusion by the farm into the channel. In discussion, the 
author, on the basis of her aquaculture experience, was able to point out 
to the objectors the possibility of altering the shape of permit boundaries 
to lessen intrusion into the channel and thus the potential as a navigation 
hazard, while still allowing the developer his 7 hectare permit area. 
This solution was acceptable to the objectors. Subsequent discussion 
with the developer indicated that this would have been acceptable to 
him. However, legal proceedings were underway and all parties felt that, 
in the absence of an alternative mechanism, they were locked in and had 
to proceed. 
It was a "no win" situation for all. The developer and objectors have to 
co-exist together in an isolated area while for the legal professionals it is 
just another case. 
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4.2.2 Mining 
Mining is one of the State's most valuable industries and a major employer. 
In 1985/86 it produced 54.9 per cent of the State's export earnings and in 
1987/88 the value of production from Tasmanian recovered minerals 
was $504.87 million, an increase of 29.1 per cent over the previous year 
(according to the Report of the Minister of Mines 1987/88). The Report 
further stated that the total value of the Tasmanian mineral industry for 
the year surpassed the billion dollar level at $1159 million, which 
represented an overall increase of 20 per cent over the previous year. 
Mining is an extractive industry and each mine represents a non-renewable 
resource which is progressively reduced by operations to depletion. 
Consequently, to maintain the industry at its current level, new ore bodies 
must be discovered to replace the extracted resources. Without new 
discoveries the industry will eventually , become non-existent. Projections 
for the year 2000 indicate that it is possible that the industry will be 
reduced to well below half of its current value without new discoveries. 
The future of the industry is therefore clearly dependent on mineral 
exploration within the State (Department of Mines 1988). 
As further noted in the Directors Report 1987/88, exploration is the key 
to the future. 
4.2.2.1 	Mining Act 1929 - under review 
The Mining Act 1929, and the 1930 regulations have been amended on 
many occasions, to the point where the former Department of Mines 
published a Mining Act 1929 "unofficial consolidation" to assist industry 
and the public to negotiate the maze. 
The Act is administered by the Mines Division, Department of Resources 
and Energy, and during 1989 it has been undertaking a public review of 
what is acknowledged to be outdated legislation and procedures. 
In identifying issues for public discussion in the review process, the former 
Tasmanian Department of Mines 1989 noted that mining for metallic 
minerals has, in the main, been confined to the less populated regions of 
the State, but it is now known that the formations which host metallic 
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mineral deposits underlie rocks which have produced good farmffig soils. 
Consequently, there has been increasing interest in exploration on private 
land and "the aim of the new Mining Act will be to promote a balance 
between the interests of residents and the needs of the community". 
This review is still in progress, opportunity for public comment having 
ceased at 30 September 1989. To date neither the findings nor the proposed 
changes have been released. It is likely that a recommendation will be 
put for an administrative tribunal model rather than to retain the present 
judicial model whereby objections and appeals are heard by the Warden 
at a Mining Warden's Court. 
4.2.2.2 Mining Warden's Court 
Objections to the granting of an exploration licence or a mining lease/ 
permit are heard by the Mining Warden sitting alone in the Warden's 
Court. There are Wardens in each of three regions in the State, the 
south, the north and the north-west, and hearings are conducted in each 
area depending on the location of the licence/lease in question. 
Appeals against the Warden's decision may be made to the Tasmanian 
Supreme Court on points of law only. 
4.2.2.3 	Mining approval process 
A person wishing to evaluate and then mine a mineral resource is required 
by the Act to apply for: 
(i) an exploration licence to survey an area, take samples of soil, rock 
or water, and test for other magnetic, electrical or physical problems 
as required in order to identify the potential viability of mining 
the resource; and 
(ii) a mining lease, which authorizes mining activities on Crown or 
private land and which is approved by the Governor in Council. 
This process commences when an applicant for an exploration 
licence is satisfied that the resource is feasible to mine. 
Both exploration licences and mining permits/leases may be held by 
individuals or by companies. 
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Mining leases occupy less than 1 per cent of the area of Tasmania and 
much less than this area is disturbed by mining operations. It is the 
Exploration Licence that causes the most controversy (Tasmania, 
Department of Mines 1989a). However, both exploration licences and 
mining leases are subject to objections and appeals. 
Exploration Licence 
Exploration may be undertaken on private land either by exploration 
licence issued under the Mining Act, by a permit to Enter and Search 
(now rarely used), or by Owner's Consent (Tasmania, Department of 
Mines 1989a). Licences are granted for an initial period of 12 months but 
may be renewed conditional on satisfactory performance and a satisfactory 
programme. 
The application procedure for an exploration licence is as follows: 
(1) Application is made to Director of Mines detailing the work to be 
carried out. The decision to issue the licence is made by the Minister 
on the recommendation of the Director. 
(2) Advertisement is placed in a local newspaper by the applicant 
showing the location of the proposed licence and stating that 
objections may be lodged by those persons with 'an estate or interest' 
in the land. 
(3) Objections to the application must be lodged with the Director of 
Mines within 28 days of the advertisement of the public notice of 
the application. 
A copy of the objection is served on the applicant for the exploration 
licence by the Registrar of Mines, an employee of the Mines Division. 
(4) Hearing of Objections. Objections are then heard by the Warden 
in the Mining Warden's Court. The Warden may dismiss or uphold 
the Objections. 
(5) If the Objections are dismissed, an exploration licence is then issued 
by the Minister. 
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(6) 	An appeal against the Warden's decision may be made to the 
Tasmanian Supreme Court on points of law only. 
The Minister's decision may also be appealed in the Supreme Court if it 
is considered that he has not acted properly in making his decision, 
for example, by failing to take into account relevant matters, or on 
other grounds of natural justice. 
(ii) 	Mining Leases/Permits 
There are several categories of mining lease which may be granted by the 
Minister. They are mineral leases, coal leases, stone leases and oil leases. 
A maximum area size is accorded each with the exception of oil leases 
where the Minister has the discretion to determine size. A maximum 
lease term is set at 21 years but may be renewed. Leases may be granted 
on private or public land, including Crown Land. 
Mining leases are taken out once the presence of an ore body has been 
established, as a result, for example, of surveys and sampling undertaken 
under an exploration licence. 
The application procedure for a mining lease is as follows: 
(1) A requirement of the application is that the intending miner "mark  
out" the lease site according to the provisions outlined in the 
Mining Act 19 29 Section 4, consent to enter private property or 
Crown Land having been obtained from the owner and occupier 
or by permit from the Director of Mines. 
A "Marking Out Notice" is then erected on the property. 
(2) The notice of marking-out must be lodged with the Registrar or 
Director of Mines within 3 days of the marking out unless the 
Director deems otherwise. 
(3) The application for a lease must then be lodged on the prescribed 
form, and accompanied by a fee, with the Registrar or Director 
within 14 days after the marking-out. 
104 
There is no requirement for advertisement of an application for a 
mining lease, the rationale being that the owner and occupier have 
notice of the application as a compensation agreement must be 
settled before the lease can be issued. In some cases the consent of 
the owner and occupier is required to mark out the land. 
(4) Objections to the application may be made by: 
Any person claiming any right to, or interest in, the land. Valid 
objections can only be made by owners, occupiers, or others daiming 
a financial interest in the land, including the holders of other 
mining or exploration licences. 
Objections must be lodged with the Director within 28 days from 
the date of marking out the relevant mining lease/tenement. An 
objection must be accompanied by the prescribed fee and the objector 
must serve a copy of his objection on the applicant or upon each 
applicant if there is more than one within 2 days after lodging the 
objection. 
The objection is then forwarded by the Director to the Mining 
Warden. 
(5) Objections are then heard by the Warden in the Mining Warden's 
Court. The Warden has the power to uphold an objection to a 
portion of the land and to allow the applicant to exdude this portion 
of the land. Objections may also be dismissed or upheld in total. 
(6) If Objections are dismissed, the lease is issued by the Minister with 
the consent of the Governor-in-Council. 
(7) An objector may also appeal against the Warden's decision to the 
Tasmanian Supreme Court on points of law. 
The former Tasmanian Department of Mines (1989a) states that a mining 
lease is not the only authority required by a mine operator. Depending 
on the nature and extent of the operation, a Licence to Operate a Scheduled 
Premises may be required from the Director of Environmental Control, 
Department of Environment and Planning. This process contains its 
own objection and appeal system which will be discussed later. 
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A Planning APProval from the Municipal Council is also required in 
most cases and an objector can appeal a Council's decision to the Planning 
Appeal Board. 
4.2.2.4 	Profiles of two mining disputes 
No disputes over the granting of mining leases were accessible to the 
author during the study. However several objections against applications 
for exploration licences were lodged. Two cases will now be examined. 
The author attended court hearings and a public meeting, spoke with 
objectors and with the legal representatives of objectors and applicants 
and was in regular contact with the Registrar of Mines. 
Case A 
This was an objection against the granting of an application for an 
exploration licence. Both the applicant and the objector were public 
companies and both were legally represented. 
As with other mining cases observed, the majority of court time was 
taken up with procedural matters. The objector cited the difficulties of 
serving notice of objection on the applicant who appeared somewhat 
evasive. This meant that the notice of objection could not be served 
within the two day statutory requirement, thus technically invalidating 
the objection. 
The remainder of the hearing was spent determining the standing of the 
objector. The Warden made reference to precedent in Stow v Mineral 
Holdings 1977 14 ALR 497 and drew parallels with the apparent absence 
of standing of the objector in this case. It was determined that the objector 
had no "estate or interest" in the area subject of the decision. In handing 
down his decision, Warden Dockray (1989) said that the court "could 
only consider the technicalities not the merits" of the case. Substantive 
issues of the dispute were not and could not be considered. 
A short adjournment in proceedings enabled the parties' legal 
representatives to discuss the matter, on the basis of which the objector 
reconsidered its position and the objection was withdrawn. 
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Some four hours were spent in court, and many more on briefings and 
the travel of the applicant's legal counsel from Hobart to the north of the 
State for the hearing. 
Case B 
Case B is an example of multiple jurisdictions pertaining in a land-use 
conflict which involved several objections against an application for an 
exploration licence on private land, public recreational land and Crown 
reserve, and the need for Planning Approval from the Municipal Council 
to enable an extractive industry to proceed in the area. The issue of 
jurisdictional superiority was not clear. 
In this case, an individual with a number of current exploration licences 
and mining leases across the State applied for an exploration licence to 
survey and sample for mineral sands in an area known to be 
environmentally sensitive. The applicant was convinced from research 
and survey work already undertaken that resource prospects were good 
and he intended to apply for a mining lease on completion of his 
exploration. 
Local residents were angry that preliminary work had been undertaken 
prior to the granting of a licence and considered both exploration and 
mining incompatible with the land capability and environmental qualities 
of the area. Research was undertaken into the impacts of sand mining in 
comparable areas interstate and a public meeting was called to consider 
further action. 
Objections had been lodged by a number of local residents prior to the 
meeting in order to comply with statutory requirements, although Mines 
Division staff had advised that most persons lacked the standing to object. 
There was also considerable scepticism among the objectors who were 
advised that if a licence were granted, an Environmental Impact 
Assessment would be required by the Department of Environment and 
Planning. Their scepticism focused on the fact that the EIS would be 
undertaken by a consultant commissioned by the applicant. Residents 
could nevertheless still object through the Environment Protection Appeal 
Board. 
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Also present at the meeting was the Mayor of the Municipality who 
advised that, contrary to opinion expressed by the Hobart City Council 
that "exploration is not a land-use", extractive industries were prohibited 
by the local municipality in the area in question. The Mayor further 
stated that no planning scheme had been finalised for the area, it was 
still under an Interim Order and residents had an opportunity to object 
to the granting of Planning Approval through the Planning Appeal Board. 
The meeting decided to consider this avenue of objection, the Chairman 
of the meeting having publicly stated that "reliable sources" in the new 
government had assured him that mining would not be allowed to go 
ahead whether or not an exploration licence was granted. 
The case was subsequently heard in the Warden's Court. No objectors 
appeared; several had withdrawn their objections, others had not. All 
objections were dismissed. 
In handing down his decision to dismiss the remaining objectors, Hannon 
(1989: 3) made the following comments: 
it is my view that the nature of the objections are such that they 
don't come within the jurisdiction of the Warden's Court.... 
confining the grounds of objection to the legal basis of the application 
and of the objections and to exclude from the consideration of the 
Warden any question of discretion on the general merits of the 
application or the objection. 
Hannon went on to quote from Stow v Mineral Holdings 1977: 
It is for the Minister to determine whether as a matter of policy it 
is desirable that the licence should be granted or refused. It is for 
him to weight up the relative merits of the economic advantages 
said to flow from this successful establishment of the mining 
operation and the interest of those concerned to preserve unchanged 
the environment of the particular area and other competing 
contentions as to what is in the public interest a suitable use to 
which the land may be properly put (1989: 3). 
Hannon's concluding remarks were that: 
It is not for this Court, or me sitting as Warden of Mines, to determine 
the wider ecological and environmental issues. Those matters are 
specifically under the Mining Act, reserved for the consideration 
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of the Minister.... but I think it's relevant for those persons (i.e.  
objectors) to be made aware of the limitations of the Warden's 
Court in determining applications of this nature (1989: 4). 
It is understood that the exploration licence has now been granted and 
that an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) has been requested by the 
Department of Environment and Planning. It is also understood that 
the case has yet to be heard by the Planning Appeal Board. It has apparently 
been scheduled for public hearing early 1990, which effectively delays the 
commencement of exploration activities until after that date. 
Author's Comment 
Both cases bring to notice the inadequacies and the inappropriateness of 
the judicial system for the resolution of disputes over exploration licences. 
The limitations of the legislation, the very restrictive rules of standing 
and the inflexibility of the court system drew critical comment from both 
Wardens. The vexed issue of public versus private rights is particularly 
apparent in Case B. 
The cost to objectors, applicants and the taxpayer of legal representation 
and court time is also significant. 
4.2.2.5 	Issues and inadequacies 
There are a number of inadequacies and inconsistencies in the present 
system which are acknowledged by the Mines Division (hence the review 
of the Act). They are as follows: 
Very restrictive rules of standing. Only those persons with "an 
estate or interest" in the land, that is, owners occupiers or others 
daiming a financial interest, have a right of objection. There are 
no third party rights of objection by, for example, a person whose 
land or enjoyment of their land is likely to be affected, to either an 
exploration licence or a mining lease. 
Third party rights of objection to applications for a Licence to Operate 
and/or Planning Approval exist under the Environment Protection 
Act 1973 and the Local Government Act 1962 as indicated previously. 
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The Mines Division (Tasrriania, Department of Mines - 1989a) 
therefore argues that because third parties have rights of objection 
under other legislation, additional rights under the Mining Act 
may be unnecessary. 
What is not clear, however, is which jurisdiction is superior. It 
could therefore be, that although third parties objected and/or 
appealed in other jurisdictions, the superiority of the Mining Act 
and the denial of the right of objection and appeal here, means 
that objections under other jurisdictions are a charade. 
There is no requirement for a mining lease application to be  
advertised, other than by "marking-out" on the property in question. 
This could be perceived by the public to be a clandestine way to 
avoid disclosure of the intention to mine, particularly as it is 
indicated by the Mines Division (Tasmania, Department of Mines 
1989a) that mining for metallic minerals has tended to be confined 
to less populated regions of the State, where marking-out may not 
be noticed by the public. The perception of "hidden agendas" is 
further compounded by the absence of third party rights of objection. 
On the other hand, public advertisements are required for 
applications for a Licence to Operate and for a Planning Approval 
in regions where extractive industry is a "discretionary use". This 
highlights the inconsistencies of principles and procedures among 
environmental decision making processes. It is no wonder that 
the public and industry get confused and frustrated. The Mines 
Division (Tasmania, Department of Mines 1989a: 7) advocates a 
single development licence to include mining, environmental and 
planning approvals to be incorporated in legislation. 
Public interest versus private rights. Landowners and occupiers of 
certain classes of private land are required to consent to the issue 
of a mining lease. It can therefore be argued that they effectively 
have a power of veto over mining. 
There is an anomaly here between this requirement for a mining 
lease and that for an exploration licence where a licence holder 
may enter any class of private land after giving notice, but the 
owner or occupier has no statutory right to refuse entry (Tasmania, 
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Department of Mines 1989a).- That is, a landowner does not have 	- 
the power under the present legislation to exclude a licence holder 
from private land. The landowner must be served notice at least 3 
days prior to entry. However this gives the landowner little time 
to respond, notwithstanding that in any event the landowner has 
no authority to refuse entry to the licence holder. 
This raises the issue of private and public rights and the likelihood 
of disputes where these are perceived to be in conflict. 
Compensation difficulties can arise between the owner and the 
applicant. The Mining Act does not address these directly and it 
presumes that agreement is reached before the mining lease is 
granted. This is not always the case, a defect which is recognized 
by the Mines Division and which is to be rectified by legislation. 
Compensation for damage is retrievable via the Warden's Court 
and the amount is determined by the Warden. The onus is on the 
landowner to seek redress from the explorer. Although the explorer 
is required to lodge a security deposit with the Director prior to 
entry onto private land, the landowner has no authority to refuse 
entry and in some cases it is possible that the security deposit may 
not cover damage done. 
The inadequacies of a court, such as the Mining Warden's Court, 
as a mechanism for hearing and determining objections on 
environmental matters, was outlined by Jeffrey (1986) and indicated 
previously. Its limitations are similar to those of the Magistrates' 
Court in which marine farm objections and appeals are determined. 
4.3 	Administrative objection and appeal systems 
Administrative tribunals differ from their judicial counterparts in a 
number of ways. Their composition, processes and procedures are 
different. An administrative tribunal is perceived to have the advantages 
of relative informality of procedures, accessibility and it is not limited by 
rules of evidence. 
Michael Jeffrey QC (1986) in a comparison of the merits of courts and 
tribunals in EDR noted that tribunals: 
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had a statutory duty to consider public interest in a global sense 
(rather than private interest); 
were not limited by rules of evidence; for example, tribunal members 
can directly question a witness; 
interest was centred on obtaining the "best" information to arrive 
at the proper decision (rather than interest being centred on the 
adversarial relationship between objector and applicant); 
procedural modifications could be made at the tribunal's discretion; 
for example, site inspections and conferencing. 
However, for all its advantages over the court system, the administrative 
tribunal also remains essentially adversarial in operation. 
4.3.1 Environmental protection  
Environmental protection is defined in the Vision Statement of the former 
Department of the Environments' Annual Report 1987-88 as: 
The protection, maintenance and improvement of the Tasmanian 
environment for the beneficial use of all people: 
There are 3 strategic goals encapsulated in this statement: 
the understanding of environmental processes and their 
stress tolerance; 
the planning, development and implementation of strategies 
which minimize adverse effects on environmental quality; 
the co-ordination of environmental use through 
environmental planning, natural resource- conservation 
and pollution. 
Historically, environmental protection in Tasmania has focused on 
environmental monitoring and pollution control and although the 
development of the Environment Protection Act 1973 (Tas.) broadened 
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its mandate and functions, it remains a relatively recent innovation in 
both a legislative and an administrative sense. 
As acknowledged by Brown (1988: 2), the Act requests a negative response 
to any advertised development in that all intending developers must 
apply for a licence to operate and/or alter a scheduled premises. Scheduled 
premises are defined in Schedule I of the Act to include ore processing 
works; mines and quarries; chemical and gas works; oil refineries; food 
processing plants; pulp, paper and woodchip mills; abattoirs; sewage 
treatment works; refuse disposal sites; saw mills, and others. 
One of the innovations of the "new" 1973 Act was the creation of the 
Environment Protection Appeal Board (EPAB) to hear and determine 
appeals against the Director's decision to either grant or refuse a Licence 
to Operate a Scheduled Premises. 
4.3.1.1 	Environment Protection Appeal Board 
The Environment Protection Appeal Board (EPAB) is an independent 
administrative tribunal of three persons. It is chaired by a person with 
legal qualifications, one person must be a graduate in a branch of science, 
engineering or medicine with experience in environmental control or 
management if possible, and the third must have tertiary qualifications 
in a branch of science or engineering and at least five years experience in 
a responsible position associated with process operations in industry. 
There are also support substitutes with similar qualifications for all 
members. 
The EPAB public hearing process is more informal than those of the 
Magistrate's or Warden's Court. The Chairman of the EPAB may vary 
procedures at his discretion to question witnesses directly or to undertake 
site inspections as required. 
The Chairman of the EPAB also has the power to convene a preliminary 
hearing to determine the grounds of appeal and to ascertain the particulars 
of nominated witnesses. The Chairman then prepares a report specifying 
the matters to be determined, the estimated hearing times and that proofs 
of evidence have been exchanged. 
Having conducted a preliminary hearing, the Chairman then presides 
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over the public hearing as Chairman of the full- triburtal. 
4.3.1.2 	Environmental protection approval process 
As with marine farm and mining operations, there are a number of key 
stages in the environmental protection approval process. 
(i) Application for a licence to operate a scheduled premises. A person 
seeking a licence to operate may apply to the Director of 
Environmental Control who may grant the licence conditionally 
or unconditionally, or refuse to grant it. 
The applicant must specify the nature and situation of the premises 
and give the Director such plans, specifications and descriptions of 
emissions as the Director requires. An evaluation of the level of 
environmental assessment required is then made by the 
Department of Environment and Planning at the request of the 
Director. 
The application requirement applies both to new developments 
and to existing premises where there is a change of operations, a 
licence renewal or a licence transfer. 
(ii) Advertisement of licence application. The applicant must then 
"issue notice on all persons who may be affected", usually by an 
advertisement for two consecutive weeks in a local newspaper. 
(iii) Objections against a licence application may be lodged "with the 
Director by any person" who objects to an application within 30 
days of the advertisement. The onus is on the objector to prove 
that he/she will be affected. 
(iv) Appeals against the Director's decision to grant or renew or refuse 
a licence must be lodged with the Environment Protection Appeal 
Board within 14 days of the Director's decision, the Director having 
notified the applicant and objectors simultaneously. 
An appeal may only be lodged by persons who originally objected 
and who reside or carry on business in an area likely to be adversely 
affected by pollution from the licensed premises. Original objectors 
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can intervene in any appeal lodged by -the applicant.- The EPAB 
also has discretion to allow intervention by persons who could 
have, but did not, lodge an objection to the original application. 
A fee of $250 as security against costs has to be deposited with the 
EPAB at the time of lodgement of appeal. 
(v) A public hearing is then convened by the EPAB. 
4.3.1.3 	Profile of an Environmental Protection Dispute 
The profile of this dispute was obtained from attendance at the EPAB 
hearing and from discussions with the objectors and their legal 
representative, Environment Protection officers and a representative of 
the applicant. This case involved an application by a company to expand 
its quarry operations. Since the quarry was first used, urban encroachment 
had increased, and private housing was now being constructed close, to 
the boundary of the premises. 
The case was heard by the EPAB comprising a Chairman and two persons 
with engineering qualifications. There was no preliminary conference 
and the hearing took 2V2 days. Both the applicant and the appellants 
were legally represented. 
Considerable time (4 hours) was spent in determination of the threshold 
matters of grounds of appeal and the particulars of the appellants. There 
was also the question of appellant access to the Environmental Impact 
Statement (EIS) which had been commissioned by the applicant at the 
request of the former Department of Environment. The end result was 
that water pollution, and traffic hazards caused by increased traffic on 
unsealed roads adjacent to the quarry and nearby housing were dismissed 
as grounds of appeal by the EPAB. Neither were appellants allowed 
access to the EIS, "commercial in confidence" being cited in the defence 
against access in the public interest. The EIS was then admitted as evidence 
in support of the applicant's case. 
The EPAB then adjourned to consider the EIS. It also decided that a site 
inspection was required the following day. 
In spite of a lower degree of formality than in the judicial system, the 
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hearing remained noticeably adversarial in operation, all parties and in 
particular less articulate appellants appearing very nervous. The 
adversarial nature of the hearing was compounded by the presence of 
legal representatives who examined and cross-examined in the manner 
of the courts. 
All parties were critical of the Department of Environment's procedures, 
citing numerous examples of inconsistency and contradiction in advice 
given, information requested and the monitoring of quarry operations, 
including breaches of licence conditions and the lodgment of quarry 
returns. The result was that the appeals were dismissed and the quarry 
was able to proceed with its expansion. The appellant's major concerns 
of water pollution, noise, dust and traffic hazards were not addressed. 
The former Department of Environment was advised to tighten up its 
monitoring and investigation processes. 
4.3.1.4 	Issues and inadequacies 
The Environment Protection Act 1973 (Tas.) is now outdated and a 
complete review is planned for 1990. 
Since the introduction of the Act in 1973, environmental protection has 
become increasingly complex and contentious. As a result a three level 
application assessment process has now been introduced. In 1988, a two 
level process was introduced to cater for small and large scale developments 
and operations. However the proposed construction of a Kraft pulpmill 
at Wesley Vale in early 1989 promoted the introduction of an unofficial 
third level of assessment. 
These levels of assessment are administered by the Department of 
Environment and Planning according to the nature and extent of the 
environmental problems likely to arise from the proposed development. 
Level 1 Assessments are for small developments unlikely to cause 
significant environmental problems and the procedure is straightforward. 
It involves a site inspection and the completion of a Development 
Proposal. The usual objection and appeal processes then apply. 
Level 2 Assessments are for developments likely to cause significant 
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environmental problems. A Development Proposal and a draft 
Environmental Management Plan (EMP) are both required. The applicant 
is required to prepare both documents in consultation with the 
Department. These are then made available for public comment prior to 
any decision by the Director. 
The usual objection and appeal processes then apply. 
Level 3 Assessments are for particularly complex and contentious 
developments such as the Wesley Vale Pulp Mill, Huon Forest Products 
Woodchip mill, and the Light Weight Coated Paper (LWC) project 
proposed by Australian Newsprint Mills. 
In cases such as these, an even more rigorous application assessment 
process is required. There are no proforma public guidelines available, 
the requirements for each development being determined by the 
Department on a case-by case basis. For example, developers may be 
required to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement and Management 
Plan (EISMP) which is then made available for public comment and 
objection. The period for formal Objections may also be extended from 
30 days to 6 weeks as is proposed, in the case of the LWC project (Department 
of Environment and Planning 1989: 2). 
Another innovation in the LWC application process is the intention to 
seek public input into the development of draft guidelines ("scoping") 
for the EIS. 
These Level 3 modifications to the application process, while well 
intentioned, could be criticized as being inequitable and inconsistent by 
both applicants and objectors. 
Many of the 1973 definitions in the Act are too narrow in 1989. 
For example, "environment" means land, water and atmosphere 
of the earth but "land" does not include soil; rather it refers to 
buildings, structures and parts thereof. The Act also makes no 
allowance for social impacts, unlike the Commonwealth 
Environment Protection (Impact of Proposals) Act 1974 or the 
Western Australian Environmental Protection Act (1986). 
Given increased public concern, the profile of social impact and 
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the need for comprehensive social impact assessment in Level 2 
and Level 3 developments in particular, the current Act is totally 
inadequate. 
This inadequacy in the evaluation of social impact issues is also 
reflected in the composition of the EPAB and the qualifications of 
its members as lawyers, engineers, medical practitioners or scientists. 
There is no capacity for social issue/impact analysis nor has it the 
jurisdiction to consider such under the Act as it stands at present. 
Similarly, there is no capacity in the EPAB for the evaluation of 
economic impact issues of significance to the public or the state. 
While there is an opportunity for a preliminary hearing, its use is 
at the Chairman's discretion. The use of a preliminary hearing in 
the dispute profiled would have hastened the hearing process by 
eliminating time spent on threshold issues. A shorter hearing 
time would also have meant less costs for all the parties. 
That the Chairman may then go on to chair the appeal hearing is 
of concern. The question this may raise in the minds of some 
parties is that natural justice may be denied if, for example, the 
Chairman is perceived to be biased as a result of his chairing the 
preliminary hearing. In New South Wales, Commissioners of 
Inquiry do not hear an appeal if they have previously acted as a 
mediator in that same dispute (NSW Commissions of Inquiry for 
Environment and Planning 1988). 
The adversarial nature of the hearing process, together with the 
inadequacies of the Act and of the EPAB composition, prevent the 
resolution of the substantive issues of disputes, such as those of 
the traffic hazards, and water and noise pollution in the case cited. 
It is likely that these issues will re-emerge as zoning issues in 
land-use planning, as environment protection jurisdiction and 
processes were unable to either address or resolve them. 
4.3.2 Land-use planning 
Land-use planning and land management are at a watershed in Tasmania. 
There is widespread recognition of the need for an integrated land-use 
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strategy for the state with land capability assessment and land conservation 
as the principles underpinning such an approach (Sandford 1989c). Land 
capability assessment is in its infancy in Tasmania and land conservation 
is noticeably absent, Tasmania being the only Australian state without 
land conservation legislation. 
The need for a land-use strategy has been acknowledged by Mant 1989, 
the Tasmanian Legislative Council's public land-use inquiry 1989 and 
reviews of local government, mining, and environment protection 
legislation which are either already underway or are imminent. The 
Labor-Green Accord partners are also committed to the development of 
comprehensive management plans for World Heritage areas, water use, 
coastal management, and forests and forest industry strategies, all of which 
impact directly on land-use planning and land management. 
There are also major problems with outdated planning legislation. 
Although legislation on land-use planning has been debated for some 20 
years, as Australian Planner (1988) notes, there has been little fundamental 
change. Land-use planning suffers from an isolationist rather than an 
integrated approach to planning and there has been no coordinated strategy 
for land-use planning and the resolution of land-use disputes. 
The significance of planning at the State level is placed in perspective 
when it is realized that some 60% of the land area of Tasmania is 
within the Crown Estate (Australian Planner 1988: 1). 
A major factor affecting planning control is land ownership. Only privately 
owned land and private development on Crown land are subject to 
planning control. As some 60.5 percent of the State's land is administered 
by the Government with only 39.5 percent being privately owned, this 
raises questions of planning coordination and highlights the need for 
State Government commitment to the development of an integrated 
land-use planning and management strategy for the State. 
As noted in Australian Planner: 
land-use planning displays a varied profile. There is a well 
developed system for statutory planning based on local government 
planning schemes with clear processes for public involvement, 
but planning at the State and regional levels is less well developed 
(Australian Planner 1988: 1). 
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McNeill (1988: 11) explains that-planning in Tasmania is enshrined under 
the title 'Town and Country Planning', and was developed on the English 
model, which has proved inappropriate for Australian patterns of building 
and development. He nevertheless states: 
Planning in Tasmania became and still largely functions as, local 
government development control mainly exercised through land-
use zoning (McNeill 1988: 11). 
Under the Town and Country Planning Act 1944 (Tas.) local government 
became the focus for planning within the State. The Act established an 
administrative framework of a Town and Country Planning Commission 
presided over by a Commissioner for Town and Country Planning. In 
1958 the Act was amended to provide for the development of regional 
land-use plans (Master Plans) by regional organizations comprised largely 
of local government representatives (Master Planning Authorities) (Tyler 
1988: 13). 
In 1962 the Town and Country Planning Act was incorporated into a 
revised Local Government Act and as Tyler (1988) indicates, subsequent 
amendments to the Act have included: 
the establishment of a Planning Appeal Board; 
the requirement for a municipality to have a planning scheme or 
an interim order before it can exercise planning controls; and 
a provision which requires a council to obtain the Commissioner's 
consent to a municipality's approval of any subdivision proposal, 
before that approval is effective. 
The Commissioner acknowledges anomalies and inconsistencies in the 
legislation which is now outdated and has not kept pace with Tasmania's 
rate and direction of development (Tyler 1988:13). This is further supported 
by Mant (1981) who, in his Report on Land Management in Tasmania, 
described land management in the State as fragmented and administered 
by a number of specialist agencies at the expense of the land resource. 
The issue of planned multiple use is a difficult one which is compounded 
by the legislative and administrative inadequacies mentioned. It 
frequently results in conflict between values of land conservation and 
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land exploitation, which in turn reflects the eternal resource management 
dilemma facing Tasmania. 
According to Birkeland-Corro (1988b), land-use planning involves the 
fundamental question of public choice regarding the extraction, 
distribution, use, pollution or depletion of a resource, the land. However 
public planning is given little thought. Birkeland-Corro states, "we do 
not plan: instead we 'manage conflict' surrounding planning issues. And, 
we do not do that very well" (Birkeland-Corro 1988b: 8). 
4.3.2.1 	Planning Appeal Board 
The Planning Appeal Board (PAB) is an independent administrative 
tribunal responsible for the management of land-use conflict. It is 
established under the Local Government Act 1962 (Tas.) and hears and 
determines appeals against the various planning decisions made by 
Municipal Councils pursuant to a statutory planning scheme or an 
approved Interim Order (Tasmania, Commissioner for Town and Country 
Planning 1986: 1). 
A Constituted Board may comprise a "full" Board of three members or it 
may be a single member Board. Normally the Board sits as a three 
person tribunal so as to maximize the expertise available (Pitt 1988: 16). 
The composition of the Board is at the discretion of the Chairman. Of 
the 3 members, the Chairman and Deputy Chairman are required to 
have legal qualifications; one member must be an architect or engineer; 
and the third member must have planning experience. 
The PAB can inform itself as it sees fit. It usually inspects sites and it has 
the power to hear any person it wishes, in addition to the parties. 
The procedure is at the discretion of the Board, and it is as informal as 
circumstances permit, although the basic adversarial court structure of 
examination and cross examination is adopted (Pitt 1988: 16). 
The Board also has the power to conduct a pre-hearing compulsory 
conference. As Pitt comments, the Board member conducting the 
compulsory conference does not sit upon any subsequent hearing of that 
appeal (Pitt 1988: 16). This is in contrast with the position adopted by the 
Environment Protection Appeal Board. 
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4.3.2.2 	Planning approval process 
According to Pitt (1988: 15), under the Act the Commissioner for Town 
and Country Planning may require any municipality to prepare a planning 
scheme within a specified time. Where there is an unfulfilled requirement 
to prepare a scheme, or a scheme is in the course of preparation, a 
municipality may make an interim order. Since 1986 no municipality 
has had the power to refuse, grant conditionally or prohibit any 
development other than under a scheme or interim order. 
Before a person is able to carry out a development, it is necessary to 
establish if an application for planning approval is required. This is 
determined by examining the Municipal Planning Scheme or Interim 
Order. If the Municipality has neither a Planning Scheme nor an Interim 
Order, then no planning approval is required. 
Both Planning Schemes and Interim Orders designate land developments 
and subdivisions by local government authorities into three broad 
categories: 
prohibited development - the Authority cannot allow certain 
specific usage; 
permitted development - 
(a) without the need for planning approval 
(b) with restrictions/conditions applied; 
discretionary development - the authority may exercise discretion 
to refuse or permit the use of land with or without restrictions or 
conditions. 
The flow chart prepared by Lawrence (1988) illustrates the planning 
approval process (Figure 3). At September 1988, some 92 per cent of the 
State was covered by either Interim Orders or Planning Schemes. 
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However, land administered by the Government (Federal or State), 
although covered by a Planning Scheme, is not controlled by the Local 
Government Act and individual State government agencies are not bound 
by the provisions of the Scheme (Lawrence 1988). 
If developments are proposed on land designated prohibited use, the 
Council has no choice but to refuse the application. There are no appeal 
provisions for this category of development. 
(i) Applications for development on land designated permitted use 
may be approved or refused by the Council. The Council may also 
attach conditions to the approval. 
The applicant can appeal against the conditions attached to such 
an approval. 
Third parties cannot appeal this category of applications. 
(ii) Applications for development on land designated discretionary 
use are required to undergo a different process which involves 
opportunities for public comment. 
Applications must be advertised in a local daily newspaper and 
persons wishing to object may do so. 
(iii) Objections (representations) must be lodged with Council  within 
14 days from the date of advertisement. 
Council then makes a decision on the application. If objections 
have been received, Council is required to advertise its decision. If 
no objections have been received an advertisement is not required. 
Only an applicant or a person who has lodged an objection during 
the 14 day period can appeal to the Planning Appeal Board against 
the Council's decision. 
An applicant can appeal against either the refusal of a planning 
approval or the conditions of approval. 
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A person who has lodged an objection with Council can appeal 
the granting of a planning approval. 
(iv) A notice of appeal is lodged with the Office of the Commissioner 
for Town and Country Planning within 14 days of the Council's 
advertising its decision, or, if the decision is not required to be 
advertised, within 14 days of service of a notice of the decision on 
the person(s) who instituted the appeal. 
There can also be appeals against delays by Councils in considering 
development applications. In this case an applicant may appeal 
against the failure of a Council to decide on an application after 
the expiry of 42 days (or longer if agreed between the applicant and 
Council) from the date the Council was notified of the advertisement 
of the application. 
(v) A hearing is then convened by the Planning Appeal Board. Appeal 
hearings are open to the public and observers and the media may 
attend. Parties to an appeal may elect to be legally represented. 
This is frequently the case although representation is also provided 
by planning consultants alone. 
4.3.2.3 	Profile of a planning dispute 
One case study of a planning dispute was available to the author. 
Discussions were held with the objectors and the applicant and the hearing 
was attended. It was an appeal by third parties against the decision of a 
Council to approve the construction of strata title home units in an area 
that had traditionally been private homes. 
The appellants were concerned that the construction of units would create 
additional traffic and noise problems, would be visually offensive and 
incompatible with local architecture, and might adversely affect the market 
values of adjacent properties. 
The case took half a day. 
The process was adversarial and sequential with the evidence being 
presented by the applicant, the Council, and finally the appellant. The 
applicant and appellant were legally represented and a Planner presented 
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- the Council's case. 
The appeal was dismissed. The PAB decided that the development was 
unlikely to cause appreciable traffic problems, that noise could be controlled 
by other regulations and public authorities, that the proposed construction 
design was somewhat similar to other nearby residences, and that approval 
conditions would ensure compliance. 
4.3.2.4 	Issues and inadequacies 
The Local Government Act 1962 like much resource management 
legislation, is now out of date. There have been significant changes 
in land-use planning since 1962, in response to increasing 
community concern about the utilisation of land. The issue of 
rural subdivision and urban encroachment into traditional 
agricultural areas is of concern to organizations such as the 
Tasmanian Farmers and Graziers Association (TFGA), which 
advocates the need for subdivision to have regard to land capability 
assessment, and the need for provision of appeals to a "Land Court" 
(TFGA 1989). At the other end of the community spectrum a 
number of conservation groups, planners and individuals have 
expressed concern about planning approval decisions taken by the 
Hobart City Council which threaten the loss of Hobart's historical 
character. Proposed development at Sullivan's Cove is one such 
example. 
Land ownership is a key issue. The exemption of the Crown from 
planning control under the Act is a major inadequacy in land-use 
planning, particularly as 60.5 per cent of the State's land resource 
is affected. Land-use legislation, be it land conservation or planning, 
must have the power to bind the Crown. Not to do so militates 
against sound land-use planning and is potentially a contributing 
factor to land-use conflict. 
Third party rights of appeal are restricted to those persons who 
have made representations/objections to Council against 
discretionary developments only. There are no third party rights 
of appeal against permitted developments. Some other States have 
removed third party rights completely, however Pitt argues in 
favour of retention if not extension of third party rights as: 
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It is unjust for a person's enjoyment of their land to be 
substantially adversely affected by a development and yet 
for them to have no right of appeal (Pitt 1988: 17). 
Third party rights, or lack of, may well be a focus for the future as 
concern about the need for sustainable land-use management gains 
momentum. Agricultural industry organizations have already 
expressed dissatisfaction with rural subdivision processes and have 
argued the need for Right-to-Farm legislation. It is likely that, as a 
political force in Tasmania, it will lobby for third party rights to be 
extended. 
Pre-hearing conferencing could be more widely used as a means of 
either resolving disputes before hearing or as a means of reducing 
the number of issues to be addressed at a hearing and thus time 
taken and costs accrued. It is of concern to note that of 109 appeals 
lodged in 1986-87, 78 were heard but only 3 compulsory conferences 
were conducted (Pitt 1988: 15). There is no explanation given for 
this and it seems further examination may be in order. 
Fast-track legislation has been used by Government to exempt 
specific developments from the planning approval and appeal 
process. The Electrona silicon development and the construction 
of the multi-storey Sheraton Hotel on Hobart's historic waterfront 
are two examples. The argument put was that such developments 
were in the public (and the State's) interest, and necessary for 
economic and employment reasons. 
To bypass the planning process in this manner, in spite of having 
the power to do so, provokes land-use and community conflict 
whereas the objective of the planning process and the Planning 
Appeal Board is to resolve conflict in the public interest. 
4.3.3 Forestry 
Tasmania is the most forested of the Australian states with forests covering 
almost 42 per cent of the island. Some 13 per cent of the State is designated 
as State reserves and 14 per cent as conservation areas under the sole 
control of the Department of Parks, Wildlife and Heritage (Rolley 1988: 
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4). 
Forest industries constitute the State's single largest source of export 
revenue and they are also major employers, although conservationists 
argue that increasing automation in both the forests and the mills will 
see a substantial downturn in employment opportunities in the near 
future. 
Industry practices have also been a focus of large-scale and sometimes 
violent disputes, and of numerous inquiries (such as the Lemonthyme 
and Southern Forests Commission of Inquiry, 1988). 
Legislation for planning the management of forests is set out in the 
Forestry Act 1920 (and subsequent amendments such as those of 1975, 
1977 and 1980) and the Forest Practices Act 1985. These Acts are supported 
by the National Parks and Wildlife Act 1970 and the Environment 
Protection Act 1973, (Rolley 1988). 
According to Rolley, the Forestry Act 1920 provides for a Forestry 
Department to have exclusive control and management of all matters of 
forest policy in state forests and timber reserves with the objective of 
providing for better management and protection of forests. The 1975 
amendment set aside land within a State forest as a Forest Reserve and 
the 1977 amendment provided for a Private Forestry Council, a Private 
Forest Division, and a Commissioner with statutory responsibilities for 
private forests. 
In 1976, a public inquiry into Private Forestry Development in Tasmania 
recommended legislation which would focus specifically on initiatives 
required to improve the practice of forestry and provide for forest 
conservation on both public and private forest lands. This became the 
Forest Practices Act 1985 and it covers all forests where commercial wood 
production is planned, including forests on the Register of the National 
Estate. 
The Forest Practices Act seeks to achieve an integrated approach to forest 
management. Key features of the Act and components in the integrated 
forest management strategy are: 
the creation of Private Timber Reserves; 
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a requirement for timber harvesting plans; 
the implementation of a Forest Practices Code; 
the constitution of a Forest Practices Tribunal. 
The Act binds the Crown and is superior to the Local Government Act 
1962. 
The Forest Practices Act applies only to forest areas designated for timber 
production. "It does not provide, nor was it intended to provide, a 
legislative mechanism to resolve disputes between differing groups on 
fundamental and broader scale land-use planning" (Rolley 1988: 11). 
4.3.3.1 	Forest Practices Tribunal 
The Forest Practices Tribunal is an independent administrative tribunal, 
the objective of which is to adjudicate conflicts that may arise in the 
application of the Act between the parties most directly affected. It 
constitutes three persons, one of whom is legally qualified and with a 
minimum of five years experience, one being a person with a sound and 
practical knowledge of forestry operations, and the third being a person 
qualified in land and forest management. 
The Tribunal may inform itself on any matter as it thinks fit, procedures 
are flexible, site inspections are undertaken, and appeal hearings often 
occur on site. 
The hearings are not public, there are no third party rights of appeal, and 
parties are not entitled to legal representation. 
4.3.3.2 	Forestry approvals processes 
(i) An application for land to be declared a private timber reserve 
may be made to the Forestry Commission by any person who wishes 
to have his land designated as such. 
(ii) An advertisement of the particulars of the application is published 
in the State's daily newspapers by the Commission which also 
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sends a copy of the notice to the local authority exercising jurisdiction 
over the land and the local authority exercising jurisdiction over 
any adjacent land. 
(iii) Objections may be lodged with the Commission by any prescribed 
person by a date specified as being not less than 28 days after the 
advertisement. 
A "prescribed person" means: 
(a) a local authority exercising jurisdiction over the land, or 
part of the land to which the application relates, or over any 
land adjacent to that land; 
(b) a State authority; or 
(c) a person who has a legal or equitable interest in the land, or 
the timber on the land, to which the application relates. 
An objector must specify the grounds of objection and must also 
serve a copy of the objection on the applicant by the date specified 
in the advertised notice. 
(iv) The Commission may then grant or refuse the application, having 
regard to Objections received. If an application is granted, the 
Commission notifies objectors accordingly. 
(v) 	An appeal to the Forest Practices Tribunal may be made by a person 
whose application was refused by the Commission and where the 
Commission grants an application for a private timber reserve, by 
a person who has lodged an objection. 
Appeals must be lodged within 14 days of receipt of notification of 
the Commission's decision. 
The Registrar of the Forest Practices Tribunal is then required to 
serve a copy of the notice of appeal on each person who lodged an 
objection (in the case of an appeal by the applicant) and publish 
the notice of appeal in the daily newspaper circulating in the area 
in which the intended reserve is located. 
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There is provision for any person who objectedio intervene in 
specified circumstances. 
(vi) Following a hearing the Commission recommends to the Governor 
that the land be declared a private timber reserve. Notification of 
the decision is published in the Gazette. 
There is provision for compensation in some circumstances in the 
event of dismissal of an appeal. 
Once land has been declared a private timber reserve, it can be used only 
in accordance with the Forest Practices Code. If this ceases to be the case, 
the Commission investigates relocation of that reserve. The owner of a 
reserve may appeal such a decision to the Tribunal. 
According to a senior manager in the Forestry Commission (pers. corn. 
1989), preliminary hearings involving objectors and the applicant are 
often held, although there is no specific provision for this in the Act. He 
stated that these were only held when the Commission intended to refuse 
an application, and only 2 out of 80 applications had been refused as at 
June 1989. There had also been no appeals by objectors to the Tribunal. 
He also stated that the Act had been deliberately drafted to limit the 
number of objectors, to inhibit opportunities for community consultation 
and input, and to deny third party rights of appeal. 
Timber Harvesting Plan approval process 
The Forest Practices Code sets out the standards that apply to forest 
operations, of which the Timber Harvesting Plan is a part. The Timber 
Harvesting Plan is the key to sound forest practice (Forestry Commission 
1988) and is a plan of action drawn up by those involved in the operation 
- the landowner, the timber processor and the contractor. It must then be 
approved by the Forest Practices Officer, an employee of the Forestry 
Commission. 
A timber harvesting plan is required for both Crown land and private 
property timber harvesting operations. There are some exemptions for 
small operations that are not considered to be environmentally sensitive. 
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A timber processor is deemed guilty of an offence and can be convicted 
and fined up to $15,000 if he/she acquires or purchases timber for sale 
from land in respect of which there is no timber harvesting plan at the 
time of harvesting. 
(i) An application for a timber harvesting plan may be made to the 
Forestry Commission by any person intending to undertake timber 
harvesting. It must be signed by the landowner, the timber processor 
and the contractor(s). 
(ii) The plan is then submitted to the Forest Practices Officer for 
approval. 
The Forest Practices Officer may approve or ask for further 
information, amend or vary, or refuse the Plan. 
(iii) An appeal may be lodged with the Tribunal by any person who 
has applied for approval of a timber harvesting plan. Appeals can 
be in relation to a Commission decision to refuse to approve a 
plan, to amend or vary a plan, to refuse an applicant's proposed 
amendment, or a decision to amend or vary an applicant's 
amendment (Forestry Commission 1988: 9). 
There are no third party rights of appeal. 
(iv) A hearing is then convened by the Forest Practices Tribunal and 
the Tribunal's decision is final. 
4.3.3.3 	Profile of a forestry dispute 
The Forestry Commission stated that it was unable to allow the author to 
observe a Tribunal hearing as they were private hearings and that the 
consent of all parties and the Tribunal was required. In spite of follow 
up by the author, such an opportunity was not offered. 
It should also be noted that, as stated previously, only 2 out of 80 applications 
for private timber reserves were refused to June 1989. 
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4.3.3.4 	Issues and inadequacies 
The Forest Practices Act 1985 raises a number of issues. As the most 
recent resource management legislation examined, it is reasonable to 
expect that it would demonstrate a responsiveness to increased community 
concern about environmental impacts and the need for improved 
environmental decision making and dispute resolution systems. That it 
does not do so is of interest for the following reasons: 
The issue of public interest v private rights comes into sharp relief 
in the forestry operations approval processes. The Act and its 
processes clearly support commercial timber production as a private 
right. There is no provision for public interest in the management 
of the private forestry resource be it on Crown or private land, the 
denial of third party rights of objection and appeal being an example. 
There are no third party rights of objection or appeal, Objections 
being restricted to a very narrow category of "prescribed persons" 
in the case of private timber resources, and to landowners, timber 
processor and contractors who are parties to a specific timber 
harvesting plan in the case of approval of timber harvesting plans. 
These restrictions on the standing of objectors are contrary to prevailing 
judicial opinion and trends to extend objections and appeal rights and 
their jurisdictions to include a wider class of persons. Such restrictions, 
while supporting an objective of timber production and forest 
management as determined by the Forestry Commission, may be perceived 
as arrogant and obstructive by the community, and in particular by those 
with an ecocentric perspective. It could also be argued that, in making 
decisions in the public interest, natural justice is denied those who wish 
to object on grounds other than timber productivity. For example, equal 
weight does not appear to be awarded to forest conservation, as distinct 
from forest production. 
A Forestry Commission defence that conservation and land-use 
management is adequately catered for by other government departments 
such as the Departments of Environment and Planning and Parks, Wildlife 
and Heritage, lacks substance when it is noted that the Forest Practices 
Act binds the Crown and is superior to the Local Government Act and 
the Environment Protection Act. 
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Tribunal hearings are in effect, private hearings, restricted to 
tribunal members, the applicant(s) and objector(s). Observers, and 
the media are not permitted, unlike the EPAB and PAB hearings, 
unless the permission of all parties is first obtained. Rightly or 
wrongly, this adds to public perceptions of collusion between the 
Forestry Commission and the forest industries. 
The Act binds the Crown and in most cases it is the superior 
jurisdiction. This means it can override lesser legislation, as 
indicated. There are advantages and disadvantages here. On the 
one hand, the Crown is bound to observe sound forest practices. 
On the other hand, the Commission is in a position of strength, 
and it is possible for decisions based on a forest development or 
timber production ethos to override the need for preservation and 
conservation. 
The Forests Practices Act has apparently failed to take into account 
the weight of public opinion in support of third party objection 
and appeal rights and public interest issues. However, given the 
statement made to the author by a senior Forestry Commission 
Manager, as mentioned, it would seem that the Commission has 
in fact taken very careful note of public opinion. A sceptic may be 
excused for thinking it was a case of attack being the best form of 
defence. 
It should not be forgotten however, that at the time this Act was being 
compiled, from 1976 to 1987 when it was proclaimed, the Tasmanian 
forests had been battlegrounds for long and bitter conflicts between those 
in support of timber production and those concerned with forest 
conservation. It is therefore not surprising that the Forest Practices Act 
constitutes a defensive reaction to public criticism of forest practices by 
limiting opportunities for third party intervention in the approvals 
processes while endeavouring to ensure that improved forest practices 
and standards are developed and enforced. 
4.4 A comparison of EDR systems 
An analysis of the five systems previously described reveals a number of 
commonalities of process, procedure, issues and inadequacies. 
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There are distinct similarities across the apPi-ovals processes, with all 
systems using a staged process or approach to environmental decision-
making and dispute resolution. The stages identified are an application 
to develop, a provision for objections against the application, and a right 
to appeal the decision to grant or refuse the application. This is where 
the appeal process similarities cease. 
There are wide ranging differences among systems in their requirements 
for the application to be advertised and if so, by whom - applicant or 
statutory authority. There are even anomalies within systems, as is the 
case with mining. There are major differences in the rules of standing, 
third party rights being the exception rather than the rule, and although 
resource management and environmental decision making are generally 
assumed to be in the public interest, private rights appear to dominate 
the agendas of most of these systems, promoting a perception of resource 
development rather than resource conservation. 
Similarities exist among the hearing processes also. With the exception 
of the forestry appeal hearings, all are public, and all are adversarial. 
With the exception of forestry again, legal representation is optional, but 
is used in most cases, as objectors and appellants consider they are otherwise 
disadvantaged. 
The judicial/court based systems are definitely more inflexible and 
procedurally oriented. Their inability to deal with environmental issues 
has been acknowledged by Magistrates Hannon, Bryan and Dockray. There 
is undoubtedly a preference for administrative tribunals as a more 
appropriate forum for environmental dispute resolution. 
Nevertheless, there are differences in operations and procedures among 
the tribunals. The composition of the tribunal/board varies, as does its 
power to sit as a tribunal/board of one person. No tribunals/boards have 
a social impact analysis capacity among their membership, in spite of 
increasing public demand for social impact assessment. Their capacity 
for economic impact assessment is also questionable. Given the need for 
"rounded" decisions in environmental dispute resolution, the author 
considers that all the tribunals may well be deficient in this regard, and 
that a case exists to broaden their composition. Comparable problems 
have already been acknowledged by some members of the judiciary who 
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-consider that legally qualified persons are often unable to comprehensively 
and accurately determine wide ranging environmental matters. 
There are also differences in the extent to which pre-hearing conferences 
are used. Indications are that they are underutilised. The value of 
compulsory conferences and the Chairing of a subsequent hearing by the 
conference Chairman are also questioned, and these issues will be 
addressed in the following chapter. 
There seems to be a consensus that there is more procedural flexibility in 
administrative tribunals than there is in courts. However they remain 
adversarial in operation and in spite of attempts by the tribunal to 
maximize informality, objectors, appellants and applicants interviewed 
all indicated that they felt intimidated by the adversarial nature of the 
hearing process. 
Additional comments by parties about the hearing process were that it 
was very costly and time consuming and that they lost control of their 
case to lawyers. A number also commented that the case presented by 
the lawyers bore little resemblance to the original objection or appeal. 
However the parties who made these comments felt unable to present 
their own case in a combative legal arena. The anomalies and differences 
discussed above are illustrated in Figure 4. 
Although similarities exist among the environmental decision making 
and dispute resolution systems examined, many differences and 
inconsistencies remain. The end result is confusion and frustration for 
all parties. 
For the developer, it may be necessary to lodge applications in several 
jurisdictions which have to be negotiated either concurrently or 
sequentially. This information is not readily available in many cases and 
with the exception of the Forest Practices Act, there is no clear indication 
as to which legislation has priority. It is time consuming and may cost 
the developer loss of commercial advantage. 
For the public, it is a maze of misinformation and inconsistent procedures 
apparently designed to restrict public access and input to environmental 
decision making - a perception of private rights at the expense of public 
interest. 
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FIGURE 4 
Comparison of EDR Systems in Tasmania 
Jurisdiction EDR Mode Approval Process Issues and Inadequacies 
Marine Farms Magistrates - Application to Director - Restrictive rules of standing 
Court - Advertisement by Minister if lease (Marine Board; Local 
Sea Fisheries - Objections to applications Government; use of waters;) 
Act 1959 + to Minister if permit (Marine Board; 
amendments) - Decision by Minister 
- Objections and appeal 
against decision to 
livelihood affected - no third 
party rights) 
- Limited grounds of appeal 
Magistrates Court 
- Public hearing at 
- No provision for pre-hearing 
conferencing 
Magistrates Court 
- Right to appeal 
Magistrates decision to 
- Procedural inflexibility - 
no site inspections + limited 
by rules of evidence 
Supreme Court - Adversarial - intimidating and 
costly 
- Private (commercial) rights v 
public interest 
- No clear channels of 
communication between public 
and Department 
Mining Mining (A) Exploration Licence - Legislation out of date 
Wardens - Application to Director - Restrictive rules of standing 
(Mining Act Court - Advertisement by Applicant "estate or interest": no 
1929 + - Objections to application third party rights 
amendments) to the Warden's Court 
- Public hearing at Wardens 
Court 
- Right to appeal Warden's 
decision to Supreme Court 
(B) Mining Lease 
- No requirement for mining 
lease to be advertused —> 
public perception of 
clandestine activities 
- Public interest v private 
rights - anomaly between 
requirements for licence and a 
lease with regard to landowner 
consent to entry 
- Applicant "marks-out" 
lease site 
- Application for lease 
(no advertisement 
required) 
- Objections to application 
to Director forwarded to 
Warden's Court 
- Compensation for damage - onus 
on landowner to retrieve 
- Procedural and process 
inflexibility in Warden's 
Court. Department favours a 
tribunal. 
- Public hearing at Warden's 
Court 
- Appeal to Supreme Court 
re. Warden's Decision 
- No provision in Act for 
conferencing, although is 
conducted as is considered 
effective. 
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Jurisdiction EDR Mode Approval Process Issues and Inadequacies 
Environment Environment - Application for licence to - Legislation out of date 
Protection Protection operate (3 levels of EIA) - Definition of "environment" 
Appeal - Advertisement by inadequate e.g. does not account 
(Environment Board applicant for social impact 
Protection Act 
1973 + 
- Objections against 
application to Director 
- Application process inadequate, 
process in response to general 
amendments) - Director's decision 
- Appeal against Director's 
decision to EPAB 
concern about need for realistic 
guidelines 
- Preliminary hearings under-
utilized 
- Chairman EPAB hears appeal 
after presided over preliminary 
hearing of same case, question of 
denial of natural justice 
- Adversarial hearing process - 
intimidating and potentially 
costly 
- Hearings retain emphasis on 
procedure at expense of 
substantive issues in dispute 
Land-use Planning (A) Permitted Use - Legislation out of date 
Planning Appeal - Application for development - Third party rights restricted to 
Board - Council decision discretionary developments 
(Local - Applicant can appeal to - Pre-hearing conferences are 
Government P.A.B. underutilized and compulsory 
Act 1962 + (B) Discretionary Use - Land ownership inequities, Crown 
amendments) - Application for development exemption from Planning Control; 
- Advertisement Act does not bind the Crown 
- Objections lodged with - Potential for "Fast-Track" 
Council Legislation remains despite 
- Council decision Planning Approval Process and 
- Appeals for P.A.B. Controls 
Forestry Forest (A) Private Timber Reserves - Restrictive rights of standing 
Practices - Application to Commission - No third party rights of appeal 
(Forestry Act Tribunal - Advertisement by Commission - Public interest v private 
1920 + - Objections lodged with rights - favours private rights 
amendments) Commission - Private hearings of FPT 
(Forest - Commission decision perceived to be inequitable and 
Practices Act - Appeal to F.P.T. against in "secret" 
1985) Commissions decision 
(B) Timber Harvesting Plans 
- Act has power to bind the Crown 
and is superior to Local 
- Application for T.H.P. to 
Commission for approval 
Government Act -> implications 
for land-use planning 
- Commission decision 
- Appeal to F.P.T. against 
Commissions Decision 
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For the bureaucrat it is fragmenied, prone to overlap and/or duplication 
of procedures and not conducive to either good public relations or a 
positive public sector and government image. 
It all adds up to a rather inefficient system of decision making which, 
through its own inadequacies and an inability to keep pace with 
technological and social changes, often contributes to the development 
and escalation of environmental disputes rather than facilitating their 
resolution. 
4.5 	Conclusion 
All environmental decision making occurs in a judicial and 
administrative context which has its origins in law. In Tasmania 
environmental disputes are addressed within the context of resource-
specific legislation, a judicial and/or an administrative infrastructure, 
and an approval process. 
The constitution of appeals systems external to the administrative 
infrastructure supports the opinion that systems of review must be seen 
to be removed from political influence either directly, or indirectly through 
the bureaucracy. In spite of the need to retain formal mechanisms of 
dispute resolution, there are presently deficiencies in their operations 
and procedures which adversely affect their effectiveness in the resolution 
of disputes, and in particular their inability to resolve the substantive as 
distinct from the procedural issues in environmental disputes. 
That is not to say that they are uniformly inadequate or that they do not 
serve a positive function. It is more likely that times and public 
expectations have changed whilst legislation and systems for resource 
management have not kept pace with these changes. 
There is now a preference for administrative tribunals rather than courts 
as the forum for the resolution of environmental disputes. This view 
was widely expressed by members of the judiciary and government, 
developers, bureaucrats and the public, and appears to be further supported 
by a stated preference from the Mines Division for a tribunal to replace 
the Mining Warden's Court. The Sea Fisheries Division and Magistrate 
Hannon have also expressed support for a tribunal to determine marine 
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farm and sea fisheries disputes. 
The replacement of courts with administrative tribunals will not in itself 
address problems of restrictive rules of standing, the inability to resolve 
substantive issues, an adversarial arena, costs of litigation and lengthy 
public hearings. It is likely that, with the upsurge in public concern 
about environmental resource management issues, an increasing number 
of objections and appeals will be lodged. This will place additional pressures 
on both existing and future dispute resolution systems, which in turn 
emphasises the need to find more cost effective, appropriate and flexible 
mechanisms for preventing and managing environmental disputes. 
CHAPTER 5 
ENVIRONMENTAL MEDIATION: ITS TASMANIAN POTENTIAL. 
Examination of five of Tasmania's environmental dispute resolution 
systems has revealed that, while there are a number of processes common 
to all, there are also inadequacies in both processes and procedures. In 
particular, they are unable to address the substantive issues in a dispute; 
rules of standing are very restrictive and third party rights are the exception 
rather than the rule; they are procedurally inflexible (tribunals less so but 
they still remain adversarial in format); there are potentially high costs 
of litigation for all parties; and the objection/appeal and hearing processes 
are very time consuming for government, industry, objectors and 
appellants. 
It has also been noted that an upsurge in objections and appeals is likely 
as the public expresses its concern about inadequacies in resource 
management legislation, policies and practices . This is a manifestation 
of the inability of environmental decision making systems to respond 
appropriately or adequately to rapid technological and social change and 
increased economic pressures for natural resource development. 
Environmental issues are here to stay and environmental disputes are 
going to remain a feature of life for the foreseeable future, with 
environmental issues already at the top of political, economic and social 
agendas (Hay 1987) . 
Experience in USA and Canada demonstrates that environmental 
mediation is a flexible, cost-effective process for the resolution of site-
specific and public policy disputes, ranging from small scale, multiple 
land-use disputes to complex, multimillion dollar disputes . Examples of 
the latter are the negotiation of pollution standards and emission controls 
for a Kraft pulp mill (Bacow and Wheeler 1983), and the construction of 
the Foothills Dam (SussIdnd et al. 1983), both of which were resolved by 
mediation after litigation had failed. 
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What has been, and still is lacking in Tasmania, is the identification 
and/or development of a framework or mechanism to facilitate the 
mediation process and so achieve a stable and constructive outcome 
without the public loss of face that so often accompanies these disputes. 
There are several possibilities . 
Mediation can be incorporated into existing environmental decision 
making systems and/or it can provide an alternative to the traditional 
adversarial judicial and administrative tribunal models as a "stand-alone" 
strategy in its own right. 
In Tasmania, mediation can be readily incorporated: 
(i) As an integral part of Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) in 
any jurisdiction, for example, as part of the scoping and EIS 
development processes . 
(ii) As an integral part of the Approval Process in any jurisdiction, for 
example, mediation opportunities can be incorporated at key points 
in the application, objection and appeal procedures. 
5.1 Mediation and Environmental Impact Assessment 
5.1.1 ETA defined 
ETA is the process whereby an estimation is made of the projected 
environmental impact of a proposed development. It is usually initiated 
by the developer, the content and procedures being negotiated with the 
appropriate statutory authority. A decision by the responsible agency is 
made on the level of assessment required and the application and requisite 
details are then lodged by the applicant. A notice of intent is subsequently 
lodged for public comment. 
Porter (1987) describes a five stage process, viz: 
(i) Preparation of a statement of the developer's intentions which 
usually accompanies the application; 
(ii) The assessing agency decides on the level of assessment required. 
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This may range from a simple set of recommendations to the 
preparation of a report (often called a Public Environmental Report) 
on which public comment is sought, to a detailed environmental 
impact statement (EIS); 
(iii) Assuming a full EIS is required, a comprehensive set of guidelines 
is prepared by the assessing agency on the aspects to be covered 
and the amount of detail for each . This is scoping; 
The guidelines are usually developed at a series of meetings with 
the developer and may involve other regulatory agencies and public 
interest groups; 
(iv) The Developer prepares an EIS, usually assisted by consultants . It 
is then published and made available for public review; 
(v) An assessment is then made by the decision making authority 
based on the original EIS and comments received from other 
agencies and the public. Assessment reports are usually issued by 
the environment minister and made public. 
Most Australian states (the exceptions are Queensland and Tasmania) 
have specific environmental impact assessment legislation. Where ETA 
is implemented, it has led to a better informed public in respect of major 
developments, and one that is more environmentally aware (Porter 1987: 
81) . However there remain variations among states in the definition of 
"environment", the need for social impact assessment as part of the ETA, 
and provisions for public participation (Atkinson and Morrison 1988). 
Clearly there are advantages in having uniform ETA processes and 
procedures across jurisdictions. The same applies for approval processes, 
of which ETA is often a part. 
South Australia has recognised this and following an exhaustive public 
consultation process has developed model processes and procedures for 
ETA in that state, (South Australia, ETA Review Committee 1986). Two 
levels of assessment are identified and a Public Environmental Report 
(PER) is developed for intermediate level proposals, while an EIS is 
developed for projects of major social economic or environmental 
importance. 
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Key recommendations in this approach are: 
retention of Ministerial discretion to determine the level of 
assessment for any proposal covered by the Planning Act, 1982 
(S. A.); 
the incorporation of criteria for a PER and an EIS in subordinate 
legislation; and 
the EIS process to include 
a public hearing; 
assessment by a specially appointed Environmental Assessment 
and Review Committee; 
a decision by Cabinet with no right of appeal. 
Porter's five stage ETA process and the South Australian process are in 
contrast with the informal and rather ad hoc Tasmanian approach which 
is in need of further development if it is to become a credible process 
rather than an obstacle to developer and public alike. 
5.1.2 ETA in Tasmania 
As described in Chapter 3, ETA in Tasmania has undergone major changes 
since the introduction of the Environment Protection Act 1973. However 
there is no ETA legislation and ETA processes vary haphazardly across 
jurisdictions. Although statutory organizations other than the Department 
of Environment and Planning may require some form of works 
programme to be submitted with an application for a development project 
(this is the case with a mining lease, for example), there is no formal 
requirement for an ETA as either described by Porter or the South Australian 
model, despite the inevitability of environmental impact. 
There is also no uniformity of approval processes across the five systems 
studied. This compounds public and industry confusion and frustration 
and fosters allegations of inequitable treatment and secrecy which almost 
inevitably lead to conflict. 
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The Department of Environment and Planning curreritiy has three levels 
of assessment, two being formal and published in Departmental policies 
and guidelines. However Level III assessment requirements are not stated 
in formal policies and guidelines and their development has been reactive 
rather than proactive in that they have been worked up on a case-by-case 
basis to deal with such developments as the Wesley Vale Kraft Pulp Mill 
and the recently proposed LWC paper project at Australian Newsprint 
Mills. 
There is no consistency of process or procedure, although there has been 
an extension of opportunity for public comment in scoping in the LWC 
project. This opportunity was not available for the Wesley Vale proposal. 
To "learn as you go" is no longer acceptable. It is too costly for Tasmania 
in every respect and it is not surprising that criticism has come from 
many quarters. Tasmania needs to overhaul its environmental protection 
legislation, policies and practices, and to include EIA criteria and standard 
procedures in all resource management legislation. 
5.1.3 Mediation and the EIA - Tasmanian style 
Public consultation is acknowledged as the keystone of a successful EIA 
process and mediation has a valuable contribution to make as part of this 
process. It should not be seen as a substitute for public participation in 
the formal decision-making process, nor as a means of preventing parties 
from going to appeal if they so wish. It can nevertheless make an effective 
contribution to the ETA process in a number of ways. 
(i) 	Scoping 
Pre-EIS consultation involving the proponent/developer, relevant 
statutory/ regulatory agencies and public interest groups (including those 
in opposition) should be undertaken, and this usually involves a series 
of meetings. The presence of a neutral mediator at these would assist the 
parties to: 
(a) clarify the agenda and discuss their interests/concerns effectively; 
(b) develop the criteria to be included in the EIS guidelines; 
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(c) - — identify specific areas of study/issues to be induded and addressed 
in the EIS; 
(d) identify and delete matters which are agreed by the parties to be 
irrelevant or insignificant; and 
(e) assist parties in writing the guidelines. The final product could 
then be binding on all parties. 
In this way, all parties are involved in the development of a set of guidelines 
which they consider cover all the issues and areas of study and which are 
achievable and workable. 
Included in the guidelines should be a dispute resolution process agreed 
to by all the parties and which requires them to negotiate and/or mediate 
disputes before resorting to litigation. Such agreements are not uncommon 
in construction contracts in the building industry and in the insurance 
industry in other states (Australian Commercial Disputes Centre 1988). 
The use of mediation in the pre-EIS phase also provides an opportunity 
for the inclusion of an adequate provision for social impact analysis and 
economic impact analysis in the EIS. These are presently excluded by the 
jurisdictional limitations of the Environmental Protection Act from the 
EIA process in Tasmania, despite the fact that the social and economic 
impacts of development are critical issues for the State and can determine 
the success or failure of many a project. There is no point in excluding 
contentious issues from the EIA agenda as they are frequently the 
substantive issues in the dispute, and they will only reappear in another 
form if not resolved. Mediation by a third party neutral at this point can 
ensure that the substantive issues are identified and addressed so that no 
hidden agendas remain to re-emerge in a destructive manner at a later 
date. 
Traditionally the EIS is prepared by the proponent, or a consultant 
commissioned by the proponent, in consultation with the assessing agency. 
On completion the EIS is made available to the public for comment and 
objection. The normal period for public comment is 30 days, although 
this has been extended for complex projects. A public display period of 6 
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weeks is proposed for the LWC project. 
(a) Pending the development of new, comprehensive environmental 
protection legislation, it would be a constructive innovation if a 
social impact assessment (SIA) team could be formed to undertake 
the SIA component of the EIS. This would enable the developer, 
government and public to address these concerns, despite their 
present exclusion from existing formal systems. By participating in 
SIA, a developer and the government would demonstrate an 
appreciation of public concerns about social impact. A cooperative 
approach would also reduce the likelihood of subsequent objections 
and appeals on other grounds as a demonstration of dissatisfaction 
- even though the substantive issues may be of a social or economic 
nature. 
The SIA could be undertaken by a small team of experts nominated 
and agreed to by the parties. It could perhaps be financed by the 
developer and government as a demonstration of good faith. 
Mediation would be an asset in assisting the parties to agree to the 
composition of the SIA team if they were unable to reach agreement 
on this. It would also assist in identification of the issues, criteria 
and guidelines for the SIA study, as discussed in relation to the 
EIA generally. 
(b) A South Australian innovation which could be considered for 
adoption in the Tasmanian EIA process is the Environment 
Assessment Review Committee (EARC), the purpose of which is 
to provide an objective oversight of public views received and to 
give general direction to the entire EIS process . The Chairperson 
is constant, although the membership of each EARC changes with 
each EIS, depending on the nature of environmental experience 
required for the EIS in question (South Australia, EIA Review 
Committee 1986: 38). 
The EARC is restricted to an oversight function. It does not perform 
a dispute resolution function and reservations have been expressed 
about its neutrality and independence from government - qualities 
essential for mediator credibility. Even were the concept of EARC 
introduced to Tasmania, it would not negate the need for a 
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mediation capacity in the EIA process. 
5.2 Mediation and the Approval Process 
As is evident from Figure 4, there are commonalities in the approval 
process, regardless of whether dispute resolution is ultimately by way of 
a court or an administrative tribunal. The common elements are: 
(i) Application for a licence/approval to develop a resource; 
(ii) Public advertisement of notice of application; 
(iii) Objections to an application are lodged with the relevant authority; 
(iv) Decision by statutory authority responsible for the resource; 
(v) Appeals are lodged against the decision taken by responsible 
authority; 
(vi) Hearing (public or private) by Court or Administrative Tribunal; 
(vii) Appeal against court or tribunal decision to Tasmanian Supreme 
Court on points of law only. This facility is available in most 
jurisdictions . 
The areas of difference have been detailed in Chapter 2. In summary they 
are: 
variations in the rights of standing and the status of objectors and, 
therefore, applicants. Third party rights of objection are the exception 
rather than the rule. 
variations in the availability and use of pre-hearing conferencing. 
Where it exists it is compulsory and apparently under-utilized. 
variations in the power to bind the Crown. 
variations in the interpretation of priority jurisdiction and 
determination of the responsible authority/agency where a 
development proposal spans several jurisdictions. There is a lack 
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of clarity in the legislation and agreement on these issues appears - 
to be by informal negotiation 13eiween the relevant agencies, - 
culminating in a "gentlemens' agreement". 
Additional areas of concern relate more to the hearing processes employed. 
the adversarial nature of both courts and tribunals. 
the inability of courts and tribunals to hear matters outside their 
specific jurisdictions, regardless of the significance of the matter to 
the development. This necessitates the submission of applications 
in multiple jurisdictions before a development can proceed. 
the general inability of courts and tribunals to address the 
substantive issues in a dispute, emphasis being on procedure rather 
than on substance. 
direct and indirect costs for all parties associated with the hearing 
process depending on the number of grounds of appeal and the 
number of appellants. 
problems associated with legal representation. These include the 
loss of control of the case by applicant and objectors; costs; and a 
tendency for legal intervention to lengthen and unnecessarily 
complicate the case by a traditional legal emphasis on procedure 
and technicalities at the expense of substance. 
Mediation can make a valuable contribution at several stages of the 
approval process. By the inclusion of mediation, variations among 
jurisdictions and the areas of concern identified above can be addressed 
and resolved as follows: 
5.2.1 Notice of application for licence or approval to develop 
An applicant's intention to develop a project, whatever its nature, may 
or may not become known before the publication of the notice of 
application. After the notice is published there is an average 28-30 days 
for lodgement of objections to the application before a decision is made 
by the responsible Minister or statutory authority. 
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• During this period of uncertainty, speculation is rife. All too often there 
is little constructive communication between the applicant and potential 
objectors, access to accurate and relevant information by concerned parties 
is often poor, and misinformation and innuendo abounds. There may 
also be no readily identifiable formal channels of communication to the 
relevant agency or to the applicant which might assist in correcting 
misinformation and allaying concerns of potential objectors about the 
impact of a proposed development. 
Persons concerned about the impact of a proposed development often 
have to make the decision to object or not to object on the basis of 
inadequate information, available formally from the application, or 
informally. Information is often couched in scientific and bureaucratic 
terminology which, more often than not, aggravates rather than allays 
suspicions. There is much to be said for the use of "plain English" in 
environmental legislation, government publications, reports and impact 
statements. 
An average of 28 to 30 days is often insufficient time for potential objectors 
to peruse and decipher scientific data, and translate it into "real" terms. It 
may also be necessary to get expert advice not readily available locally. 
Given the above it is understandable that some objections may be lodged 
inappropriately on the basis of misinformation and misunderstanding. 
It is in this period when potential objectors are considering the merits of 
their case and their decision to object or not to object, that mediation has 
significant value. 
Mediation, at this point, would: 
(i) Ensure that all parties have the necessary information upon which 
to make an informed decision, and that the data is clearly 
understood. In addition it provides an opportunity for parties to 
seek clarification from technical and scientific experts agreed to by 
all parties. Objectors can then make a better informed decision in 
relation to the merits of the case, the validity of their objections 
and whether they wish to proceed with their objections. 
(ii) Assist all parties to identify issues and concerns and so gain an 
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improved understanding of each other's positions. Parties-do not 
have to share the same values but they need to appreciate that a 
party's values are important to it, and are not necessarily "just 
tactics". 
(iii) Identify common ground among the parties and the preparedness 
and willingness of parties to "move" on common ground. 
(iv) Identify issues not in dispute. 
(v) Identify issues in dispute so that these can be addressed and, if not 
resolved by mediation, these issues may then proceed as objections. 
5.2.2 Lodgement of objections 
At the expiration of the objection period, all parties, that is, applicant, 
objectors and government agencies, should be offered the opportunity to 
consider a mediated settlement. As mediation is a voluntary process 
there should be no compulsion (this distinguishes mediation from 
compulsory conferencing or preliminary hearings as currently employed): 
it should remain the decision of the parties to use, or not to use mediation. 
The mediator must be experienced, credible and agreed to by all parties. 
She/he would then contact all the parties to the dispute and, in conjunction 
with them, work out the most appropriate approach for resolving the 
issues in that particular dispute. Each dispute is different and each 
mediation process varies according to the nature of the dispute, the issues, 
the dynamics and desired outcomes of the parties (as discussed previously). 
Possible outcomes of mediation in this phase are: 
(i) A complete information/development profile becomes available 
to all parties through the mediation process. Objections are 
identified and addressed and misinformation corrected. 
The dispute is resolved and objections are withdrawn. 
(ii) A negotiated agreement is reached between the applicant and 
objectors, for example, a "staged" development, boundary 
modifications to a lease/permit site, or agreed forms of emission 
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control. 
A formal agreement is signed by all parties and objections are 
withdrawn. 
(iii) Some issues are resolved, some are not. Some objections are 
withdrawn but a minority of objectors decides to proceed to appeal. 
(iv) Parties may decide to forego mediation and go directly to appeal. 
5.2.3 Lodgement of appeals  
By this stage, a dispute has usually reached an impasse, litigation costs 
are mounting and it is a highly emotionally-charged, adversarial "combat". 
This may act as an additional incentive for parties to negotiate. 
Given comments about the procedural (as distinct from the substantive) 
emphasis of the judicial process and the very restrictive laws of standing 
in public interest litigation, the court's or tribunal's decision can only 
reflect the limitations of existing legislation and processes. 
The advantages of mediation at this stage are: 
(i) Mediation offers parties at the point of impasse, a further 
opportunity to resolve the dispute, bearing in mind that public 
appeal hearings with legal representation and expert evidence, as 
is often the case, can be extremely costly, time consuming and 
inevitably intimidating, despite the relative informality of tribunal 
proceedings. 
(ii) Mediation "frees up" the resources and time of the court or tribunal, 
government agencies and the parties, by ensuring that only 
unresolved issues remain on the hearing agenda, should all the 
issues not be resolved by mediation. 
The decision to proceed with mediation at this stage must be made 
by the parties. However there is no reason why a party, be it the 
applicant, government agency or public interest group, should not 
initiate the idea. 
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Alternatively, there is no reason why a magistrate—or chairman of 
a tribunal could not ask the parties whether they would like to 
consider mediation as a final option before proceeding with the 
public hearing. In the Supreme Court of Hawaii disputants' 
participation is voluntary, but the Court may require parties to 
consider the use of mediation and postpone further court 
proceedings during a specified Mediation Exploration Period of 
30-60 days. Mediation proceeds beyond this point only if participants 
so choose (Adler 1987a: 3). 
(iii) The position of the magistrate or chairman is not compromised by 
his participation in a preliminary hearing. 
Mediation at this stage of the approval process could be very effective. 
Parties entering into mediation at this stage are invariably highly 
motivated and committed to achieving a satisfactory outcome. 
However, parties may decline the opportunity and elect to continue to 
an appeal hearing. It is sufficient for one party to refuse to participate in 
mediation. In such a situation, unless a mediator can caucus with the 
resistant party and persuade it to try mediation, there may be no alternative 
but for all parties to proceed to a hearing with all its attendant costs and 
disadvantages. 
At no point should mediation deny parties their right to proceed to 
litigation if they so choose. 
5.3 	Mediation as an alternative to litigation 
The preceding sections have outlined the ways in which mediation can 
complement the ETA and Approvals Process. Not only is mediation of 
value and readily accommodated within existing structures, but it can be 
used as an alternative to existing methods of dispute resolution. That is, 
it can "stand alone" as a legitimate process in its own right or as part of 
an EDR package. 
Victoria has already acknowledged mediation as a potentially valuable 
process for the resolution of such complex environmental disputes as 
the construction of a controversial, high-voltage transmission line 
through inner Melbourne (Powerline Review Panel 1989) . The Victorian 
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government has also responded to a need expressed within rural Victoria 
for environmental mediation to be used to resolve land-use conflict 
(Sandford 1989b). In both cases, existing systems for dispute resolution 
have been deemed inadequate by the parties - industry, government and 
the community and it is considered that environmental mediation could 
provide a more constructive alternative. There is clear evidence of a 
preference by all parties for processes other than litigation. 
Victoria's social and governmental structures and processes differ from 
those of Tasmania in that they tend to be more consultative and 
participatory. It also has a more consistent and established approach to 
social justice, conservation, energy and economics, as embodied in clear, 
published government strategies and policies. 
State differences not withstanding, there is every reason to be confident 
that environmental mediation could work in Tasmania. It is not proposed 
as a panacea or "quick-fix" solution for all disputes as there will always 
be parties who want to use litigation. It will also require a willingness 
and a commitment from government, industry and public interest groups 
to seriously consider and be prepared to try a non-adversarial process not 
used previously in any formal sense for dispute resolution in the state. 
A significant proportion of Tasmania's resources is controlled directly or 
indirectly by government. Some 60 percent of the State's land is Crown 
land, approvals processes control the management of fisheries, forestry, 
mining, land and water resources, and environmental protection acts as 
a watchdog over most of those. Once land conservation legislation is 
developed (as is proposed), government will also have a degree of control 
over private and agricultural land, in addition to the controls it exercises 
through land-use planning and the Local Government Act. It therefore 
seems inescapable that in almost any environmental dispute, government 
is destined to be a party. 
5.3.1 Site-specific disputes 
Disputes may develop around site specific issues such as the development 
of a pulp mill or marine farm; the impact of tourism on recreational and 
wilderness areas; the relocation of a health facility; the establishment of a 
hazardous waste disposal site; the development of management plans 
for environmentally sensitive areas such as the Central Highlands or 
154 
coastal reserves; - and the implementation of ail- agricultural chemicals 
and aerial spraying regime. In all of these, the government will be a 
party. 
• At present, there is no way of preventing what commences as a resolvable 
site-specific conflict from escalating into a full-scale dispute. Most of the 
above examples encompass a range of issues or sets of concerns that 
cannot be comfortably or adequately accommodated in any one jurisdiction 
or approvals process. 
They are also disputes that are not appropriate to a judicial or litigated 
resolution. As was mentioned previously and as is substantiated by USA 
experience, lawyers, the judiciary, and even the administrative tribunal 
system are ill equipped to deal with the breadth and complexity of 
environmental issues generally (Sandford 1989a). 
Mediation could be productively used to prevent the escalation and to 
facilitate the early resolution of many site-specific disputes. The case of 
the marine farm permit boundary (discussed in Chapter 3) is a prime 
example. In the absence of an alternative, parties have no option but to 
use traditional (inappropriate) processes. 
Government could act as a change agent if it were to set a precedent for a 
cooperative rather than conflictural approach to environmental dispute 
resolution. Mediation only needs to be initiated by one party. It can then 
be considered and accepted by the others. It is the first step that is the 
most difficult. 
5.3.2 Public policy disputes 
Mediation can be an effective alternative for the resolution of public 
policy as well as site specific disputes. Public policy disputes often evolve 
from public concern about an issue, which is then taken up by government, 
eventually becoming policy or legislation . Land-use planning and 
environmental protection are but two areas where government plays a 
lead role in the development of public policy. 
Conflict is likely to occur when it comes to determining priority legislation 
(and thus agency status and authority), power to bind the Crown, and 
powers of veto. 
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The public often assumes that public policy is policy designed and 
implemented in the public interest. In reality, there is no public policy 
process per. se., nor any single policy process. There are many variations. 
It comes down to competition and negotiation among Ministers and 
government agencies for power and resources - at the expense of the 
public interest, some might say. 
Public policy disputes are not uncommon. They are just less obvious 
than site-specific disputes, partly because public servants are bound by an 
oath of non-disclosure as a condition of service; partly because they are 
rarely newsworthy items; and partly because they are often unintelligible 
to the public, being couched in legalistic and bureaucratic argument and 
terminology. 
The victim of public policy disputes is the public - industry and community 
alike. A public policy dispute over which legislation is superior in an 
approval process is expensive for industry and the community in legal 
costs and time taken as they are often threshold matters which must be 
resolved before the hearing can proceed. 
Mediation could be invaluable in assisting government agencies to resolve 
public policy disputes. As with any parties to a dispute, confidentiality is 
important and no individual or agency wants to suffer the public loss of 
face that occurs when these disputes are played out in Cabinet or, 
occasionally, in the media. Bad news travels fast and poor handling of 
such a dispute may inhibit a career public servant's promotional 
aspirations . 
Furthermore, although there may be some formal dispute resolution 
systems in place for site specific disputes (albeit deficient), there are no 
mechanisms to assist government agencies to resolve public policy 
disputes. It should also not be forgotten that federal, state and local 
governments are all involved in developing public policy and in the 
case of environmental policies all three levels of government may be 
involved (regulation-negotiations are one example). Consequently there 
needs to be a versatile dispute resolution process which can accommodate 
these differences in policy making, operation and procedure. 
There should also be opportunity for public, including industry, input 
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into public policy. This occurs at preserit in an informal manner - and via 
advisory committees, task forces and the like. However access to those . 
forums is often inequitable and dependent on informal rather than formal 
networks. 
Were mediation is available, it could serve two functions: 
(a) assist in facilitating the resolution of inter and intra Governmental 
public policy disputes; and 
(b) provide a mechanism to formalize and thereby legitimize public 
input to the environmental policy development process, including 
legislative and policy reviews. 
5.4 The Implementation of Environmental 
Mediation in Tasmania 
It has been established that existing dispute resolution systems are 
inadequate for addressing and resolving the complex and diverse 
environmental issues with which the State will be confronted in the 
1990s and beyond. Environmental mediation has been proposed as an 
effective and cost effective process for the resolution of many site-specific 
and public policy disputes. Its versatility means that it can be incorporated 
into existing ETA and approvals processes or it can stand alone as a process 
in its own right. What is therefore required is an integrated EDR strategy 
of which mediation is a key component. 
For mediation to succeed in Tasmania, there are three prerequisites: 
(i) Increased awareness and education of all parties about the process 
and benefits of mediation as a non-adversarial process for the 
resolution of environmental disputes; 
(ii) The development of a mechanism(s) or facility whereby parties 
wishing to consider mediation as an alternative to litigation can 
seek advice and obtain the services of trained and experienced 
mediators whose expertise and ethics are assured. 
(iii) The training of mediators as third party neutral professionals. It is 
not an arena for amateurs. Mediators should have a wide-range of 
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experience, expertise and qualifications. Mediation expertise should-
not be perceived as being restricted to the legal profession, as lawyers 
are, by virtue of their training, adversarially inclined. 
(iv) Overseas and interstate experience indicates that the most effective 
way of increasing public and governmental awareness and use of 
mediation is through the creation of a:mediation service. In most 
cases mediation services have been trialled and evaluated over a 
three year period, as with the Offices of Public Disputes in the USA 
and the community justice centres in New South Wales, Victoria 
and, most recently, Queensland. 
5.4.1 A Tasmanian Mediation Service - Office of Public Disputes 
There are a number of factors that should be considered in the 
establishment of a mediation service, in particular its mission, functions 
and institutional location. 
The mediation service must have a state-wide mandate and it would 
provide a focus for environmental dispute resolution which has hitherto 
been lacking. 
Mission 
The mission of a Tasmanian mediation service would be to promote the 
understanding and effective use of EDR among government agencies, 
industry, public interest groups, local communities and private citizens, 
with an emphasis on public/environmental disputes. 
Functions  
The functions of a mediation service should include: 
(i) 	Clearing House 
As a clearing house, the mediation service would: 
(a) 	Collect and analyse information on the range of 
public/environmental disputes present and projected in Tasmania. 
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This should be conducted in consultation with government 
agencies, industry, industry organizations, conservation and other 
community groups, and members of the judiciary as appropriate. 
It would essentially be an inventory of actual and potential disputes 
and could be coordinated by a public disputes coordinator with 
mediation expertise. 
(b) Identify and screen disputes suitable for mediation resolution; 
(c) Develop a register of public disputes mediators with a broad range 
of occupational skills and experiences, rural and urban . This would 
enable mediators and disputes to be "matched". Parties to a dispute 
could be given a "short list" of possible mediators from which 
they could select a mutually acceptable mediator, with the assistance 
of the public disputes coordinator. 
Sources of mediators could be public agencies, community interest groups, 
industry organisations or interested individuals. This would assist in 
developing a pool of skilled and trained mediators with public interest 
expertise who, although unable to mediate disputes in which their own 
agency or organisation was involved, would be available to mediate 
disputes elsewhere. 
(ii) Dispute Resolution 
The mediation service would directly mediate disputes, be they site specific 
or public policy. It would also provide a mediation service to the EIA and 
Approvals Processes as discussed in the previous section. In addition to 
providing a direct mediation service; it could also act as a catalyst to 
mediation by others. 
The credibility and effectiveness of the service will initially be established 
• by the selection and successful mediation of several complex and significant 
test cases. 
(iii) Consultancy and Advisory Service 
An advisory service would be provided to government agencies, or any 
other parties and interested persons or organizations, on the resolution 
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of public disputes which arise during the course of their activities. 
A consultancy service on the design and implementation of public affairs 
and dispute resolution strategies and systems would also be provided as 
preventative of the development of disputes. 
(iv) Training 
The service would sponsor training courses in EDR to familiarize the 
judiciary, senior resource managers in government and in industry, and 
the public with EDR techniques. It would serve three purposes: 
(a) Stimulate the demand for EDR through seminars for senior 
administrators; 
(b) Train mediators and so develop a core of trained mediators with 
expertise in public disputes; 
(c) Promote EDR generally through the establishment of an EDR 
network both locally and nationally. 
(v) 	Research 
Undertake an evaluation of EDR generally and the mediation service in 
particular, and other research as appropriate. 
Institutional location 
The USA experience suggests that there is no single answer to the question 
of institutional location of a public disputes mediation service. Irrespective 
of its location, it must be independent (and be seen to be independent) of 
external influence, be it from government, industry or the community. 
To be successful it must have political neutrality, independence of 
operation and credibility. It must provide a totally confidential service. 
Potential institutional locations for a mediation service as described are: 
(i) within the Tasmanian public sector; 
(ii) in a non-profit organization; 
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(iii) in a tertiary institution; 
(iv) in the private sector; 
(v) in a tripartite/multiparty structure. 
(i) 	In the Tasmanian Public Sector 
Historically, environmental dispute resolution in the USA has been based 
in non-profit organisations and universities, although government 
agencies have been parties at the table in 83 percent of all mediated 
site-specific disputes (Bingham 1986). Given this, not only has EDR 
expertise been accumulating in non-profit and academic organisations, 
but the lack of formal connections with and access to government agencies 
and other institutions in site specific disputes and public policy decision 
making has been proving a major obstacle to effective mediation (Haygood 
1988). 
As a result, since 1984, mediation offices have been established within 
State government agencies. They have been designed to promote the use 
of mediation to resolve disputes of statewide interest. The range of 
activities undertaken varies and reflects the institutional location of each. 
The models vary widely from location in the state judiciary, to a state 
planning office, and the office of a public advocate. 
An evaluation of four state offices of public dispute resolution in the 
USA (Szanton 1988) revealed that, although there were striking differences 
in location and in the sources of their day-to-day political support, the 
significance of these different placements was small. Haygood (1988) also 
suggests that institutional relationships may be as important as formal 
location, as the institutional location of an office and its primary 
transinstitutional links both clearly affect the opportunities and challenges 
the office faces. 
The extent of government involvement in and control over 
environmental decision making in Tasmania makes it imperative that, 
if a mediation service is to succeed, it must have formal connections 
with and access to government decision making processes. For this reason 
alone, a case can be put for a mediation service or an Office of Public 
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Disputes to be located within the Tasmanian public sector. 
While due consideration would, no doubt, be given to the relative merits 
of each institutional location, it could also be predicted that there would 
be competition among Ministers and agencies, so that the final decision 
on the precise location of a mediation service would inevitably be a 
political one. 
Within the Tasmanian public sector there are several possibilities: 
(a) within a central agency; for example, Department of Premier and 
Cabinet; 
(b) within an executive branch agency; for example, Department of 
Environment and Planning, which has direct responsibility for 
policy decisions on such substantive issues as land-use and 
environmental protection . 
(c) within a line agency; for example, the Departments of Forestry, 
Primary Industry, and Resources and Energy; 
(d) within an independent statutory body; for example, the proposed 
Tasmanian Resources Assessment Commission; 
(e) within a public advocacy authority; for example, the Ombudsman. 
The advantages and disadvantages of each institutional location as 
outlined below are adapted from Haygood (1988). 
A. 	Central Agency 
The Department of Premier and Cabinet is the central agency in the 
Tasmanian State Service. The advantages of locating a mediation service 
within this agency would include: 
(a) ease of access to government decision makers; 
(b) a central location may assist in interagency disputes, Department 
of Premier and Cabinet having a policy coordination role; 
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(c) the ability to assist with- regulation development, and 
implementation of government policy; 
(d) the identification and promotion of opportunities for public policy 
dialogue; 
(e) high level support may facilitate entry into significant public policy 
disputes. 
Potential disadvantages of a location within this Department are: 
(a) difficulties of access and entry to cases. The Department of Premier 
and Cabinet is removed from substantive contact with industry 
and the community; 
(b) public perceptions of bias in favour of the state or government of 
the day are likely; 
(c) it would be vulnerable to bureaucratic politicisation; 
(d) it would be vulnerable to extinction with a change of government. 
B. 	Executive Branch Agency  
The Department of Environment and Planning is an agency which has a 
direct responsibility for land-use planning and management and 
environmental protection in the broadest sense. It could be the lynchpin 
in the development of a Statewide integrated resource management and 
environmental dispute resolution strategy. It is also likely to be responsible 
for wide ranging legislative, administrative and policy review, EIA, and 
the Approvals Processes for land-use planning and environmental 
protection. 
The advantages of locating a mediation service in this Department include: 
(a) the presence of an "inside" proponent of dispute resolution lends 
greater credibility to dispute resolution processes; 
(b) relatively easy access to government decision makers; 
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(c) provides a useful opportunity to assist in the resolution of 
interagency conflicts; 
(d) can assist with enforcement negotiations, administrative hearing 
processes, regulation development and promulgation. 
In the 1990s the Department of Environment and Planning will be 
an active participant in proposing, promoting and implementing 
legislation which is likely to give rise to controversy and 
opportunities for dialogue. 
(e) high level support may also facilitate entry into significant public 
policy disputes. 
Possible disadvantages include: 
(a) may be "suspect" in the opinions of some as a representative of 
the State; 
(b) potential for conflicts of interest when the dispute involves the 
Department; 
The location of a mediation service in an agency such as this has not 
proved a problem in the USA where steps have been taken to insulate 
the service from political pressures by drawing clear boundaries and 
distinctions between the mediation service programs and those of their 
host agencies (Haygood 1988: 8). 
Haygood notes further (1988: 8) that several of the mediation offices or 
services use advisory boards composed of members from within and 
outside state government for advice and consultation. 
C. 	Line Agency 
In 1988 there were no examples of the location of a mediation service 
within a substantive or line agency in the USA as it was considered that 
the disadvantages outweighed the advantages (Haygood 1986: 9). 
Disadvantages include: 
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(a) pr3x.imity to disputes negates neutrality; 
(b) limited mandate in terms of functions and authority; for example, 
limited to forestry, fisheries or mining; 
(c) conflicts of interest, such as a statutory requirement to implement 
and enforce legislation and policies. 
D. 	Independent Statutory Body  
The establishment of a Tasmanian Resources Assessment Commission 
(TRAC), possibly modelled on the Federal Resource Assessment 
Commission, is planned by the State government (Crean 1989). Little is 
known (or can be found) about the proposed functions and objectives 
except that it is to assess proposals for resource development in Tasmania 
and that legislation is proposed for early 1990. 
Whether or not it may be an appropriate location for an environmental 
mediation service will be dependent on its constitution, purpose and 
mandate, which are yet to be determined. If it resembles the federal model, 
it may in fact be an appropriate location for a mediation service which, 
amongst other functions, could provide a mediation service to the TRAC 
itself, and to the EIA and the Approvals Processes, as well as undertaking 
the functions mentioned previously. 
The Federal RAC is an independent body which enquires into and reports 
to the Prime Minister on the environmental, cultural, social, industrial, 
economic, and other aspects of Australia's resources and their uses (RAC 
1989) . It was established under the Resource Assessment Commission 
Act 1989 and its role is to "assemble information on specific resource 
issues and to provide a process by which all interested parties can have 
their views impartially and independently considered" (RAC 1989: 1) . 
It is essentially an investigatory body which either reports on possible 
courses of action or provides an overview of an issue, depending on its 
terms of reference for a particular inquiry. A Tasmanian equivalent could 
perhaps provide an appropriately independent and neutral base for the 
location of an environmental mediation service. 
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E. 	Public Advocacy Authority • 
Tasmania has no such agency with the exception of the Ombudsman's 
office. This would not be an appropriate location. The office of the 
Ombudsman has been widely criticized of late as it has been seen to have 
been politicalized, and this has seriously damaged the credibility of the 
office. 
New Zealand and Victoria each has a public advocate for the environment, 
although their roles and functions vary. 
New Zealand's Office of the Parliamentary Commissioner for the 
Environment is an independent review agency on environmental issues. 
It is outside of government and the Commissioner is appointed by the 
Governor-General on the recommendation of the House of 
Representatives. Although New Zealand is presently engaged in a major 
reform and rationalisation of its resource management laws, the office of • 
the Commissioner for the Environment will continue (NZ Ministry for 
the Environment 1989). 
The Victorian Commissioner for the Environment is also an independent 
office established by statute. Its present role is limited to the preparation 
of annual environmental reports on matters such as water quality, it 
does not function as an environmental ombudsman, and its resources 
are very limited (Scott 1989) . 
Were its objectives and functions reviewed, it could perhaps provide a 
possible base for a public dispute mediation service. The author 
understands that this situation is being actively considered at the present 
time. 
On the other hand, if it were to have an environmental advocacy function, 
the office may be perceived to have a conflict of interest and so be in 
breach of that essential quality, mediator neutrality. 
(ii) 	Non-profit organisations 
In the USA mediation services have been provided by numerous non- 
profit organisations. Some have been formed specifically to provide such 
a service, for example, the New England Environmental Mediation Centre. 
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This centre assists in a wide variety of land -use, facility-siting and pollution 
control disputes, it facilitates dialogue over public policy, and it provides 
training. It is funded by grants from a philanthropic foundation a_nd fees 
for service levied on a case-by-case basis. 
It is conceivable that a comparable organisation could be established in 
Tasmania, perhaps supported by assistance from a trust such as the Sidney 
Myer Trust. It would have the advantages of independence from 
government, and neutrality of operations. Disadvantages could be funding 
uncertainty, difficulties in the determination of fee-for-service criteria, 
and a lack of access to government decision making. 
(iii) 	Tertiary Institutions 
Tertiary institutions have played a pivotal role in the development and 
promotion of EDR in the USA. Not only do they conduct- applied research 
and training courses, but their staff play a very active role as mediators in 
a wide range of disputes, including labour management and international 
environmental disputes. 
The Harvard Law School and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
conduct programs in mediation and public dispute resolution. 
In Sydney, the Sydney University Law School has introduced final year 
studies in alternative dispute resolution, and law schools in other states 
are doing likewise. There is, however, no prima facie reason why EDR 
should be sited in law schools. EDR requires mediators with an ability to 
consider a wide range of complex economic, social, political and 
environmental issues which are often interrelated and interdependent. 
Any tertiary institution contemplating the adoption of a mediation 
component must take into account the value of a multidisciplinary 
approach and avoid EDR being "captured" by any professional discipline. 
Possible advantages are perception of mediator neutrality, and access to 
research and educational expertise. Possible disadvantages are lack of 
formal communication with and access to government decision making, 
and lack of communication with industry and the public generally. 
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(iii) Private Sector  
Mediation services can also be provided by the private sector. There are 
numerous private sector consultants and companies in Canada and the 
USA which provide a mediation service on a fee-for-service basis like 
any other commercial operation. 
Such an operation is relatively straightforward in the case of costing and 
charging for mediation of labour-management, commercial or family 
disputes where there are a limited number of clearly identified parties. 
Environmental disputes are more complex to cost. 
It is understood that the Australian Commercial Disputes Centre (ACDC), 
a Sydney based private commercial disputes company, has considered 
expanding into environmental mediation but is concerned about the 
difficulties of determining a fee structure. 
The advantages of private sector involvement are: 
(a) it creates a ready source of supply of mediators; 
(b) perceptions of a conflict of interest are less likely to occur, particularly 
in disputes where government or industry are participants; 
(c) mediator neutrality. 
Disadvantages include: 
(a) lack of formal communication with and access to government 
decision making; 
(b) may be perceived to be profit rather than public interest oriented. 
(v) 	Tripartite/Multiparty Structure 
The author is not aware of precedents for this model although they may 
well exist. Nevertheless, given the widely expressed concern about the 
inadequacies of existing dispute resolution mechanisms by government, 
the private sector and public interest groups, there would appear to be 
merit in the establishment of a tripartite or multiparty environmental 
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mediation service. 
In the field of land degradation, the Landcare Program is a good example 
of how organizations with apparently divergent, if not conflicting interests 
can come together for a common purpose. In this case, the National 
Farmers Federation and the Australian Conservation Foundation and 
their state counterparts, have combined forces to tackle the problem of 
land degradation at both a state and a national level. 
It is conceivable that a tripartite or multiparty approach to the resolution 
of public disputes may also be effective. In this case, industry, government, 
public interest groups, and a tertiary institution such as the University of 
Tasmania could be involved. 
Assistance to support a mediation service could take a number of forms 
according to the nature and extent of the resources of each party: 
direct financial assistance to pay mediator salaries; 
provision of suitable accommodation/facilities, printing, 
computing and other resources; 
access to expertise, information and research support. 
A tripartite/multiparty mediation service could be managed by a 
representative committee/board, chaired by a neutral outsider. 
The advantages of this model would be: 
(a) it would optimize the involvement by and commitment of the 
key parties in most public disputes; 
(b) it would assist the promotion of EDR concepts and public awareness; 
(c) it would provide a "working-model" of the ways in which industry, 
government, public interest groups and academics can work 
together in the public interest; 
(d) it is consistent with the collaborative approach being promoted by 
the State government in the areas of resource development and 
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economic policy. 
Disadvantages could include: 
(a) "power struggles" for control of the service by a particular interest 
group. This could be minimized by the appointment of an 
independent Chairperson; 
(b) difficulties in determining the funding/financial support 
equivalents by the parties. 
The multiparty organization is an exciting and innovative concept which 
would reinforce the value of environmental mediation as a collaborative 
process for the resolution of public disputes in Tasmania. 
There is no single "best" location for EDR in Tasmania but two options 
warrant further consideration: 
(a) location within the Tasmanian public sector; and 
(b) location with a multiparty body representative of government, 
industry, public interest groups and academia. 
The development of EDR in non-profit organizations and the private 
sector may occur of its own accord. What is needed at this time is for the 
Tasmanian government to lead the way in the promotion of 
environmental mediation as a flexible and innovative alternative to the 
traditional adversarial model. 
Tasmania can lead Australia in environmental dispute resolution if it so 
chooses. Environmental mediation is not a gamble, it is a proven, cost-
effective and constructive process which can assist in optimizing resource 
management while minimizing social, economic and environmental 
dislocation. 
5.5 	Conclusion 
The adoption of environmental mediation as part of an integrated 
environmental dispute resolution strategy, must be further studied. 
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Environmental issues are here to stay and environmental mediation is a 
growth industry in the USA and Canada. It is therefore of concern that 
environmental mediation may be seen as a new "quick-fix" solution 
when other processes have failed. If this were the case, it would run the 
risk of being discredited. 
Furthermore, attitudes are not going to change quickly. Tasmania is 
attitudinally conservative and may well be cautious, if not suspicious of 
what could be perceived as a radical new idea. The fact that mediation 
has been successfully used in other states and overseas does not guarantee 
it an enthusiastic reception in Tasmania. 
Perhaps the 1989 Pilots' Dispute has brought home to Tasmanians the 
economic and human costs of prolonged adversarial disputation. Perhaps 
there is an increasing appreciation of the desirability of avoiding the 
development of a litigious mentality as has happened in the United 
States. It is hoped that these experiences and knowledge, together with 
the pattern of cooperation, collaboration and negotiation that is being 
promoted by the current State government, will foster a receptive climate 
for the introduction of environmental mediation. 
From the author's analysis of the literature, and relevant legislation, case 
study material and discussions with government agencies, disputants, 
and members of the judiciary, it is concluded that in order to develop the 
most appropriate system for EDR in Tasmania, it will be necessary to 
consider a combination of mediation and litigation. Opportunities for 
parties to use litigation should remain while mediation is used as an 
alternative to litigation in selected site-specific and public policy disputes 
and as a complement to litigation in the EIA and Approvals Processes. 
CHAPTER 6 
FUTURE DIRECTIONS FOR EDR IN TASMANIA 
6.1 	Introduction 
The author's search for more contemporary and constructive options for 
the resolution of Tasmanian environmental disputes was prompted 
initially by her concern about the social, environmental, and economic 
repercussions of bitter resource management conflicts on local 
communities. This then led to a search for less adversarial alternatives 
to the traditional confrontations, in both Australian and overseas 
literature. 
It rapidly became apparent that there was a dearth of Australian literature 
on EDR, Australian literature and experience being restricted primarily 
to the practice of ADR to resolve community, and more recently 
commercial, disputes. It also became clear that the USA was in the 
forefront of mediation of environmental disputes. However USA 
literature concentrated heavily on the use of mediation as an alternative 
to traditional judicial and administrative processes and to a lesser extent 
on the possibilities and benefits of redesigning existing legislation, policies, 
and decision-making systems processes to incorporate mediation 
opportunities as an integral part of environmental decision-making. 
There is a considerable body of literature on the characteristics of public 
disputes, and on mediation as a process, its techniques and the roles and 
functions of mediators (Folberg and Taylor 1984; Susskind and Cruikshank 
1987; Adler 1987; Moore 1987 and 1989; Carpenter and Kennedy 1988). 
The current level of sophistication on environmental mediation theory, 
appears to have grown out of the use of mediation to resolve site specific 
disputes (Lake 1980; Bingham 1986; Susskind et al. 1983; SussIdnd and 
Cruikshank 1987; and Amy 1987); public policy disputes (Bingham 1986, 
Ehrmann and Lesnick 1980; Amy 1987; Laue 1988) and regulation 
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negotiation (Bingham 1986; Haygood 1988). 
There is evidence that all these types of disputes have been, or are being 
experienced in Tasmania and it appears that mediation could well make 
a positive contribution to environmental dispute resolution in the state, 
cultural and political differences between the USA and Tasmania 
notwithstanding. 
This conclusion is further borne out by the Canadian experience of 
environmental mediation, including the link between mediation and 
the Westminster system of government (Sadler 1986), the incorporation 
of negotiation and mediation into existing ETA, approval and appeals 
processes (Jeffrey 1987), and the development of a system for the resolution 
of wilderness disputes (Rankin 1989). 
In the light of both the USA and Canadian experiences, it is considered 
that there is definite potential for the successful application of mediation 
to the resolution of environmental disputes in Tasmania. The nature of 
the disputes - site specific, data, public policy, and regulation negotiation 
- is comparable and the existing judicial and administrative systems have 
been widely criticized by all parties, members of the judiciary and 
government as being inflexible, fragmented, procedurally oriented and, 
in many cases, unable to address (let alone resolve), the substantive issues 
in dispute. 
The attitudinal conservatism of Tasmania, including in the political 
sphere, the direct and indirect costs of dismantling existing processes, 
and the Canadian experience with the Westminster system, suggest that 
rather than emphasising mediation as an alternative for existing processes, 
there will be more value in looking at the possibility of rationalizing and 
redesigning existing systems. This would achieve a more integrated 
approach to both EDR and environmental decision-making across all 
jurisdictions with a greater likelihood of success, in that it would retain 
the best elements of the "known" while incorporating opportunities for 
negotiation and mediation at strategic points. This would then expand 
the EDR options available to all parties while minimizing the possibility 
of rejection of the "unknown". 
To discard present arrangements in their entirety would be to invite a 
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conservative backlash from government agencies and some of the parties 
in the absence of locally proven alternative approaches. Environmental 
mediation is a little known concept in Australia, let alone in Tasmania 
and education of government, industry, public interest groups, and the 
media in the theory, practice and possibilities of mediation is required as 
a precursor to adoption. To expect Tasmania to embrace environmental 
mediation from a "cold start" would be unrealistic in the wake of its 
experiences with large scale environmental confrontations and its general 
resistance to new ideas from elsewhere. 
6.2 	Proposals for change 
As indicated, Tasmania lacks both a strategic approach to environmental 
decision-making on a statewide basis and an integrated environmental 
dispute resolution system. The relatively small population of the island, 
the centrality of effective resource management to the State's economic 
and social future and the heavy toll taken by environmental disputes, 
make it imperative that a concerted and non-partisan effort is made to 
develop a comprehensive and coordinated strategy for environmental 
decision making and dispute resolution. 
Mant (1989) also proposes a more coordinated approach. He recommends 
the amalgamation of all the legislature dealing with Crown Lands into a 
single Lands Act and the development of a single Approvals Act to 
incorporate all land-use, pollution licensing and other approval 
mechanisms. In addition, Mant proposes a general right of standing for 
members of the public to enable them to restrain breaches of appraisals 
and legislation. 
To implement and administer this legislation, Mant suggests a single 
multidisciplinary land management agency such as the Department of 
Environment and Planning so that all land management and land-use 
activities of the State Government can be brought together under one 
Minister. To keep the Ministry honest, he suggests a public enquiry process 
for developing controls over private land and for categorising public 
lands. As Mant sees it: 
If changes along the lines of the above were made now, Tasmania 
could lead the world in the creation of a truly modern administrative 
and legislative framework for the ecological management of land 
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(1989:8). 
Both the Local Government Act and the Environment Protection Act are 
seriously deficient for the 1990s. The Department of Environment and 
Planning, which has responsibility for the administration of both these 
Acts, supports a legislative review of land-use planning and management 
as do members of the Government, the Green Independents and the 
Liberal Party. 
The Department of Resources and Energy (Mines Division) favours 
deregulation and a single development licence to include mining, 
environmental and planning approvals. It perceives the advantages of 
this approach as being the simplification of the process for the applicant, 
the land owner and third parties. It further recommends that the 
procedures be formalised and incorporated in legislation. 
The Tasmanian Farmers and Graziers Association has now developed a 
policy on land-use planning, primary producers being the largest private 
owners of land in Tasmania. The policy argues the need for the protection 
of the State's rural resource base and its development on a sustainable 
basis; the need for responsible land-use planning procedures for the 
subdivision of rural land; and the need for Right-to-Farm legislation 
(TFGA 1989). The TFGA policy statement addresses issues of rural 
subdivision, World Heritage listings, the National Estate, the Central 
Plateau, Mining, land capability, and integrated catchment management. 
It is a considered and timely document, the production of which appears 
to be in part a response to the change of State government. The TFGA 
membership has traditionally supported conservative political parties 
such as the Liberal Party and the election of an ALP-Green Accord has 
created some uncertainty about the future security of private agricultural 
land. 
The TFGA Land-Use Policy Statement does however make several 
recommendations for the rationalization of land-use planning appraisal 
and appeals systems which are similar to those proposed by the Mines 
• Division, Mant and the Department of Environment and Planning. It 
proposes the use of land capability assessment as fundamental to any 
approval by local councils, and the creation of what the TFGA has termed 
a "Land Court" comprising representatives from each of Department of 
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Environment and Planning, TFGA, Chamber of Mines, and the (former) 
Town and Country Planning Commission, with an independent 
Chairman (TFGA 1989). 
The author sought clarification from the TFGA on its use of the term 
"Land Court" as its format appeared to be more tribunal than court. This 
was confirmed by the Executive Director TFGA; that is, the intent is an 
administrative tribunal. 
6.3 Tasmanian resource profiles 
Another component of a legislative and administrative rationalization 
should be the development of a comprehensive, central database of the 
State's resources - a Tasmanian resource profile, in which economic, 
social, biophysical and environmental values are determined for each 
resource. 
This cannot be achieved by the current fragmented approach where each 
resource is managed in accordance with its own legislation and by a 
bureaucracy of resource specialists. A significant amount of data is already 
available. For example, the Forestry Commission and the Department of 
Environment and Planning each has a Geographical Information System 
(G.I.S.) and data banks on land management issues specific to each 
jurisdiction. The Department of Primary Industry also intends to acquire 
a G.1.S. for use in land capability assessment of agricultural land. 
Compilation of a state resource profile requires a multidisciplinary 
approach. Resources have traditionally been appraised according to their 
economic value. The evaluation of the social and environmental value 
of a resource is more difficult and would be best achieved through the 
use of multidisciplinary project teams rather than by resource specialists 
working in isolation from one another. Whether these teams are based 
in a centralized, multidisciplinary agency as proposed by Mant (1989), or 
are drawn from existing structures as required, needs further investigation. 
The establishment of composite resource profiles would assist in 
legitimizing social and environmental factors within environmental 
decision making and approval processes. It would also provide baseline 
data which should be accessible to all parties in a dispute and would go 
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some way towards equalising the imbalance of power in environmental 
disputes when information and data is either not available or is not 
accessible to all parties. 
The development of a resource profile as described is a challenge, but an 
achievable challenge. It would provide a baseline for future strategic 
planning in the state. 
The scene is set. There is widespread agreement among industry, public 
interest groups and government that resource management legislation 
and environmental decision-making administrative systems are in need 
of urgent review. What is needed is initiative and creative thinking. 
6.4 Environmental mediation - future prospects 
Provisions for EDR and in particular mediation should be incorporated 
into all legislative and administrative decision-making processes. All 
ElAs and ElSs should contain dispute resolution mechanisms as a pre-
condition for approval. Parties should be able to anticipate that conflict is 
possible at some stage in the development process and so should agree to 
build in dispute resolution procedures to both the EIA and EIS process. 
They should also agree to consider mediation of their differences prior to 
seeking redress by way of litigation. 
The previous chapter confirms the value of mediation at key points in 
both the EIA and Approvals processes. Any new and/or reviewed 
legislation and administrative systems should include provisions for 
mediation as recommended in Chapter 5. 
There should also be provision for the use of mediation as an alternative 
to litigation at the discretion of the parties. For this to become a reality, a 
mediation service must be available and this is best achieved initially 
through a government supported and promoted Office of Public Disputes. 
Environmental mediation could play a leading role in Tasmania's future, 
if only the State is prepared to consider and embrace some new ideas 
which would make it a pacesetter in environmental dispute resolution 
in Australia. Where better to test out the effectiveness of an "idea whose 
time has come" than in a crucible of environmental discontent? 
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6.5 Toward an EDR system for the future 
An idea is one thing, its implementation is another. Tasmania needs an 
integrated environmental dispute resolution system which includes: 
(i) legislative and administrative review and rationalization; 
(ii) a uniform EIA process across all jurisdictions; 
(iii) a uniform Approvals Process across all jurisdictions; 
(iv) an Office of Public Disputes; 
(v) a Land and Environment Tribunal. 
6.5.1 Legislative and Administrative Review and  
Rationalization  
Support for a legislative and administrative review and rationalization 
of resource and land management is well established. The inefficiencies 
and costs of retaining the present multiplicity of resource-specific 
legislative and administrative packages far outweigh their value. It also 
prevents the development of a statewide strategy for resource management 
as the fundamental building block of the State's future. 
Mant's (1989) proposal for a single Lands Act and a single Approvals Act 
encapsulates many of the recommendations made by agencies, industry, 
public interest groups and individuals to the author during the course of 
this thesis. A Lands Act could also include land conservation, land 
capability, and flora and fauna protection guarantees, in addition to land 
-use planning and land management prescriptions. It is envisaged that 
Codes of Practice for land conservation and land management would 
also be developed. 
It would be a brave Minister who endeavoured to include forests and 
mining practices in a single Lands Act, although the Mines Division has 
supported a single approvals process. - A Lands Act could not include sea 
fisheries or marine farm leases or permits. It would, however, control 
their land-based operations. 
178 
The implementation of a single Approvals Act and approvals system for 
all proposed developments would be well received by all parties. Chapter 
5 has identified the commonalities among existing approval processes 
and there are very few differences of any magnitude. It is anticipated that 
support for the concept of an approvals mechanism would be forthcoming 
from groups as diverse as the TFGA, the Chamber of Mines, the Tasmanian 
Conservation Trust and the Tasmanian State Service (although its 
implementation may be more difficult). 
The alternative to a total legislative and administrative rationalization is 
the retention of resource-specific legislation for fisheries, forestry and 
mining while rationalising land-use planning and environmental 
protection in either a Lands and Environment Protection Act, or a Lands 
Act and a separate Environment Protection and Impact Assessment Act. 
This would be less difficult as the Local Government Act and the 
Environment Protection Act are now administered by a single Minister 
and a single Department. 
6.5.2 Standardization of ETA and Approvals Processes 
Irrespective of the legislative rationalization adopted, ETA and Approvals 
Processes and procedures should, and could be, standardized across all 
jurisdictions. Comparisons made in Chapter 4 reveal more similarities 
than differences. 
Standardization would ensure consistency of operation. Provision should 
be made for graded ETA assessments, for example Levels 1, 11 and 111, 
the latter category to accommodate large-scale and complex projects such 
as the Wesley Vale Pulp Mill and the Light Weight Coated Paper project 
at ANM, Boyer. Projects of this scale should be assessed within the usual 
regime rather than dealt with on a case-by-case basis. The ETA and 
Approvals Processes should have sufficient flexibility built into them to 
achieve this. 
The creation of a Tasmanian Resources Assessment Commission as a 
discrete entity to handle ETA and approvals for selected projects should 
not be necessary if a comprehensive and co-ordinated ETA and single 
Approvals Process is in place, as this system would provide for deregulation 
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of the development process without the problems of perceived denial of 
natural justice and inequity that the establishment of a separate TRAC 
could create. 
A Resources Assessment Commission should not be used as "window-
dressing" for "fast-track" legislation as mentioned by Pitt (1988). The 
government always retains the power to legislate the passage of projects 
if it so chooses. If this be the case, it should be prepared to be accountable 
and to publicly defend its actions rather than to hide behind a bureaucratic 
facade. 
The incorporation of EIA and the Approvals processes in legislation, as 
in the EIA Acts of other states, and the single Approvals Act proposed by 
Mant (1989), should be investigated. Providing the legislation allowed 
for resource differences, there would seem to be advantages in ensuring 
that the principles and procedures of EIA and Approvals could be enforced 
for all resource management. EIA and Approvals legislation could also 
apply to fisheries, forestry and mining as well as land-use and 
environmental protection. 
6.5.3 Office of Public Disputes 
The creation of an Office of Public Disputes will address the key deficiency 
in Tasmanian EDR, that is, the lack of an appropriate mechanism or 
framework for the prevention, management and resolution of 
environmental disputes. It will provide a dispute resolution focus for all 
parties, government, industry and the public. 
The TRAC as proposed by Crean (1989) is an attempt to establish such a 
framework. However the TRAC mandate and functions as proposed are 
too restrictive and are focused on assessment rather than on dispute 
resolution. Furthermore it is likely that the TRAC will not have the 
capacity to address a wide range of disputations, but will consider only 
those referred to it, which are likely to comprise current Level 111 projects. 
The mission, functions and two potential institutional locations of an 
Office of Public Disputes were outlined in the preceding chapter. Not 
only would such an office provide a direct dispute-resolution service to 
the EDR system as a whole, but it would be a valuable resource to assist 
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government and industry to design effective dispute resolution systems 
for the prevention of the development of disputes. 
This office will be an essential part of the new EDR system. 
6.5.4 Land and Environment Tribunal 
Evidence suggests that, regardless of whether environmental dispute 
resolution systems are centralized or decentralized, administrative 
tribunals rather than courts are the most appropriate and the preferred 
forums for hearings. 
The establishment of a centralized resource appeals tribunal, a Land and 
Environment Tribunal, would receive widespread support. It would 
address 
the issues of: 
(a) inconsistency and fragmentation of process and procedure across 
jurisdictions by replacing the many judicial and administrative 
processes with a single, centralized tribunal system; 
(b) as an administrative tribunal it would have the potential to 
overcome judicial limitations of rules of evidence, procedural 
inflexibility and the emphasis on private rather than public interest; 
(c) it would obviate the necessity for sequential approval and hearing 
\processes in different jurisdictions; 
(d) as a multi-party tribunal it would overcome the inadequacies of a 
legally qualified person acting alone to resolve resource disputes 
in which he/she has little expertise or experience. (The degree to 
which this objective can be achieved will depend to a large extent 
on the composition of the tribunal.) 
Given the diversity and complexity of environmental issues, including 
the need to incorporate social and economic as well as biophysical impacts, 
a single tribunal would not be feasible. A more effective and efficient 
approach would be: 
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(a) the appointment of several Commissioners to chair tribunals. One 
could be full-time to ensure continuity and- security of supply and 
the remainder could be part-time. Although it would be 
advantageous to have legal expertise on tribunals, it is not always 
essential and there is no reason why persons chairing tribunals 
must be legally qualified. A range of expertise and experience among 
the Commissioners is essential; 
(b) a core of resource specialists and other persons with relevant 
industry and community experience should be established to 
support the Commissioners on tribunals; 
(c) tribunals would be convened as required to hear disputes pertaining 
to the resource in question. The Chairperson and tribunal members 
for a dispute would be selected on the basis of relevant expertise 
and experience; 
(d) tribunal members often have professional expertise and resource 
relevant experience, but in the author's experience, many have 
inadequate communication and dispute resolution skills, which 
should be essential pre-requisites for any person wishing to serve 
on a tribunal. 
The Office of Public Disputes could sponsor the training of tribunal 
members in dispute resolution skills as required; 
(e) The Land and Environment Tribunal would also act as a point of 
referral to the Office of Public Disputes for parties at the point of 
impasse and for whom mediation may be an option. This would 
provide an effective liaison of the adversarial and non-adversarial 
systems so that they could work in a complementary and mutually 
beneficial manner. 
The development of an integrated EDR system is essential, timely and, 
most importantly, it would be in response to a proven need as identified 
by industry, the public and government agencies. All parties have been 
critical of traditional adversarial systems for reasons of their propensity 
to polarize and exacerbate issues and emotions in a dispute; their inability 
to resolve substantive issues; the high costs of litigation; and the lengthy 
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approval and hearing processe-s% 
It is time to change from a fragmented, adversarial system to an integrated 
and essentially non-adversarial EDR system as a prelude to a more 
collaborative approach to environmental decision-making and dispute 
resolution in the 1990s and beyond. 
6.6 EDR systems options 
In the author's opinion there are three structural options for a Tasmanian 
EDR system. There are advantages and disadvantages associated with 
each. Some of the components are constant and some are variable. The 
options are: 
6.6.1 A centralized EDR system to include:  
(a) a Lands Act; 
(b) an Environmental Impact Assessment Act (or an Environment 
Protection and Impact Assessment Act); 
(c) a single Approvals Act; 
(d) an Office of Public Disputes; 
(e) a Land and Environment Tribunal. 
6.6.2 A  decentralized EDR system to include: 
(a) retention of existing resource-specific legislation; 
(b) uniform ETA processes (with or without an ETA Act); 
(c) uniform Approvals Processes (with or without an Approvals Act); 
(d) an Office of Public Disputes; 
(e) retention and/or creation of resource-specific decentralized 
administrative tribunals. 
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6.6.3 A "combination" EDR system to indude: 
(a) retention of resource-specific legislation; 
(b) uniform EIA process (with or without an EIA Act); 
(c) uniform Approvals process (with or without an Approvals Act); 
(d) an Office of Public Disputes; 
(e) a Land and Environment Tribunal. 
As indicated, there are a number of components common to each system, 
each of which has been discussed in detail in the preceding section. 
The common elements of each of these options are: 
(a) a uniform EIA process across all jurisdictions; 
(b) a uniform Approvals Process across all jurisdictions; 
(c) an Office of Public Disputes to provide an alternative process to 
litigation in the resolution of disputes; 
(d) administrative tribunals. 
The systems vary on the issue of whether existing resource-specific 
legislation and appeals processes are retained or whether a rationalized 
and a centralized system of land-use and environmental legislation, 
including a Land and Environment Tribunal, is adopted. 
All systems warrant further investigation so that the advantages and 
disadvantages of each can be evaluated. It is imperative that industry and 
the community are able to input to this process. Nevertheless, the final 
decision will no doubt be made by Cabinet, following considerable 
bureaucratic and Ministerial negotiation. 
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It is however recommericle_d that an integrated EDR system be established 
to incorporate the following: 
(i) Review and rationalization of environmental legislation, in 
particular that relating to all aspects of land-use planning and land 
management; 
(ii) Introduction of a uniform EIA process supported by legislation if 
necessary and enforceable across all jurisdictions; 
(iii) Introduction of a single Approvals Act and a uniform approvals 
process for all applications for development irrespective of 
complexity and scale; 
(iv) Creation of an Office of Public Disputes to provide a state-wide 
focus and a mediation service for the resolution of 
public/environmental disputes; 
(v) Creation of a Land and Environmental Tribunal to hear and 
determine all land-use and environmental disputes that proceed 
to a hearing; 
It is only by having an integrated system of equitable, accessible and 
accountable processes for the resolution of environmental disputes that 
Tasmania will be able to keep pace with the potentially negative 
consequences of resource development in the State. 
6.7 Conclusion 
The 1990s will be a decade of challenges, not the least of which will be the 
juxtaposition of the economic rationalism of the 1980s with the 
environmental demands of the nineties in the lives of "ordinary people". 
The past decade has seen the environmental awakening of middle-
Australia to the point where policies on environmental issues are major 
determinants of electoral success. It is predicted that the 1990s will see a 
further extension of this environmental renaissance, within industry 
and the population generally. 
• Whatever sceptics may say about their motives, corporations are now 
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making a concerted effort to ensure that their development proposals 
take account of environmental impacts to a greater degree than has been 
the case in the past. These changes in corporate consciousness can be 
attributed to a combination of factors - increased environmental protection 
legislation; litigation by public interest groups; increased public pressure 
and the use of confrontationist strategies to ensure minimum impact 
development; and powerful media coverage of high profile disputes in 
picturesque locations. The costs of this era of confrontation, both direct 
and indirect, have been enormous for government, industry and the 
public. As a consequence, there is increasing support from all sectors, 
including members of the judiciary, for more effective ways of preventing 
and resolving complex and costly environmental disputes as society strives 
for sustainable development as the solution to resource management 
issues. 
The catchcry of the 1990s will undoubtedly be sustainable development, a 
coat of many colours, whose cloth will undoubtedly be cut to suit the 
wearer. Regardless of how "sustainable development" is interpreted in 
Tasmania, environmental conflicts and disputes will continue as parties 
endeavour to reconcile diminishing resources with the maintenance of a 
technologically-oriented and affluent lifestyle and an increasing 
population. 
A review of the literature revealed that most of the writings on 
environmental mediation have been published since the mid 1970s, 
although alternative dispute resolution (ADR) techniques have been an 
integral part of traditional decision-making in some Asian and South 
American countries for centuries. ADR has also been in formal use in 
the USA since the early twentieth century for the resolution of labour-
management, community justice and social issues. 
The use of mediation and other non-adversarial techniques in the 
resolution of environmental disputes is, therefore, relatively recent. Most 
of the literature is North American in origin, principally from the USA. 
The late 1970s saw a more gradual development of EDR processes in 
Canada than had been witnessed in the USA. Canadian writers attribute 
this more cautious approach to differences in the political systems of the 
two countries and the lack of comparable objection and appeals systems 
in the USA, so that parties have no option but to resort to mediation as 
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an alternative hilitigation. In Canada, on the other hand, there seem to 
be greater opportunities for mediation to effectively complement litigation 
as part of the impact assessment and approvals processes. It is also available 
as alternative to litigation. 
Comparisons can most readily be made between the Canadian and 
Tasmanian scenarios, both having a Westminster system of government, 
a judicial system based on the common law, and similar environmental 
decision-making and dispute resolution judicial andY administrative 
mechanisms. It is therefore conceivable that the development of 
environmental mediation in Tasmania is likely to more closely 
approximate the rather cautious and complementary approach of Canada, 
than that of the USA where mediation is more often used as an alternative 
to, rather than as a complement of, litigation. 
In the absence of any literature on the use and potential of environmental 
mediation in Australia, this study breaks new ground and provides a 
benchmark for the future. As a minor coursework thesis, it has been 
necessary to set boundaries and the dimensions of the study have of 
necessity been restricted to the identification of mediation opportunities 
within existing judicial and administrative decision-making systems and 
recommendations for future directions for Tasmania as outlined in the 
objectives of the study. 
This has meant that, among other things, that the penetration of politics 
into EDR has not been able to be fully addressed. Clearly the influence of 
intergovernmental, intragovernmental, interdepartmental, and other 
politics will have a significant influence on the potential for success of 
the mechanisms and processes proposed.. 
The thesis has also identified a number of issues associated with the 
development and use of environmental mediation which warrant further 
study, in particular the evaluation of the effectiveness and efficiency of , 
environmental mediation as a non-adversarial alternative to litigation 
in the Australian context. The professionalization of mediators and the 
institutionalization and funding of mediation services to ensure their 
availability, continuity and neutrality also need further examination. 
Perceptions of mediation as second-rate justice need to be investigated in 
anticipation of an anti-mediation backlash from the legal and planning 
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professions which have traditionally been the mainstay of environmental 
law. Finally, the major issue of the politics of environmental mediation 
as a reactionary, or at least conservative, phenomenon in environmental 
politics must be more thoroughly analysed, following as it does in the 
wake of the mediation euphoria of the 1980s. 
The focus of this thesis has been environmental dispute resolution in 
Tasmania, however the concepts and recommendations are readily 
transferable to environmental dispute resolution systems and scenarios 
elsewhere in Australia. There remains a lot of work to be undertaken - a 
Pandora's box of doctoral theses - but it is hoped that the demonstrated 
potential of mediation as a proven, non-adversarial process for the 
resolution of environmental disputes will go some way towards 
encouraging a more cooperative and collaborative transition to the twenty 
first century. 
APPENDIX I 
ENVIRONMENTAL DECISION MAKING SYSTEMS 
The definition of a system depends on who defines it - a public administrator, 
physical or social scientist, or lawyer - and how and why it is defined. For 
example, the Macquarie Dictionary (1985) states that a system is: 
an assemblage or combination of things or parts forming a complex or 
unitary whole. 
On the other hand, Buc.kly in Metcalf (1977: 35) defines a system as: 
A complex of elements or components directly or indirectly related in a 
causal network, such that each component is related to at least some 
others in a more or less stable way within any particular period of time. 
Environmental decision making systems are essentially anthropocentric decision 
making systems which focus on environmental matters or issues - environment 
being broadly defined to include political, economic, social, cultural, and biophysical 
factors. 
Environmental decision making systems are open rather than closed systems; 
they are dynamic, and process oriented, and their formal and informal components 
are interrelated and interdependent. It is these interrelationships that constitute 
the structure of the system (Buckly in Metcalf 1977). 
The dynamic and interrelated nature of such systems means that a decision 
taken in relation to any one component of the system, will impact on other 
components or subsystems of the whole. For example, Environmental Impact 
Assessments, approvals, objections, and appeals can be considered as components 
of subsystems of a larger environmental decision making system - that is, they 
are all subsystems of a larger system, such as land use planning. 
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Traditionally, environmental decision making- systems comprise a judicial 
framework enshrined in legislation, administered by a bureaucracy which 
interprets and implements the legislation, and directed and supported by a public 
policy process to formulate policy options. The public service/bureaucracy is 
central to any environmental decision making system as it is charged with 
managing public goods, such as a resource, in the public interest. 
However as Davis et al. 1988 note: 
Although Australian systems of government are based on the Westminster 
system which sets up lines of decision making and implementation via 
public servants, ministers and parliament   the fragmentation of the 
state makes it difficult to identify a single decision making process (1988: 
107). 
Environmental decision making systems are also subsystems of both State and 
Federal systems of government and decision making and while there are 
commonalities among them, and they are interdependent and interrelated in 
land use planning and management, they remain resource specific. The resulting 
fragmentation and sequential nature of decision making supports the comments: 
government decision making tends to be fragmented, ad hoc and sequential 
(Davis et al. 1988: 81). 
In fact, a fundamental flaw in environmental decision making at both State and 
at Federal levels is that environmental decision making systems are resource 
focused and promote duplication and fragmentation rather than an integrated 
approach to environmental decision making. Such a decision making 
environment must therefore be conducive to, rather than preventative of, the 
development and escalation of environmental disputes. 
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